IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-50888
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LORENZA RUIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(EP-00-CR-196-1-H)
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May 28, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Lorenza Ruiz appeals her jury-trial
conviction for making a materially false statement about a matter
within the jurisdiction of a government agency, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001. She contends that there was insufficient evidence
to establish that her admittedly false statement to a United States
Customs Service Inspector that she owned the car she was driving
into the United States was material to a function of the Customs
Service.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
To be “material” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a statement
must have “a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of
influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it
was addressed.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). “Deciding whether a
statement is ‘material’ requires the determination of at least two
subsidiary questions of purely historical fact: (a) ‘what statement
was made?’ and (b) ‘what decision was the agency trying to make?’
The ultimate question: (c) ‘whether the statement was material to
the decision,’ requires applying the legal standard of materiality
. . . to these historical facts.” Id. at 512.
With respect to what statement was made, Ruiz admits that she
falsely stated to Customs Inspector Omar Fournier that she owned
the car she was driving into the United States. With respect to
what decision the agency was trying to make, Ruiz complains that
the government failed to present evidence regarding the statutory
or regulatory functions assigned to the Customs Service. This
complaint gains her naught. Although determination of what
decision the Customs Service was trying to make at the time of
Ruiz’s statement falls within the province of the jury or fact-
finder, see id. at 512, the actual function of the Customs Service
is a purely legal issue and thus not one that would have been
decided by the jury, see id. at 511-15.
The district court correctly and properly instructed the jury
that the Customs Service has jurisdiction to decide whether a
person or vehicle may be legally permitted to enter the United
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States. In light of this jury instruction and Inspector Fournier’s
testimony that it is important for the Customs Service to identify
vehicle ownership to detect vehicles carrying narcotics and stolen
vehicles, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that at the time Ruiz made the statement in question, the
Customs Service was trying to decide whether Ruiz and the vehicle
she was driving could be legally permitted to enter the United
States. See United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 543 (5th
Cir. 1998).
Finally, with respect to the issue whether the statement was
material to the agency’s function and decision, Ruiz asserts that
Inspector Fournier’s testimony established only that Ruiz’s
statement was capable of affecting Inspector Fournier’s own
subjective concept of his duties. This too is unavailing. Customs
Inspector Fournier’s testimony that he may conduct a less rigorous
inspection of a vehicle apparently driven by its owner supports his
more general testimony that it is important for the Customs Service
to identify vehicle ownership in connection with detecting whether
vehicles are stolen and thereby detect drug smugglers, who
typically do not drive their own cars. Based on this testimony, a
rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ruiz’s false statement regarding ownership of the vehicle she was
driving into the United States was at least capable of influencing
the Customs Service’s decision regarding whether she and her
vehicle could be legally permitted to enter the United States. See
id.
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For the foregoing reasons, Ruiz’s conviction is
AFFIRMED.
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