IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-30432
Summary Calendar
JO ANN WILLIAMS, Individually,
on behalf of Willie E. Williams’ Estate,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MIDWEST EMPLOYERS CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants.
CAMPBELL E. WALLACE,
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
March 8, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is an interlocutory appeal of sanctions ordered under
Rule 11 and the inherent power of the court. Because the sanctions
order is neither a final judgment nor a reviewable collateral
order, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I
This case arose out of a state law workers’ compensation
claim. In 1989, Willie Williams brought a claim against Spartech
Films for workers’ compensation. Spartech Films had an excess
indemnity policy issued by Midwest Employers Casualty Company
(“Midwest”). In 1991, Spartech’s workers’ compensation payments to
Mr. Williams ceased. Mr. Williams later received a default
judgment against Adams Plastics, Inc., from the Louisiana Office of
Workers’ Compensation. Adams Plastics did not pay the judgment.
In 1997, Mr. Williams brought a direct action against Midwest
as the insurer of Adams Plastics to collect his default judgment.
Midwest removed to federal court, where it then filed third-party
demands against Spartech Films and Adams Plastics, alleging that
they failed to comply with the terms of their policies. Mr.
Williams died in 1998, and Jo Ann Williams (“Williams”) substituted
in his place as plaintiff.
On June 7, 1999, Magistrate Judge Karen Hayes mediated a
settlement between Williams and Midwest. After hours of
negotiation, the parties drafted and signed a “Memorandum of
Settlement Agreement” that included arrangements for payments by
Midwest to Williams and assignments of rights by Williams to
Midwest. Over the next month and a half, revised versions of the
settlement agreement passed between the parties as disputes over
the meaning of the agreed-to settlement intensified. During this
time, Williams did not receive her insurance money from Midwest,
even though Louisiana law requires an insurer “to pay a settlement
2
within thirty days after an agreement is reduced to writing,”1 and
even though Wallace, in a letter to the court, had stated that
Midwest had tendered the funds to Williams.
On July 28, 1999, Williams filed a motion to enforce
settlement and for sanctions. In addition to levying sanctions
against Midwest, Magistrate Judge Hayes, citing various
misrepresentations made by Wallace to Williams and the court,
recommended sanctioning Wallace. The District Court, Judge Robert
G. James, ordered Wallace to show cause “why monetary sanctions
should not be imposed against him in this case pursuant to Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Court’s inherent
powers.” After briefing, Judge James sanctioned Wallace in the
amount of $1,500.
Wallace appealed.
II
As a general rule, the federal Courts of Appeals have
jurisdiction only over appeals from “final decisions of the
district courts.”2 A decision is not final unless “it ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment.”3 In the case before us, no final judgment
has been entered; Midwest’s litigation continues.
1
See La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1220(A)(2) (2000).
2
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
3
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999)
(internal quotations omitted).
3
Nor is the sanctions order itself an appealable final
decision. Click v. Abilene National Bank4 held that sanctions
orders are not themselves appealable final decisions, nor are they
appealable collateral orders.5
Two subsequent cases created two exceptions to the rule
announced by Click: Markwell v. County of Bexar6 held that if the
sanctioned attorney has withdrawn from the case, he may appeal; and
Chavez v. M/V Medina Star7 held that if the party represented by
the sanctioned attorney is no longer party to the case, the
attorney may appeal. Neither exception applies here. Wallace
continues to represent Midwest. And although Williams (apparently)
has settled with Midwest, Midwest still has third-party claims
pending against its insureds. We have no jurisdiction over this
appeal.
III
Because we find that neither Markwell nor Chavez applies here,
we need not consider whether those decisions survive the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Cunningham v. Hamilton County.8
4
822 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1987).
5
Click applied this rule to sanctions levied under Rule 11,
Rule 37, or 28 U.S.C. § 1927, finding no reason to differentiate
between these types of sanctions. Id. at 545.
6
878 F.2d 899, 901 (5th Cir. 1989).
7
47 F.3d 153, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1995).
8
527 U.S. 198 (1999).
4
Cunningham held that a Rule 37 sanctions order is not an appealable
final decision nor an appealable collateral order. Cunningham
emphasized that the appealability of a sanctions order should not
“turn on the attorney’s continued participation.”9 Cunningham
rejected the notion that an attorney’s withdrawal from involvement
in a case renders a sanction order against the attorney appealable.
It is therefore doubtful that the exceptions to Click created by
Markwell and Chavez survive Cunningham.10
The appeal is DISMISSED.
9
Id. at 209.
10
Although Cunningham involved Rule 37, rather than Rule 11,
sanctions, Click refused to distinguish between types of sanctions.
Click, 822 F.2d at 545.
5