PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 09-4219
GREGORY YOUNG BOWLES, a/k/a
New York,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.
Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(1:04-cr-00170-MBS-1)
Argued: March 24, 2010
Decided: April 23, 2010
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Agee and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Katherine E. Evatt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appel-
lant. James Chris Leventis, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED
2 UNITED STATES v. BOWLES
STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appel-
lee. ON BRIEF: W. Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
OPINION
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
Gregory Bowles pled guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm and the district court sentenced him to 188
months imprisonment. Bowles now appeals his conviction
arguing the court erred by ordering him to be forcibly medi-
cated to render him competent to stand trial. Because we find
that Bowles has waived his right to challenge the forcible
medication order, we dismiss the appeal.
I.
The government indicted Bowles on several drugs and
weapons charges, including being a felon in possession of a
firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After his initial court
appearance, the district court granted Bowles’ unopposed
motion to have a psychiatric evaluation conducted. Thereaf-
ter, he was diagnosed with a "persecutory type" of delusional
disorder and antisocial personality disorder. Consequently, the
district court found him incompetent to stand trial and com-
mitted him for treatment. Over the course of approximately
four years, the district court held several hearings regarding
Bowles’ competency and the proper psychiatric treatment
methods needed for Bowles. Eventually, the court granted the
government’s motion and ordered Bowles to be forcibly med-
icated to render him competent to stand trial. Bowles did not
seek an interlocutory appeal of the forcible medication order.
Thereafter, Bowles was rendered competent and pled guilty
pursuant to a written plea agreement to one count of being a
UNITED STATES v. BOWLES 3
felon in possession of a firearm. The district court conducted
a Rule 11 colloquy and in accepting his plea found that he
was "fully competent and capable of entering an informed
plea [and] that his plea of guilty is a knowing and voluntary
plea." J.A. 235. The court imposed a sentence of 188 months
imprisonment. Bowles now seeks to appeal the forcible medi-
cation order and have his conviction vacated.
II.
A plea of guilty "represents a break in the chain of events
which has preceded it in the criminal process." Tollett v. Hen-
derson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Accordingly, we have held
that "[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all nonjuris-
dictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to entry
of the plea." United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 644 (4th
Cir. 2004). Indeed, relying on these principles, we recently
held in United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),
that a "defendant who has pled guilty has no non-
jurisdictional ground upon which to attack that judgment
except the inadequacy of the plea, or the government’s power
to bring any indictment at all."
Here, Bowles seeks to reopen his judgment of conviction
upon his guilty plea on a nonjurisdictional issue – the forcible
medication order. However, as the foregoing authorities make
clear, such a course of action is not permitted. We note that
Bowles could have preserved this issue through an interlocu-
tory appeal. See e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176
(2003) (finding review of the district court’s forcible medica-
tion order is proper as an interlocutory appeal under the "col-
lateral order" doctrine because it "(1) conclusively
determine[s] the disputed question, (2) resolve[s] an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and
(3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg-
ment") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d
4 UNITED STATES v. BOWLES
806, 812 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d
227, 235 (4th Cir. 2005). Further, Bowles could have
attempted to negotiate a conditional plea, see Fed. R. Crim.
Proc. 11(a)(2), or he could have proceeded to trial, which
would also have preserved this issue for our review. Because
Bowles did not take these necessary steps, he has waived his
right to appeal the forcible medication order.* Accordingly,
we dismiss his appeal.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we find Bowles’ argument
waived and dismiss the appeal.
DISMISSED
*We ordered supplemental briefing on the waiver issue. In his supple-
mental brief and at oral argument, Bowles argued for the first time that his
guilty plea was not voluntary or competent. We find this argument is
waived. See United States v. Jones, 308 F.3d 425, 427 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002)
(holding that an argument not raised in the opening brief is waived). In
any event, we find these arguments are not supported by the record.