IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-30173
Summary Calendar
BERNICE P. FRANK, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
BERNICE P. FRANK, Individually & on behalf of Quinton Frank,
on behalf of Brandon Frank,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
POLICE DEPARTMENT CITY OF EUNICE; ET AL.,
Defendants,
CITY OF EUNICE; BRUCE VIGE, Officer; PAT GREEN, Officer,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 98-CV-731
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December 14, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Bernice P. Frank appeals the district court’s summary judgment
dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Frank alleged that
Officer Bruce Vige, Officer Pat Green, and the City of Eunice
violated the constitutional rights of her deceased daughter,
Sabrina Frank, by unlawfully arresting her, unlawfully
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
incarcerating her, and denying her medical treatment during her
incarceration as a pretrial detainee. Frank contends that the
district court erred in determining that Officer Vige was entitled
to qualified immunity. Frank also contends that the district court
abused its discretion by denying a continuance of the summary
judgment proceedings.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the
same criteria that the district court employed. See
Olabisiomotosho v. Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999). We
view the facts and any inferences to be drawn in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Id. “Summary judgment is properly
granted if `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id.;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Frank contends that Officer Vige’s failure to conduct a proper
accident investigation resulted in the wrongful arrest and
incarceration of Sabrina Frank. Frank contends that Officer Vige
was not entitled to qualified immunity and that summary judgment
was improper because there were disputed issues of fact concerning
whether Officer Vige had sufficient information to arrest and
detain Sabrina Frank.
We review a claim of qualified immunity by asking first,
whether the plaintiff has asserted the violation of a “clearly
established constitutional right.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
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226, 231-32 (1991). If so, we decide whether the defendant’s
conduct was “objectively reasonable in light of the legal rules
clearly established at the time of the incident.” Jones v. City of
Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 2000)(citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In evaluating a claim of illegal arrest,
“the qualified immunity determination turns on whether a reasonable
officer could have believed the arrest to be lawful, in light of
clearly established law and the information the officer possessed.”
Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)(internal
quotations, brackets, and ellipsis omitted). A defendant is
entitled to the qualified immunity defense against a § 1983 claim
for false imprisonment “if he acted on the basis of a reasonable,
good faith belief that the detention was lawful.” Douthit v.
Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980).
It is uncontested that when Officer Vige arrived on the
accident scene, Sabrina Frank was alone, appeared intoxicated, and
was lying near the truck. A reasonable officer could have
believed, under the circumstances, that an arrest for driving while
intoxicated and without a license was lawful. See Babb, 33 F.3d at
477. The defendants presented competent summary judgment evidence
supporting Officer Vige’s contention that Sabrina Frank had been
driving the vehicle. The district court did not err in determining
that Officer Vige’s conduct was objectively reasonable and that he
was entitled to qualified immunity.
Frank contends that she presented evidence that the conduct of
Officers Vige and Green amounted to deliberate indifference to
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Sabrina Frank’s medical needs. Frank asserts that the district
court disregarded proof that Sabrina Frank requested and required
medical treatment while she was in the Eunice Jail, that Officer
Vige did not inform Officer Green of Sabrina Frank’s discharge
orders, and that no one monitored Sabrina Frank’s condition.
To establish a constitutional violation in a case involving a
pretrial detainee complaining of an episodic act or omission by an
individual defendant, “the plaintiff must establish that the
official(s) acted with subjective deliberate indifference.”
Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d at 526 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). The individual defendant must actually know of the risk
of harm and act with deliberate indifference to the risk. See Id.
at 528.
Frank did not show that Officers Vige and Green knew that
Sabrina Frank’s condition was serious. She had been examined by a
physician over a two-hour period and discharged with no documented
injuries and with instructions to return if necessary. Although
Frank presented evidence that Sabrina Frank moaned, cried, and
called for help, no evidence was presented that the officers knew
of the seriousness of her condition and acted with deliberate
indifference to the risk of harm. The district court did not err
in granting summary judgment on the medical treatment claims
against the individual defendants.
Frank alleged liability for Sabrina Frank’s arrest and denial
of medical treatment against the City of Eunice based on city
policies that permit officers to arrest individuals who do not have
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a driver’s license, the failure to require the presence of a jail
warden after 4:30 p.m., and the failure to have medically trained
personnel available for overnight detainees. To establish
liability under § 1983 against a municipality, a plaintiff must
show (1) that a municipal employee acted with subjective deliberate
indifference to violate clearly established constitutional rights;
and (2) “that the municipal employee’s act resulted from a
municipal policy or custom adopted or maintained with objective
deliberate indifference to the [plaintiff]’s constitutional
rights.” Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d at 526, 528-29. Because Frank
was unable to establish a § 1983 violation attributable to Officer
Vige and Officer Green, her claims against the City of Eunice also
fail. The district court properly granted summary judgment on the
claims against the City of Eunice.
Finally, Frank contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying a continuance on the summary judgment motion
so that she could obtain additional deposition testimony. We will
not disturb the district court’s decision to deny a motion for a
continuance absent an abuse of discretion, and we will affirm the
denial of a continuance on a summary judgment motion “unless it is
arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.” Transamerica Ins. Co. v.
Avenell, 66 F.3d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 1995). Frank has not shown
that the district court’s denial of a second continuance on the
motion for summary judgment was an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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