UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 00-30056
In Re: JOSEPH W. THOMAS,
Appellee.
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JOSEPH W. THOMAS,
Appellee,
VERSUS
COOPER/T. SMITH STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC.,
Movant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
(99-CV-1672-B)
February 22, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges, and FISH*, District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
*
District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company (“Cooper”) appeals from an
order entered by the district court, Judge Ivan L. R. Lemelle
presiding, which denied Cooper’s motion for sanctions, costs, and
attorneys’ fees against Joseph W. Thomas, Esquire (“Thomas”), who
had prosecuted an allegedly frivolous action against Cooper before
the Department of Labor. The motion for sanctions was presented to
the district court by referral from an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 18.29(b).
Thomas originally filed and prosecuted a claim on behalf of
six alleged dependents of James Thomas, Sr. (no relation to
Appellee), seeking death benefits under the Longshore and
Harborworkers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
Thomas employed the services of one of his new associates, Pauline
Feist, to handle the case. On December 8, 1998, the ALJ assigned
to the case granted summary judgment against three of the
claimants. Thomas was provided an opportunity to develop evidence
of dependency with respect to the remaining three claimants. At
trial, and after arriving late, Thomas behaved belligerently and
discourteously toward both his opposing counsel and the ALJ. And
the evidence presented at trial by Cooper conclusively established
that in fact the three remaining claimants were adults, fully
capable of supporting themselves at the time of their father’s
death. Shortly after the trial, and after researching the
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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dependency issue himself, Thomas attempted to voluntarily dismiss
his clients’ claim, but the ALJ instead granted Cooper’s second
motion for summary judgment.
Following the grant of summary judgment, the ALJ, clearly
upset by Thomas’s unprofessional conduct, referred the question of
whether sanctions should be imposed against Thomas to the district
court. The ALJ did so pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 18.29(b), which
permits referral of the issue of sanctions to the district court in
light of the fact that the ALJ has no authority to impose sanctions
itself. See, e.g., Boland Marine & Mfg. v. Rihner, 41 F.3d 997,
1002 (5th Cir. 1995). Cooper attempted to intervene in the
sanctions referral in order to request its attorneys’ fees for
defending an allegedly frivolous claim, but the district court
denied intervention as the issue of attorneys’ fees was not
presented as part of the ALJ’s referral, and intervention was,
thus, premature. The district court ultimately remonstrated Thomas
and ordered him to attend five hours of CLE training on
professionalism.
The ALJ issued a second referral for sanctions to the district
court, this time specifically addressing Cooper’s request for
attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In its factual findings,
the ALJ concluded that there was no factual basis for the
dependency claims presented by Thomas on behalf of any of the six
claimants, and the ALJ concluded that the claims were frivolous
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from inception. According to the ALJ, Thomas “knowingly”
prosecuted six baseless claims. The district court conducted a
hearing on Cooper’s motion and ultimately concluded in a brief
written order that sanctions were not warranted “under the facts of
this case.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court
noted its familiarity with Thomas’s reputation as an attorney based
on twenty years of association. Additionally, the district court
concluded, inter alia, that it was unwilling to conclude that
Thomas “knowingly” prosecuted baseless claims.
As a preliminary matter, we note that we have supplemented the
record of this case with the second order of referral by the ALJ,
which the district court clearly considered and relied upon. With
respect to the issue before us, that is, whether the district court
erred in refusing to impose sanctions against Thomas for
prosecuting allegedly frivolous claims, having carefully reviewed
the entire record of this case and having fully considered the
parties’ respective briefing on the issue in this appeal, we find
no basis for concluding that the district court abused the broad
discretion conferred upon it in deciding whether to impose
sanctions. Section 1927 specifically provides that an attorney
may be subject to sanctions for the excess costs and attorneys’
fees when the attorney “so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously.” If Thomas’s conduct rose to such a
level, we have consistently held that even where a district court
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finds bad faith, it may exercise its equitable discretion and
refrain from imposing sanctions. See Warren v. Reserve Fund, Inc.,
728 F.2d 741, 748 (5th Cir. 1984). Finding no compelling basis for
disturbing the district court’s exercise of its equitable
discretion, we therefore AFFIRM the order of this district court
for the reasons stated both in its order and at the hearing on
Cooper’s motion for sanctions.
AFFIRMED.
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