FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 21 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HARPREET SINGH THIND, No. 05-76886
Petitioner, Agency No. A078-638-211
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
HARPREET SINGH THIND, No. 06-72711
Petitioner, Agency No. A078-638-211
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Submitted April 16, 2010 **
San Francisco, California
Before: ARCHER, CALLAHAN and BEA, Circuit Judges.***
Harpreet Singh Thind (“Thind”), petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”)
order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Thind contends that the BIA and
IJ erred in finding that he failed to present a credible claim. Thind also seeks
review of the BIA’s subsequent order denying his motion to reconsider, reopen and
remand, arguing that the BIA abused it discretion when it dismissed his motion
based on issues he raised in regard to the translation of his hearing.1 We deny the
petition and motion to reopen because none of Thind’s contentions are persuasive.
First, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s credibility determinations. Li v.
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2004) (an adverse credibility determination
will be upheld where the inconsistencies go to the heart of the asylum claim).
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Senior United States Circuit
Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we repeat
them here only as necessary to the disposition of this case.
2
Thind contends that each of the IJ’s inconsistency findings were either in error or
were minor inconsistencies that did not go to the heart of his claim. However,
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Thind’s testimony was
inconsistent or incredible. In particular, the IJ’s finding that Thind was unable to
demonstrate a rudimentary knowledge of the Akali Dal Mann’s political activities
was an adverse credibility finding that went to the heart of his claim because
Thind’s claims are based on his religious and political activities and opinion
related to his participation in the Akali Dal Mann. Id. Numerous other
discrepancies – e.g., the dates Thind attended schools and the five-day difference
between his testimony and his father’s affidavit – even if minor when considered
on their own, cumulatively support the IJ’s decision. Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d
738, 742 (9th Cir. 2007); Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005).
In sum, these inconsistencies undermine the basis for Thind’s asylum claims and
support the IJ’s credibility determination. Li, 378 F.3d at 962.
Second, Thind contends that the IJ violated his right to due process by
admitting insufficiently authenticated documents – specifically, his father’s
affidavit – for the purpose of impeachment. Due process violation allegations are
reviewed de novo. Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 377 (9th Cir.
2003). To prevail, Thind must show “prejudice – that his rights were violated in a
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manner so as potentially to affect the outcome of the proceedings.”
Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation and
citation omitted). Thind, however, offers no cogent argument for why it was
improper for the IJ to use a document that Thind himself had submitted. Also,
despite Thind’s contention, the record does not reflect that the IJ rejected his
testimony in favor of his father’s. Rather the record shows that the IJ merely noted
a discrepancy between the dates given in Thind’s testimony and the date listed in
Thind’s father’s affidavit. Thind has therefore failed to show the requisite
prejudice necessary to succeed on his claim. Id.
Thind’s final contention is that the IJ’s oral rendering of her decision was
not “simultaneously translated” for him and that this error justifies reopening his
case. The BIA’s decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is
discretionary. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The court reviews the BIA’s denial of
motions to reopen for abuse of discretion. Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176,
1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Thind’s motion as Thind did
not raise the “simultaneous translation” issue either before the IJ or on appeal to
the BIA and offers no excuse for not doing so. Id. However, even if we were to
consider the merits of Thind’s contention, he offers no cogent argument for why
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simultaneous translation was required or even what the basis of his complaint is.
The record reflects that when the IJ issued her oral decision, a Punjabi-speaking
interpreter was present. Nothing in Thind’s briefing to this court or in the record
of the proceedings suggests that Thind misunderstood or challenged the translation
provided by the interpreter as the IJ rendered her decision, or that Thind thereafter
discovered any errors in the translation. Thind has therefore failed to show how
BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen was “arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.”
Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
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