UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-31182
Summary Calendar
LAWRENCE THIBODEAUX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF OPELOUSAS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 97-CV-1290
February 14, 2001
Before POLITZ, JOLLY, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Lawrence Thibodeaux appeals the dismissal of his claims against the City of
Opelousas for discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et al., and
for violation of fifth amendment due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
BACKGROUND
Thibodeaux was a police officer employed by the City of Opelousas. On June
27, 1996, while off-duty and intoxicated he was involved in an automobile accident.
He fled the scene, leaving his police revolver in the abandoned vehicle. Shortly
thereafter, in the early morning hours, he entered a private residence, went into the
bedroom, startled the occupants, and identified himself as a police officer responding
to a 911 call. As a result, the City conducted a pre-disciplinary hearing and ultimately
terminated his employment. Thibodeaux appealed this decision to the Opelousas Fire
and Police Civil Service Board, the Louisiana 27th Judicial District Court, and the
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate court found that Thibodeaux
was terminated in good faith for just cause and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his
application for a writ of certiorari.
Thibodeaux filed the instant action in June of 1997. The district court issued a
stay pending final judgment in the previously filed state court proceedings. After this
stay was lifted the defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging res judicata. The
district court denied this motion, finding that the state court proceedings concerned only
whether plaintiff was dismissed in good faith and for just cause. The defendants then
successfully moved for summary judgment as to the claims under the Rehabilitation
Act. In its order, the district court requested that the parties review the recently issued
2
opinion in Weekly v. Morrow to determine if that opinion applied to plaintiff’s § 1983
claims. After briefing, the court issued a memorandum ruling stating that Weekly
prohibited the court from hearing the plaintiff’s due process claims. The defendants
then moved for summary judgment as to the remaining § 1983 claim. This motion was
granted and Thibodeaux appealed.
ANALYSIS
We review de novo the grant of a motion for summary judgment.2 A review of
the briefs and record in the case at bar persuades that the district court correctly
dismissed the plaintiff’s claims under both the Rehabilitation Act and § 1983.
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation
Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he has a disability; (2) he is an individual
qualified for the job in question; (3) an adverse employment decision was made
because of his disability; and (4) he or she was replaced by a non-disabled person or
was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees.3 The plaintiff devotes much
of his brief to his assertion that alcoholism is construed as a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act. We need not address this contention, however, because, even
2
Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957 (5th Cir. 1999).
3
Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 136 F.3d 1047 (5th Cir. 1998).
3
assuming that the plaintiff had a disability under the act, he cannot met the third prong
of this analysis: showing that an adverse employment decision was made because of
his disability. There was a binding final determination made in the state court
proceedings that Thibodeaux was terminated in good faith and for just cause. As the
Sixth Circuit appropriately stated in Maddox v. University of Tennessee:
[There is a] distinction between discharging someone for unacceptable
misconduct and discharging someone because of a disability. . . . To hold
otherwise, an employer would be forced to accommodate all behavior of
an alcoholic which could in any way be related to the alcoholic’s use of
intoxicating beverages; behavior that would be intolerable if engaged in
by a sober employee, or for that matter, an intoxicated but non-alcoholic
employee.4
Thibodeaux fails to make the required prima facie showing under the Rehabilitation
act. His disability claims were properly dismissed.
Thibodeaux also asserts a due process claim under § 1983, contending that the
City denied him due process when it initially terminated him without notice and
opportunity to respond. Although the City did fail to provide proper notice to the
plaintiff prior to his first termination, they promptly rescinded that termination and
instituted proceedings for termination, giving him both a pre-determination hearing and
post-termination relief. In fact, Thibodeaux had notice of and participated in review
of his claim from the pre-determination hearing through the state court of appeals. The
4
62 F.3d 843, 847 (6th Cir. 1995).
4
district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff was given an exhaustive review with
full notice. Thibodeaux received full procedural due process.
Thibodeaux additionally claims that his substantive due process rights were
violated. This contention also fails. In Schaper v. City of Huntsville,5 we held that
the availability of a post-termination hearing is an important factor in determining
whether a plaintiff’s substantive due process rights were violated. Thibodeaux was
given both a post-determination hearing and full review by subsequent state courts. No
more was required.
Finally, we agree with the district court that Thibodeaux’s due process claim is
merely a request that we overturn the state decision and reinstate him with back pay.
As we have recently noted in Weekly v. Morrow,6 such a request is equal to asking
the district court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the state court decision. Under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,7 district courts have no power to review, modify or
nullify final state court determinations. Therefore, dismissal of this claim was also
appropriate.
5
813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1987).
6
204 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2000).
7
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
5
The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.
6
Thibodeaux v. City of Opelousas
Combined Opinion