Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy

07-0016-cv
The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2
3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
4
5 August Term, 2008
6
7
8 (Argued: January 12, 2009 Decided: October 2, 2009)
9
10 Docket No. 07-0016-cv
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
13
14 THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SUDAN,
15 REV. MATTHEW MATHIANG DEANG,
16 REV. JAMES KOUNG NINREW, NUER
17 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT SERVICES IN U.S.A,
18 FATUMA NYAWANG GARBANG, NYOT TOT RIETH,
19 individually and on behalf of the estate
20 Of her husband JOSEPH THIET MAKUAC,
21 STEPHEN HOTH, STEPHEN KUINA, CHIEF
22 TUNGUAR KUEIGWONG RAT, LUKA AYUOL YOL,
23 THOMAS MALUAL KAP, PUOK BOL MUT, CHIEF
24 PATAI TUT, CHIEF PETER RING PATAI, CHIEF
25 GATLUAK CHIEK JANG, YIEN NYINAR RIEK AND
26 MORIS BOL MAJOK, on behalf of themselves
27 and all others similarly situated,
28
29 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
30
31 -v.- 07-0016-cv
32
33 TALISMAN ENERGY, INC.,
34
35 Defendant-Appellee,
36
37 REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN,
38
39 Defendant.
40
41 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
42
1 Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, LEVAL and CABRANES,
2 Circuit Judges.
3
4 Appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of

5 Talisman Energy, Inc. (“Talisman”) on Plaintiffs-Appellants’

6 claims under the Alien Tort Statute. The United States

7 District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cote,

8 J.) held that to establish accessorial liability for

9 violations of the international norms prohibiting genocide,

10 war crimes, and crimes against humanity, plaintiffs were

11 required to prove, inter alia, that Talisman provided

12 substantial assistance to the Government of the Sudan with

13 the purpose of aiding its unlawful conduct. We agree, and

14 affirm dismissal on the ground that plaintiffs have not

15 established Talisman’s purposeful complicity in human rights

16 abuses.

17 PAUL L. HOFFMAN, Schonbrun
18 DeSimone Seplow Harris &
19 Hoffman, Venice , CA (Adrienne J.
20 Quarry, Schonbrun DeSimone
21 Seplow Harris & Hoffman, Venice ,
22 CA; Carey D’Avino, Stephen
23 Whinston, and Keino Robinson,
24 Berger & Montague, P.C.,
25 Philadelphia, PA; Lawrence Kill,
26 John O’Connor, and Stanley
27 Bowker, Anderson Kill & Olick,
28 P.C., New York, NY; Daniel E.
29 Seltz, Steven E. Fineman, and
30 Rachel Geman, Lieff, Cabraser,
31 Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, New

2
 1 York, NY on the brief), for
2 Plaintiffs-Appellants
3
4 MARC J. GOTTRIDGE (Joseph P.
5 Cyr, Scott W. Reynolds, Andrew
6 M. Behrman, on the brief),
7 Lovells, New York, NY, for
8 Defendant-Appellee
9
10 RALPH STEINHARDT , Professor of
11 Law, George Washington
12 University Law School,
13 Washington, DC (William J.
14 Aceves, Professor of Law,
15 California Western School of
16 Law, San Diego, CA, on the
17 brief) for Amici Curiae
18 International Law
19 Scholars in Support of
20 Appellants
21
22 RICHARD L. HERZ (Marco B.
23 Simons, on the brief),
24 Earthrights International,
25 Washington, DC, for Amicus
26 Curiae Earthrights International
27 in Support of Plaintiffs-
28 Appellants and Reversal
29
30 Judith Brown Chomsky and Michael
31 Poulshock, Law Office of Judith
32 Brown Chomsky, Elkins Park, PA,
33 and Jennifer M. Green and
34 Katherine Gallagher, Center for
35 Constitutional Rights, New York,
36 NY, for Amicus Curiae on Civil
37 Conspiracy and Joint Criminal
38 Enterprise in Support of
39 Plaintiffs-Appellants and in
40 Support of Reversal of the
41 District Court’s Opinion
42
43 Terrence P. Collingsworth, Derek
44 Baxter, and Natacha Thys,

3
 1 International Labor Rights Fund,
2 Washington, DC, for Amicus
3 Curiae International Labor
4 Rights Fund in Support of
5 Plaintiffs-Appellants
6
7 Mark Diamond, Counsel for Amici
8 Curaie, New York, NY, for Amici
9 Curiae Lexiuste Cajuste, Neris
10 Gonzalez, Zenaida Velásquez
11 Rodriguez, and Francisco
12 Calderon in Support of
13 Plaintiffs-Appellants Urging
14 Reversal
15
16 Renee C. Redman, Legal Director,
17 American Civil Liberties Union
18 Foundation of Connecticut,
19 Hartford, CT, for Amici Curiae
20 Canadian Parliamentarians in
21 Support of the Appellants
22
23 Jonathan W. Cuneo and R. Brent
24 Walton, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca,
25 LLP, Washington, DC, for Amici
26 Curiae The Rt. Reverand Keith L.
27 Ackerman, SSC, Bishop, Diocese
28 of Quincy, the Episcopal Church;
29 Christian Solidarity
30 International-USA; Coalition for
31 the Defense of Human Rights;
32 Family Research Council;
33 Institute on Religion &
34 Democracy; Renew Network;
35 Servant’s Heart; Sudan Advocacy
36 Action Forum; Sudan Sunrise; and
37 Trinity Presbytery’s Sudan
38 Ministry in Support of
39 Appellants
40
41 LEWIS S. YELIN, Attorney,
42 Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
43 U.S. Department of Justice,
44 Washington, DC (Michael J.

4
 1 Garcia, United States Attorney,
2 and David S. Jones, Assistant
3 United States Attorney, Southern
4 District of New York, New York,
5 NY, John B. Bellinger III, Legal
6 Advisor, Department of State,
7 Washington, DC, Jeffrey S.
8 Bucholtz, Acting Assistant
9 Attorney General, and Douglas N.
10 Letter and Robert M. Loeb,
11 Attorneys, Appellate Staff,
12 Civil Division, U.S. Department
13 of Justice, Washington, DC, on
14 the brief), for Amicus Curiae
15 United States
16
17 SAMUEL ESTREICHER, NYU School of
18 Law, New York, NY (Michael D.
19 Ramsey, University of San Diego
20 School of Law, San Diego, CA on
21 the brief), for Amici Curiae
22 Professors of International Law,
23 Federal Jurisdiction and the
24 Foreign Relations Law of the
25 United States in Support of
26 Defendant-Appellee
27
28 Karen M. Asner and Milana
29 Salzman, White & Case LLP, New
30 York, NY, for Amicus Curiae the
31 Government of Canada in Support
32 of Dismissal of the Underlying
33 Action
34
35 Robin S. Conrad and Amar D.
36 Sarwal, National Chamber
37 Litigation Center, Inc.,
38 Washington, DC, and John
39 Townsend Rich, Paul R. Friedman,
40 and William F. Sheehan, Goodwin
41 Proctor LLP, Washington, DC for
42 Amicus Curiae the Chamber of
43 Commerce of the United States of
44 America in Support of Defendant-

5
 1 Appellee Talisman Energy, Inc.
2 and in Support of Affirmance
3
4 Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A.
5 Samp, Washington Legal
6 Foundation, Washington, DC for
7 Amici Curiae Washington Legal
8 Foundation and Allied
9 Educational Foundation in
10 Support of Defendant/Appellee,
11 Urging Affirmance
12
13 James J. Dillon, Foley Hoag LLP,
14 Boston, MA, Janet Walker,
15 Professor of Law, Osgood Hall
16 Law School of York University,
17 Toronto, Ontario, Canada, and H.
18 Scott Fairley, Theall Group LLP,
19 Toronto, Ontario, Canada, for
20 Amici Curiae the Canadian
21 Chamber of Commerce; the Mining
22 Association of Canada; the
23 Canadian Association of
24 Petroleum Producers; and the
25 Prospectors and Developers
26 Association of Canada in Support
27 of Defendant-Appellee
28
29 James J. Dillon, Foley Hoag LLP,
30 Boston, MA, for Amici Curiae The
31 National Foreign Trade Council;
32 The Independent Petroleum
33 Association of America; and The
34 United States Council for
35 International Business in
36 Support of Defendant-Appellee
37
38 Christopher Greenwood, CMG, QC,
39 Essex Court Chambers, London,
40 United Kingdom, for Amicus
41 Curiae Professor Christopher
42 Greenwood, CMG, QC, in Support
43 of Defendant-Appellee
44

6
 1 James Crawford, Whewell
2 Professor of International Law,
3 University of Cambridge,
4 Cambridge, United Kingdom, for
5 Amicus Curiae Professor James
6 Crawford in Support of
7 Defendant-Appellee
8
9
10 DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge:
11
12 Plaintiffs-Appellants are Sudanese who allege that they

13 are victims of human rights abuses committed by the

14 Government of the Sudan in Khartoum (“the Government”) and

15 that Talisman Energy, Inc. (“Talisman”), a Canadian

16 corporation, aided and abetted or conspired with the

17 Government to advance those abuses that facilitated the

18 development of Sudanese oil concessions by Talisman

19 affiliates. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the United

20 States District Court for the Southern District of New York

21 (Cote, J.) dismissing their claims under the Alien Tort

22 Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

23 We hold that under the principles articulated by the

24 United States Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542

25 U.S. 692 (2004) , the standard for imposing accessorial

26 liability under the ATS must be drawn from international

27 law; and that under international law, a claimant must show

28 that the defendant provided substantial assistance with the

7
1 purpose of facilitating the alleged offenses. Applying that

2 standard, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

3 judgment in favor of Talisman, because plaintiffs presented

4 no evidence that the company acted with the purpose of

5 harming civilians living in southern Sudan.

6 It becomes necessary to set out at some length the

7 background of the hostilities in the Sudan; the history of

8 the oil enterprise, its facilities and corporate structure;

9 the security measures taken by the enterprise and by the

10 Government; the injuries and persecutions alleged; and the

11 extent and nature of Talisman’s connection to the human

12 rights abuses.

13

14 BACKGROUND

15 A. Civil War in the Sudan

16 At the time Sudan obtained its independence from

17 Britain and Egypt in 1956, civil war broke out between the

18 Arab-dominated Islamic regime in the north, and the non-

19 Muslim African population in the south.1 In 1972, the two

1
The facts are set forth in detail in the district
court’s summary judgment decision. See Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 641-
61 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) . We recount only those facts that bear
upon the disposition of the appellate issues.
8
1 sides reached a power-sharing agreement in Addis Ababa,

2 Ethiopia, after which relative stability ensued until an

3 anti-Government uprising in 1983.

4 In 1991, southern rebels fractured, and the factions

5 fought the Government and each other, with large-scale

6 displacement and death among civilians.

7 In April 1997, the Government signed the Khartoum

8 Peace Agreement (“KPA”) with several (but not all) of the

9 southern rebel groups. The KPA provided for religious

10 freedom, a cease-fire, sharing of resources and power

11 between the north and south, creation of a “Coordinating

12 Council” of factions in southern Sudan, and the

13 consolidation of most of the rebel militias into the South

14 Sudan Defense Force (“SSDF”), which was aligned with the

15 Government, but with a measure of autonomy and control in

16 the south. The benefits of this agreement were short-lived:

17 the SSDF split into warring factions by 1998, and competing

18 militia groups continued fighting each other and the

19 Government. This violence continued throughout the time

20 that Talisman operated in the Sudan.

21 B. Oil Development in the Sudan

22 After Chevron discovered oil in southern Sudan in 1979,

9
1 the Government granted development rights to foreign

2 companies for six numbered “blocks.”

3 In August 1993, a Canadian company named State

4 Petroleum Company (“SPC”) purchased the rights to develop

5 blocks 1, 2, and 4. In 1994, SPC was acquired by, and

6 became a wholly owned subsidiary of, another Canadian

7 company, Arakis Energy Corporation (“Arakis”).

8 In December 1996, SPC formed a consortium with three

9 other companies: China National Petroleum Corporation

10 (“CNPC”), Petronas Carigali Overseas SDN BHD (“Petronas”),

11 and Sudapet, Ltd. (“Sudapet”) (collectively “the

12 Consortium”), which were wholly owned by China, Malaysia,

13 and the Republic of the Sudan, respectively. The Consortium

14 members signed agreements among themselves and with the

15 Government concerning oil exploration, production, and

16 development, as well as the construction of a pipeline from

17 the Consortium’s concession area to the Red Sea. More than

18 half of the Consortium’s profits accrued to the Government.

19 The Consortium members conducted operations through a

20 Mauritius corporation, called the Greater Nile Petroleum

21 Operating Company Limited (“GNPOC”), which was owned 40% by

22 CNPC, 30% by Petronas, 25% by SPC, and 5% by Sudapet.

10
1 C. Talisman’s Purchase of Arakis

2 In October 1998, Talisman acquired Arakis and its 25%

3 stake in GNPOC. The purchase of Arakis was effectuated

4 through Talisman’s indirect subsidiary, State Petroleum

5 Corporation B.V., which was later renamed “Talisman (Greater

6 Nile) B.V.” (“Greater Nile”) on December 10, 1998. Greater

7 Nile was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Goal

8 Olie-en-Gasexploratie B.V., which at the time was wholly

9 owned by British companies. The British companies were

10 wholly owned subsidiaries of Talisman Energy (UK) Limited,

11 which was a direct and wholly owned subsidiary of Talisman.

12 Before purchasing Arakis, Talisman engaged in several

13 months of due diligence: meetings between senior Talisman

14 executives and governmental and security officials in the

15 Sudan; conversations with GNPOC employees and visits to

16 GNPOC development sites; reports on security conditions in

17 the country; roundtable discussions in Canada with

18 representatives of non-governmental organizations, church

19 groups, and other stakeholders; and consultations with

20 representatives of the British government, which controlled

21 the Sudan in condominium with Egypt from 1899 to 1956.

22 Among their many meetings, Talisman CEO Jim Buckee and

11
1 other Talisman officers met with Riek Machar (“Machar”),

2 then the First Assistant to the President of the Sudan and

3 head of the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council (“SSCC”) and

4 the SSDF. Sudanese officials, including Machar and Unity

5 State Governor Taban Deng Gai, provided assurances

6 concerning safety, security, and peace.

7 Robert Norton, the head of security for Arakis in the

8 Sudan from 1994 to 1998, advised Talisman that the oil

9 fields were protected both by the military and by

10 Government-sponsored militias. Norton opined that, though

11 Talisman’s assistance would greatly advance oil exploration,

12 it would tip the military balance in favor of the

13 Government. Norton believed that Talisman should not invest

14 in the Sudan.

15 A representative of Freedom Quest International also

16 discouraged Talisman from investing in the Sudan, warning

17 senior Talisman officials that GNPOC and the Government used

18 the Sudanese military to expel civilian populations from

19 villages in order to create a “cordon sanitaire” (“buffer

20 zone”) around oil fields.

21 D. Security Arrangements for GNPOC

22 Because GNPOC’s operations took place amidst civil war,

12
1 security arrangements were made for Consortium personnel in

2 coordination with the Government and military forces.

3 Plaintiffs contend that these arrangements resulted in the

4 persecution of civilians living in or near the oil

5 concession areas.

6 In May 1999, GNPOC and the Government built all-weather

7 roads traversing the oil concession areas and linking the

8 concessions to military bases. To protect GNPOC’s employees

9 and equipment, these roads served the dual purposes of

10 moving personnel for oil operations and facilitating

11 military activities. According to plaintiffs, these roads

12 enabled the military to operate year-round in areas prone to

13 seasonal flooding, enhancing the military’s ability to

14 launch attacks.

15 In 1999-2000, GNPOC upgraded two airstrips in the

16 concessions--Heglig and Unity--for the safety and

17 convenience of GNPOC personnel. The improvements also had

18 the effect of supporting military activity, because the

19 Government began using the airstrips to supply troops, take

20 defensive action, and initiate offensive attacks.

21 Heglig, in particular, was used extensively by the

22 military. Talisman employees saw outgoing flights by

13
1 helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers. One Talisman

2 security advisor observed 500-pound bombs being loaded on

3 Government-owned Antonov bombers at Heglig and regular

4 bombing runs from the airstrip. At both Heglig and Unity,

5 GNPOC personnel refueled military aircraft, sometimes with

6 GNPOC’s own fuel.

7 During the time that Greater Nile was a member of the

8 Consortium, it employed former soldiers as security advisors

9 who traveled throughout the concession areas, coordinated

10 with Mohammed Mokhtar (the former Sudanese Army colonel who

11 served as head of GNPOC security), and wrote detailed

12 reports for senior Talisman officials.2

13 Talisman CEO Buckee was aware of the military’s

14 activities from GNPOC airstrips. In February 2001, he wrote

15 to Sudanese Minister of National Defense Major General Bakri

16 Hassan Saleh urging restraint in the Government’s military

17 activities and warning that whatever “the military

18 objectives may be, the bombings are [universally] construed

2
Talisman argues that security reports prepared for
Greater Nile are inadmissible because of “multiple levels of
hearsay lurking” in the documents and the absence of a
hearsay exception allowing for their admission. We do not
reach this question, because even assuming the reports would
be admissible in their entirety, they would not defeat
summary judgment.
14
1 as violations of international humanitarian law.” Greater

2 Nile employees expressed concern to Mokhtar and Government

3 officials about bombers and helicopter gunships using the

4 airstrips.

5 Notwithstanding occasional breaks, the military

6 continued to use the facilities. After a missile attack on

7 the Heglig facility in August 2001, Buckee dropped his

8 objection to the presence of helicopter gunships, and a

9 Greater Nile security officer wrote to the Government

10 emphasizing the need for security at GNPOC’s facilities.

11 E. Buffer Zone Strategy

12 At the heart of plaintiffs’ complaint is the allegation

13 that the Government created a “buffer zone” around GNPOC

14 facilities by clearing the civilian population to secure

15 areas for exploration. Witness testimony and internal

16 Talisman reports show evidence of forced displacement. For

17 example, a 2002 Greater Nile report describing the “buffer

18 zone” around the Heglig camp explained that “[t]he remaining

19 nomads . . . are being ‘encouraged’ to complete their move

20 through the area as soon as possible. The area within the

21 security ring road while not a sterile area as found on

22 security operations elsewhere . . . is moving in that

15
1 direction.” A 1999 security report stated that “[t]he

2 military strategy, driven it appears by the GNPOC security

3 management, is to create a buffer zone, i.e. an area

4 surrounding both Heglig and Unity camps inside which no

5 local settlements or commerce is allowed.”

6 F. Greater Nile Inquiry into Expanding its Exploration Area

7 Greater Nile explored options for drilling new wells

8 within GNPOC’s concession, but outside the small area

9 secured by the military in which production was ongoing.

10 Greater Nile considered expanding exploration

11 notwithstanding its knowledge of the Government’s buffer

12 zone strategy. According to plaintiffs, decisions about

13 where to explore “were based upon technical analysis of

14 geological formations performed by Talisman employees in

15 Calgary,” without regard to the human consequences of

16 expansion.

17 G. Plaintiffs’ Injuries

18 The individual plaintiffs remaining in the case consist

19 of current or former residents of southern Sudan who were

20 injured or displaced by Government forces in attacks on

21 communities in Blocks 1, 2, and 5A. The plaintiffs were

22 subjected to assaults by foot soldiers, attackers on

16
1 horseback, gunships, and bombers. They testified at

2 depositions, with varying degrees of certainty, as to

3 whether the attacks were perpetrated by the Government.

4 The Presbyterian Church of Sudan asserts claims based

5 on the destruction of its churches by the Government.

6 Plaintiffs Rev. James Koung Ninrew, Chief Tunguar Kueigwong

7 Rat, and Chief Gatluak Chiek Jang testified to seeing

8 churches burned in the Government’s attacks.

9 H. Procedural History

10 In November 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and

11 four individual plaintiffs purporting to represent a class

12 of thousands of southern Sudanese filed a complaint against

13 Talisman in the United States District Court for the

14 Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs filed an amended

15 complaint in February 2002 naming additional plaintiffs and

16 adding the Government as a defendant. Plaintiffs’ amended

17 complaint alleged that Talisman (1) directly violated, (2)

18 aided and abetted the Government of Sudan in violating, and

19 (3) conspired with the Government of Sudan to violate

20 customary international law related to genocide, torture,

21 war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Plaintiffs

22 subsequently abandoned the claim of direct liability and

17
1 elected to proceed against Talisman only on the claims of

2 aiding and abetting and conspiracy.

3 1. Talisman’s Motions to Dismiss

4 The case was initially assigned to Judge Allen

5 Schwartz. In March 2003, Judge Schwartz issued a lengthy

6 decision denying Talisman’s motion to dismiss on numerous

7 jurisdictional grounds. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.

8 Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

9 The case was reassigned to Judge Denise Cote after

10 Judge Schwartz died in March 2003. Plaintiffs filed a

11 Second Amended Class Action Complaint in August 2003, which

12 added plaintiffs. 3

13 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa, and our

14 decision in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d

15 233 (2d Cir. 2003), defendants moved for judgment on the

16 pleadings arguing that the decisions changed the landscape

17 for ATS claims and required reconsideration of the

18 conclusions that [i] corporations can be liable for

19 violating the ATS, and [ii] accessorial liability is

3
On August 27, 2004, after the submission of relevant
discovery, the district court again denied a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ.
9882(DLC), 2004 WL 1920978 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004).

18
1 recognized under the ATS. By decision dated June 13, 2005,

2 the district court denied Talisman’s motion. Presbyterian

3 Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d

4 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

5 Talisman again moved for judgment on the pleadings

6 based on a letter from the United States Attorney, with

7 attachments from the Department of State and Embassy of

8 Canada expressing concern with the litigation. Presbyterian

9 Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ.

10 9882(DLC), 2005 WL 2082846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005).

11 The Department of State advised that “considerations of

12 international comity and judicial abstention may properly

13 come into play” in view of Canada’s objections to the

14 litigation and the United States government’s determination

15 that Canadian courts were capable of adjudicating

16 plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at *2. Canada argued that the

17 court’s exercise of jurisdiction [i] infringed on its

18 sovereignty, [ii] chilled its ability to use “trade support

19 services as ‘both a stick and carrot in support of peace,’”

20 and [iii] violated traditional restraints on the exercise of

21 extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. at *1-2.

22 In August 2005, the district court denied Talisman’s

19
1 motion. Id. at *9. As to dismissal on comity grounds, the

2 court found an insufficient nexus between Canada’s foreign

3 policy and the specific allegations in the complaint because

4 the litigation did not require judging Canada’s policy of

5 constructive engagement with the Sudan, but “merely” judging

6 “whether Talisman acted outside the bounds of customary

7 international law while doing business in Sudan.” Id. at

8 *5-8. The court also observed that Canadian courts are

9 unable to consider civil suits for violations of the law of

10 nations. Id. at *7.

11 As to dismissal on political question grounds, the

12 court emphasized that the State Department letter did not

13 explicitly declare that the lawsuit would interfere with

14 United States policy toward the Sudan or Canada, and the

15 court concluded therefore that exercising jurisdiction would

16 not unduly intrude on the authority of the executive

17 branch. 4 Id. at *8.

4
In 2005, the district court denied two motions for
class certification on the ground that plaintiffs failed to
satisfy the “predominance requirement.” Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 456, 482-85
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882(DLC), 2005 WL 2278076, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 20, 2005). The court explained that all
class members would have to show “that the injuries for
which they are claiming damages were actually caused by [a

20
1 2. Motions to Amend and for Summary Judgment

2 In April 2006, plaintiffs filed a Proposed Third

3 Amended Class Action Complaint. Later that month (before

4 the district court ruled on plaintiffs’ motion), Talisman

5 moved for summary judgment as to all claims. On September

6 12, 2006, the district court granted Talisman’s motion. See

7 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453

8 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

9 The district court first considered whether

10 international law recognized conspiracy liability. The

11 court held that “the offense of conspiracy is limited to

12 conspiracies to commit genocide and to wage aggressive war”

13 and that international law does not recognize the doctrine

14 of liability articulated in Pinkerton v. United States, 328

15 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946). Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453

16 F. Supp. 2d at 663, 665. The court observed that plaintiffs

17 never brought a claim for “wag[ing] aggressive war” and that

Government campaign in the south],” which would require
individual, fact-intensive inquiries, given the numerous
factions of rebel groups and the fog of war. Presbyterian
Church of Sudan, 226 F.R.D. at 482. Moreover, “damages to
class members occurred over more than four years, a
territory of many hundreds of square miles, . . . [and]
through at least 142 separate incidents.” Presbyterian
Church of Sudan, 2005 WL 2278076, at *3.

21
1 they had abandoned their genocide claim. Id. at 665.

2 Nonetheless, the court addressed the genocide claim and held

3 that plaintiffs could not be made liable for a co-

4 conspirator’s conduct solely because that conduct was

5 foreseeable. Id.

6 The district court next considered plaintiffs’ claim

7 that Talisman aided and abetted genocide, war crimes, and

8 crimes against humanity. The court undertook to define the

9 elements of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS, and

10 concluded that they must be derived from international law.

11 The court comprehensively surveyed international law and

12 held that:

13 To show that a defendant aided and
14 abetted a violation of international law,
15 an ATS plaintiff must show:
16
17 1) that the principal violated
18 international law;
19
20 2) that the defendant knew of
21 the specific violation;
22
23 3) that the defendant acted with
24 the intent to assist that
25 violation, that is, the
26 defendant specifically directed
27 his acts to assist in the
28 specific violation;
29
30 4) that the defendant’s acts had
31 a substantial effect upon the
32 success of the criminal venture;

22
1 and
2
3 5) that the defendant was aware
4 that the acts assisted the
5 specific violation.

6 Id. at 668.

7 As to plaintiffs’ genocide claim, the court held that

8 whether or not genocide was taking place, plaintiffs had

9 presented no evidence that Talisman was aware of the

10 genocide, or, if it was, that Talisman intended to further

11 it. Id. at 669-70.

12 As to war crimes and crimes against humanity, the court

13 identified the kinds of “substantial assistance” that

14 Talisman allegedly provided in aid of these violations:

15 “(1) upgrading the Heglig and Unity airstrips; (2)

16 designating areas ‘south of the river’ in Block 4 for oil

17 exploration; (3) providing financial assistance to the

18 Government through the payment of royalties; (4) giving

19 general logistical support to the Sudanese military; and (5)

20 various other acts.” Id. at 671-72.

21 The court determined that the airstrips at Unity and

22 Heglig were owned and operated by GNPOC--not Talisman--and

23 that there was no evidence that Talisman upgraded or

24 improved the airstrips. Id. at 673. Moreover, even if

23
1 plaintiffs could show that Talisman was involved, there is

2 no evidence that it upgraded the airstrips with the

3 intention that the Government would use them for missions

4 that violate human rights. Id. at 674.

5 As to designating areas “south of the river” for

6 exploration, the court determined that preliminary

7 discussions about expanding operations did not violate

8 international humanitarian law and that there was no

9 evidence Talisman was involved in such discussions, let

10 alone that it considered the expansion as a pretext for

11 attacking civilians. Id. at 675.

12 As to Talisman’s payment of royalties to the

13 Government, the court found no admissible evidence of the

14 relationship between oil profits and military spending. Id.

15 Nonetheless, the court assumed the relationship, and held

16 that such payments were not enough to establish liability in

17 the absence of evidence that Talisman “specifically

18 directed” payments to military procurement or that it

19 intended to aid attacks. Id. at 676.

20 As to the construction of all-weather roads and the

21 provision of fuel to the military, the court concluded that

22 the assistance was provided by GNPOC, not Talisman, which

24
1 had a limited presence on the ground. Id. at 676-77.

2 Finally, the court addressed plaintiffs’ allegations

3 that Talisman assisted the Government by “using its

4 community development program as a cover for gathering

5 military intelligence” and by publicly denying knowledge of

6 human rights violations. The court ruled that there was no

7 admissible evidence of the former allegation, and concluded

8 that the latter did not constitute “substantial assistance”

9 in violation of international humanitarian law. Id. at 677.

10 Although not necessary for deciding Talisman’s motion,

11 the court ruled on whether plaintiffs could show that their

12 injuries were caused by attacks initiated from GNPOC

13 airfields, finding that only three plaintiffs were

14 “arguably” attacked with GNPOC assistance, id. at 677, and

15 that there was an absence of admissible evidence as to which

16 Government aircraft flew particular missions, id. at 678.

17 Further, plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint was

18 denied on the ground that plaintiffs could not show good

19 cause to amend three years after the deadline for amendment

20 set forth in the scheduling order. Id. at 680. The court

21 went on, however, to discuss the merits of the amended

22 complaint and whether it could survive a motion for summary

25
1 judgment (given that the discovery period had closed). The

2 court conducted a comprehensive choice of law analysis, and

3 concluded that [i] there was no basis for applying domestic

4 federal law to plaintiffs’ claims against foreign

5 corporations, id. at 681-83, and [ii] plaintiffs could not

6 pierce the corporate veils of Talisman’s subsidiaries or

7 hold GNPOC or the subsidiaries liable on theories of joint

8 venture or agency, id. at 683-89.

9 Having prevailed on summary judgment, Talisman moved

10 for partial judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

11 Procedure 54(b), so that it could achieve finality in the

12 case notwithstanding the Government’s failure to enter an

13 appearance. The district court granted Talisman’s motion

14 and entered judgment in favor of Talisman. See Presbyterian

15 Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ.

16 9882(DLC), 2006 WL 3469542, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2006).

17 This appeal followed.

18

19 DISCUSSION

20 Plaintiffs argue that, in granting summary judgment,

21 the district court drew inferences in favor of Talisman,

22 excluded plaintiffs’ evidence from consideration, and failed

26
1 to hold Talisman responsible for human rights abuses

2 committed by its partners and agents. This Court “review[s]

3 de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,

4 drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving

5 party.” Paneccasio v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d

6 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2008).

7

8 I

9 The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have

10 original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a

11 tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a

12 treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Although

13 the statute was passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,

14 it provided jurisdiction in only one case in its first 170

15 years. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. Invocation of the statute

16 became more frequent after the issuance of Filártiga v.

17 Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), which held “that

18 deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official

19 authority violates universally accepted norms of the

20 international law of human rights, regardless of the

21 nationality of the parties,” and that the ATS “provides

22 federal jurisdiction” over torture claims. Id. at 878. The

27
1 torturer was likened to the pirate and slave trader of old,

2 “an enemy of all mankind.” Id. at 890.

3 Filártiga held “that courts must interpret

4 international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has

5 evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”

6 Id. at 881. At the same time, Filártiga cautioned

7 restraint: “[t]he requirement that a rule command the

8 ‘general assent of civilized nations’ to become binding upon

9 them all is a stringent one.” Id. “It is only where the

10 nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of

11 mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express

12 international accords, that a wrong generally recognized

13 becomes an international law violation within the meaning of

14 the statute.” Id. at 888.

15 In Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), we

16 concluded “that certain forms of conduct violate the law of

17 nations whether undertaken by those acting under the

18 auspices of a state or only as private individuals.” Id. at

19 239. Kadic recognized that claims for genocide and war

20 crimes against individuals could proceed without state

21 action. Id. at 244.

22 In Flores, we surveyed the state of ATS case law and

28
1 engaged in a detailed analysis of the ATS and related

2 principles of international law. Flores distilled three

3 elements required to state a claim under the ATS:

4 “plaintiffs must (i) be ‘aliens,’ (ii) claiming damages for

5 a ‘tort only,’ (iii) resulting from a violation ‘of the law

6 of nations’ or of ‘a treaty of the United States.’” 414

7 F.3d at 242 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350). We again issued a

8 caution: “in determining what offenses violate customary

9 international law, courts must proceed with extraordinary

10 care and restraint.” Id. at 248. The decisive issue in

11 this case is whether accessorial liability can be imposed

12 absent a showing of purpose. To answer this question “‘we

13 look primarily to the formal lawmaking and official actions

14 of States and only secondarily to the works of scholars as

15 evidence of the established practices of States.’” 5 Id. at

5
Flores cited Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which provides that courts
should look to the following sources of international law:

a. international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting
states;

b. international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations;

29
1 250 (quoting United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 103 (2d

2 Cir. 2003)). After a thorough review of these sources,

3 Flores concluded that the alleged prohibition on

4 “intranational pollution” and “rights to life and health

5 [were] insufficiently definite to constitute rules of

6 customary international law.” Id. at 254-55.

7 The United States Supreme Court has analyzed the ATS

8 only once. In Sosa, the Court explained that the ATS “was

9 intended as jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the

10 power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a

11 certain subject,” 542 U.S. at 714, and that “[t]he

12 jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on

13 the understanding that the common law would provide a cause

14 of action for the modest number of international law

15 violations with a potential for personal liability at the

16 time,” id. at 724. Claims “based on the present-day law of

d. subject to the provisions of Article
59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists
[i.e., scholars or “jurists”] of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.

414 F.3d at 251 (italics omitted)(quoting Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993).

30
1 nations” should be recognized only if “accepted by the

2 civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to

3 the features of the 18th-century paradigms” contemporary

4 with enactment of the ATS. Id. at 725.

5 Sosa cited five reasons for courts to exercise “great

6 caution” before recognizing violations of international law

7 that were not recognized in 1789:

8 First, . . . the [modern] understanding
9 that the law is not so much found or
10 discovered as it is either made or
11 created[;] . . . [s]econd, . . . an
12 equally significant rethinking of the
13 role of the federal courts in making
14 it[;] . . . [t]hird, [the modern view
15 that] a decision to create a private
16 right of action is one better left to
17 legislative judgment in the great
18 majority of cases[;] . . . [f]ourth,
19 . . . risks of adverse foreign policy
20 consequences[; and] . . . fifth[,] . . .
21 the lack of a] congressional mandate to
22 seek out and define new and debatable
23 violations of the law of nations.
24
25 Id. at 725-28. Thus, under Sosa, “the determination whether

26 a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action

27 should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of

28 judgment about the practical consequences of making that

29 cause available to litigants in the federal courts.” Id. at

30 732-33.

31 We have applied Sosa in four opinions addressing ATS

31
1 claims. In three of them, we considered whether Sosa

2 permitted recognition of particular offenses. In Vietnam

3 Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517

4 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008), we held that the manufacture and

5 supply of an herbicide used as a defoliant (with collateral

6 damage) did not violate international law: “[i]nasmuch as

7 Agent Orange was intended for defoliation and for

8 destruction of crops only, its use did not violate . . .

9 international norms . . . , since those norms would not

10 necessarily prohibit the deployment of materials that are

11 only secondarily, and not intentionally, harmful to humans.”

12 Id. at 119-20.

13 Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008), held

14 that detention without notice of consular rights (in

15 violation of Article 36(1)(b)(third) of the Vienna

16 Convention on Consular Relations) did not violate a “well-

17 accepted” international law norm. Id. at 208-09. But a

18 divided panel held in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d

19 163 (2d Cir. 2009), “that the prohibition in customary

20 international law against nonconsensual human medical

21 experimentation can[] be enforced through the ATS.” Id. at

22 169.

32
1 In the fourth case--Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank

2 Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007)--we ruled in a per curiam

3 opinion that “in this Circuit, a plaintiff may plead a

4 theory of aiding and abetting liability under the [ATS].”

5 Id. at 260.

6

7 II

8 Plaintiffs assert that Talisman aided and abetted (and

9 conspired with) the Government in the commission of three

10 violations of international law: [i] genocide, [ii] war

11 crimes, and [iii] crimes against humanity. All three torts

12 may be asserted under the ATS. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236 (“[W]e

13 hold that subject-matter jurisdiction exists[, and] that

14 [defendant] may be found liable for genocide, war crimes,

15 and crimes against humanity . . . .”); see also Sosa, 542

16 U.S. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring

17 in judgment)(describing a “subset” of “universally

18 condemned behavior” for which “universal jurisdiction

19 exists,” including “torture, genocide, crimes against

20 humanity, and war crimes”); Flores, 414 F.3d at 244 n.18

21 (“Customary international law rules proscribing crimes

22 against humanity, including genocide, and war crimes, have

33
1 been enforceable against individuals since World War II.”).

2 In Kadic, we defined “genocide” and “war crimes.”

3 Kadic adopted the definition of genocide from the Convention

4 on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

5 art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277

6 (“Genocide Convention”), which defines genocide as:

7 any of the following acts committed with
8 intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
9 national, ethnical, racial or religious
10 group, as such:
11
12 (a) Killing members of the group;
13
14 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm
15 to members of the group;
16
17 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
18 conditions of life calculated to bring
19 about its physical destruction in whole
20 or in part;
21
22 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent
23 births with the group;
24
25 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the
26 group to another group.
27
28 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (quoting Genocide Convention).

29 As to war crimes, Kadic applied the definition from

30 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, which “applies to

31 ‘armed conflict[s] not of an international character’” and

32 requires “‘each Party to the conflict’” to adhere to the

33 following:

34
 1
2 Persons taking no active part in the
3 hostilities . . . shall in all
4 circumstances be treated humanely,
5 without any adverse distinction founded
6 on race, colour, religion or faith, sex,
7 birth or wealth, or any other similar
8 criteria.
9
10 To this end, the following acts are and
11 shall remain prohibited at any time and
12 in any place whatsoever with respect to
13 the above-mentioned persons:
14
15 (a) violence to life and person,
16 in particular murder of all
17 kinds, mutilation, cruel
18 treatment and torture;
19
20 (b) taking of hostages;
21
22 (c) outrages upon personal
23 dignity, in particular
24 humiliating and degrading
25 treatment;
26
27 (d) the passing of sentences and
28 carrying out of executions
29 without previous judgment
30 pronounced by a regularly
31 constituted court . . . .
32
33 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243 (alterations in original)(quoting

34 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

35 Time of War art. 3, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75

36 U.N.T.S. 287). This standard applies to “all ‘parties’ to a

37 conflict--which includes insurgent military groups.” Id.

38 We have never defined “crimes against humanity.” Here,

35
1 the district court adopted a generally serviceable

2 definition, which the parties do not challenge and which we

3 therefore, for purposes of this case, need not evaluate or

4 edit: “[c]rimes against humanity include murder,

5 enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer, torture, rape

6 or other inhumane acts, committed as part of a widespread

7 [or] systematic attack directed against a civilian

8 population.” 6 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d

9 at 670.

10 Talisman does not contest that the enumerated torts are

11 cognizable under the ATS. At issue is whether plaintiffs’

12 claim that Talisman aided and abetted these offenses (and

13 conspired to do them) is actionable under the ATS absent

14 evidence that Talisman acted with the purpose of advancing

15 the abuses, and, if proof of purpose is an element, whether

16 the evidence supports such a finding.

17

18 III

19 There is no allegation that Talisman (or its employees)

6
The district court used the phrase “widespread and
systematic,” but plaintiffs argue that this was error, and
that “and” should be replaced by “or.” (Pls.’ Br. 65). We
assume for purposes of this appeal that plaintiffs’
formulation is correct.
36
1 personally engaged in human rights abuses; the allegation is

2 that Talisman was complicit in the Government’s abuses.

3 That allegation places in issue the standard for aiding

4 and abetting liability under the ATS. 7 This question was

5 presented to a prior panel, which held, in a brief per

6 curiam opinion, that “in this Circuit, a plaintiff may plead

7 a theory of aiding and abetting liability under the [ATS].”

8 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. However, the panel fractured as

9 to the standard for pleading such liability.

10 Judge Katzmann, concurring, was of the view “that a

11 defendant may be held liable under international law for

12 aiding and abetting the violation of that law by another

13 when the defendant (1) provides practical assistance to the

14 principal which has a substantial effect on the perpetration

15 of the crime, and (2) does so with the purpose of

16 facilitating the commission of that crime.” Id. at 277

7
We address aiding and abetting liability--a concept
typically associated with the criminal law--because
customary international law norms prohibiting genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity have “been developed
largely in the context of criminal prosecutions rather than
civil proceedings.” John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d
932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Khulumani, 504 F.3d at
270 n.5 (Katzmann, J., concurring)(“[O]ur case law . . . has
consistently relied on criminal law norms in establishing
the content of customary international law for purposes of
the [ATS].”).
37
1 (Katzmann, J., concurring). Judge Korman noted that (were

2 he not dissenting on other grounds) he would have concurred

3 with Judge Katzmann. Id. at 333 (Korman, J., concurring in

4 part and dissenting in part). Both judges observed that the

5 standard for aiding and abetting liability under the ATS

6 must derive from international law sources. Id. at 268

7 (Katzmann, J., concurring); id. at 331 (Korman, J.,

8 concurring in part and dissenting in part).

9 Judge Hall’s closely reasoned concurring opinion

10 concluded that Sosa’s reliance on international law applied

11 to the question of recognizing substantive offenses, but not

12 to the issue of secondary liability. On that issue, he

13 found that “Sosa at best lends Delphian guidance,” largely

14 in dicta. Id. at 286 (Hall, J., concurring). Citing “a

15 hornbook principle that international law does not specify

16 the means of its domestic enforcement,” id. (internal

17 quotation marks omitted), Judge Hall turned to the

18 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b), which states that

19 the aiding and abetting standard should be [i] knowing [ii]

20 encouragement [iii] that facilitated the substantive

21 violation. Id. at 287-89.

22 The upshot of this split is that notwithstanding the

38
1 agreement of two judges, Judge Katzmann’s view did not

2 constitute a holding and is therefore not binding precedent.

3 In this unusual circumstance, the issue remains live. This

4 opinion draws substantially from Judge Katzmann’s concurring

5 opinion, and adopts his proposed rule as the law of this

6 Circuit.

7 Judge Katzmann began by choosing the source of law that

8 should provide the basis for an aiding and abetting

9 standard. 8 He observed that this Court has “repeatedly

10 emphasized that the scope of the [ATS’s] jurisdictional

11 grant should be determined by reference to international

12 law.” Id. at 269 (Katzmann, J., concurring)(citing Kadic,

13 70 F.3d at 238; Flores, 414 F.3d at 248; Filártiga, 630 F.2d

14 at 887). Similarly, footnote 20 of Sosa, 9 while nominally

15 concerned with the liability of non-state actors, supports

8
Judge Katzmann’s individual opinion contains a
thorough discussion of aiding and abetting principles. This
opinion sets forth only so much of Judge Katzmann’s analysis
as is necessary to provide the context of our holding. For
an extended discussion of the aiding and abetting issue, see
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 268-77 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
9
A consideration related to whether the ATS provides
jurisdiction over a norm is “whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a
private actor such as a corporation or individual.” Sosa,
542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
39
1 the broader principle that the scope of liability for ATS

2 violations should be derived from international law. Id.

3 Judge Katzmann concluded that, while domestic law might

4 provide guidance on whether to recognize a violation of

5 international norms, it cannot render conduct actionable

6 under the ATS. Id. at 270.

7 Judge Katzmann’s research “revealed no source of

8 international law that recognizes liability for aiding and

9 abetting a violation of international law but would not

10 authorize the imposition of such liability on a party who

11 acts with the purpose of facilitating that violation

12 (provided, of course, that the actus reus requirement is

13 also satisfied).” Id. at 277. While liability had been

14 imposed in certain cases under a less-stringent knowledge

15 standard, see, e.g., id. at 277 n.12 (citing Prosecutor v.

16 Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 102(ii)

17 (Feb. 24, 2004)), Judge Katzmann cited Sosa’s requirement

18 that a norm obtain universal acceptance, and adopted the

19 standard set forth in the Rome Statute: “that a defendant

20 may be held liable under international law for aiding and

21 abetting the violation of that law by another when the

22 defendant (1) provides practical assistance to the principal

40
1 which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the

2 crime, and (2) does so with the purpose of facilitating the

3 commission of that crime.” Id. at 277.

4 We agree that Sosa and our precedents send us to

5 international law to find the standard for accessorial

6 liability. Plaintiffs argue that aiding and abetting

7 liability is a matter ordinarily left to the forum country,

8 where (in this venue) the principle is broad and elastic.

9 But such an expansion would violate Sosa’s command that we

10 limit liability to “violations of . . . international law .

11 . . with . . . definite content and acceptance among

12 civilized nations [equivalent to] the historical paradigms

13 familiar when § 1350 was enacted.” 542 U.S. at 732.

14 Recognition of secondary liability is no less significant a

15 decision than whether to recognize a whole new tort in the

16 first place.

17 Thus, applying international law, we hold that the mens

18 rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in ATS

19 actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone. Even if

20 there is a sufficient international consensus for imposing

21 liability on individuals who purposefully aid and abet a

22 violation of international law, see Khulumani, 504 F.3d at

41
1 276 (Katzmann, J., concurring); cf. id. at 333 (Korman, J.,

2 concurring in part and dissenting in part), no such

3 consensus exists for imposing liability on individuals who

4 knowingly (but not purposefully) aid and abet a violation of

5 international law.

6 Indeed, international law at the time of the Nuremberg

7 trials recognized aiding and abetting liability only for

8 purposeful conduct. See United States v. von Weizsaecker

9 (The Ministries Case), in 14 Trials of War Criminals Before

10 the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law

11 No. 10, at 662 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc.

12 1997)(1949)(declining to impose criminal liability on a bank

13 officer who made a loan with the knowledge, but not the

14 purpose, that the borrower would use the funds to commit a

15 crime). That purpose standard has been largely upheld in

16 the modern era, with only sporadic forays in the direction

17 of a knowledge standard. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 276

18 (Katzmann, J., concurring)(noting that some international

19 criminal tribunals have made overtures toward a knowledge

20 standard but that the Rome Statute of the International

21 Criminal Court adopts a purpose standard); see also id. at

22 332-37 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

42
1 part). Only a purpose standard, therefore, has the

2 requisite “acceptance among civilized nations,” Sosa, 542

3 U.S. at 732, for application in an action under the ATS.

4 See generally Flores, 414 F.3d at 248 (“[I]n order for a

5 principle to become part of customary international law,

6 States must universally abide by it.”); see also Yousef, 327

7 F.3d at 92, 105-08; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239; Filártiga, 630

8 F.2d at 888.

9

10 IV

11 Plaintiffs allege that Talisman conspired with the

12 Government to commit human rights abuses and argue that the

13 district court failed to apply conspiracy principles from

14 United States law to violations of international law under

15 the ATS. In particular, plaintiffs urge application of the

16 Pinkerton doctrine, 328 U.S. at 646-47. 10 Whether

17 conspiracy claims are cognizab le under international law is

10
“[U]nder Pinkerton, a defendant may be found ‘guilty
on a substantive count without specific evidence that he
committed the act charged if it is clear that the offense
had been committed, that it had been committed in the
furtherance of an unlawful conspiracy, and that the
defendant was a member of that conspiracy.’” United States
v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 89 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1208 (2d Cir. 1975)).
43
1 a question of first impression in this Circuit.

2 As a matter of first principles, we look to

3 international law to derive the elements for any such cause

4 of action.11 See Sec. III, supra. In so doing, we must

5 distinguish between the inchoate crime of conspiracy (which

6 requires an agreement and overt acts, but no completed deed)

7 and conspiracy as a theory of accessorial liability for

8 completed offenses.

9 As to conspiracy as an inchoate offense, the Supreme

10 Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 610 (2006),

11 that “the only ‘conspiracy’ crimes that have been recognized

12 by international war crimes tribunals (whose jurisdiction

13 often extends beyond war crimes proper to crimes against

14 humanity and crimes against the peace) are conspiracy to

15 commit genocide and common plan to wage aggressive war.”

11
Plaintiffs argue that federal conspiracy law should
apply to ATS claims. See, e.g., Cabello v. Fernandez-
Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying domestic
law to ATS conspiracy claim). Judge Cote rejected that
approach, holding that Sosa required applying international
law. Presbyterian Church, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 665 n.64. We
agree with Judge Cote. Moreover, plaintiffs would fare no
better if we adopted their preferred definition of
conspiracy, because that definition (derived from domestic
law) also requires proof “that . . . [the defendant] joined
the conspiracy knowing of at least one of the goals of the
conspiracy and intending to help accomplish it.” Cabello,
402 F.3d at 1159 (emphasis added).
44
1 Plaintiffs did not plead the waging of aggressive war, and

2 while they did plead genocide, it is pled as a completed

3 offense, not an inchoate one.

4 The analog to a conspiracy as a completed offense in

5 international law is the concept of a “joint criminal

6 enterprise.” See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 611 n.40. Even

7 assuming, without deciding, that plaintiffs could assert

8 such a theory in an ATS action, an essential element of a

9 joint criminal enterprise is “a criminal intention to

10 participate in a common criminal design.” Prosecutor v.

11 Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 206 (July 15,

12 1999)(basing that finding on numerous precedents from

13 criminal tribunals established in the aftermath of Word War

14 II). Therefore, under a theory of relief based on a joint

15 criminal enterprise, plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims would

16 require the same proof of mens rea as their claims for

17 aiding and abetting.

18 In any event, plaintiffs have not established that

19 “international law [universally] recognize[s] a doctrine of

20 conspiratorial liability that would extend to activity

21 encompassed by the Pinkerton doctrine.” Presbyterian Church

22 of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 663.

45
1

2 V

3 Therefore, in reviewing the district court’s grant of

4 summary judgment to Talisman, we must test plaintiffs’

5 evidence to see if it supports an inference that Talisman

6 acted with the “purpose” to advance the Government’s human

7 rights abuses.

8 The district court’s observations are well-considered

9 and apt. “The activities which the plaintiffs identify as

10 assisting the Government in committing crimes against

11 humanity and war crimes generally accompany any natural

12 resource development business or the creation of any

13 industry.” Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d at

14 672. None of the acts was inherently criminal or wrongful.

15 “[T]he plaintiffs’ theories of substantial assistance serve

16 essentially as proxies for their contention that Talisman

17 should not have made any investment in the Sudan, knowing as

18 it did that the Government was engaged in the forced

19 eviction of non-Muslim Africans from lands that held promise

20 for the discovery of oil.” Id. In sum:

21 The plaintiffs essentially argue that
22 Talisman understood that the Government
23 had cleared and would continue to clear
24 the land of the local population if oil

46
 1 companies were willing to come to the
2 Sudan and explore for oil, and that[,]
3 understanding that to be so, Talisman
4 should not have come. They have no
5 evidence that Talisman (or [Greater Nile]
6 or GNPOC) participated in any attack
7 against a plaintiff and no direct
8 evidence of Talisman’s illicit intent, so
9 they wish to argue that Talisman’s
10 knowledge of the Government’s record of
11 human rights violations, and its
12 understanding of how the Government would
13 abuse the presence of Talisman, is a
14 sufficient basis from which to infer
15 Talisman’s illicit intent when it
16 designated areas for exploration,
17 upgraded airstrips or paid royalties.
18
19 Id. at 672-73.

20 Plaintiffs argue that the district court’s analysis was

21 flawed because it assumed that “ordinary development

22 activities cannot constitute aiding and abetting.” This

23 argument misconstrues the district court’s analysis, which

24 does not rely on any categorical or blanket principle

25 precluding liability; rather, the court conscientiously

26 looked at each specific activity to determine if it

27 satisfied the aiding and abetting standard. A de novo

28 review of plaintiffs’ evidence confirms the soundness of the

29 district court’s ruling.

30 As a threshold matter, Talisman did not manage oil

31 operations in the Sudan: its indirect subsidiary Greater

47
1 Nile was a 25% shareholder in GNPOC, the corporation

2 responsible for developing the concessions. The rest of the

3 GNPOC shares were held by entities from China, Malaysia, and

4 the Sudan. This attenuation between the plaintiffs’

5 allegations and the named defendant (the only entity over

6 which the district court had personal jurisdiction) raises

7 knotty issues concerning control, imputation, and veil

8 piercing (among other things). Nevertheless, we will assume

9 for most purposes that plaintiffs could surmount these

10 hurdles; 12 so we proceed to the allegations of aiding and

11 abetting and conspiring to commit human rights abuses.

12 The district court classified four kinds of

13 “substantial assistance” that Talisman provided (or is

14 alleged to have provided) to the Government: “(1) upgrading

15 the Heglig and Unity airstrips; (2) designating areas ‘south

16 of the river’ in Block 4 for oil exploration; (3) providing

17 financial assistance to the Government through the payment

18 of royalties; [and] (4) giving general logistical support to

12
We will also assume, without deciding, that
corporations such as Talisman may be held liable for the
violations of customary international law that plaintiffs
allege. Because we hold that plaintiffs’ claims fail on
other grounds, we need not reach, in this action, the
question of “whether international law extends the scope of
liability” to corporations. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
48
1 the Sudanese military.” 13 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453

2 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72. We take these up one by one.

3 1. Talisman helped build all-weather roads and

4 improved airports, notwithstanding awareness that this

5 infrastructure might be used for attacks on civilians.

6 There is no doubt that roads and airports are necessary

7 features of a remote facility for oil extraction: they are

8 used for transporting supplies, bringing workers to the work

9 site, and assuring evacuation in the event of emergency.

10 There is evidence that Talisman (partially) financed

11 the road-building, from its Calgary headquarters, and helped

12 build other infrastructure, notwithstanding awareness of the

13 Government’s activity. But obviously there are benign and

14 constructive purposes for these projects and (more to the

15 point) there is no evidence that any of this was done for an

16 improper purpose. Consistent with plaintiffs’ effort to

17 show that GNPOC personnel had knowledge of the Government’s

13
The district court also addressed plaintiffs’
allegations that Talisman assisted the Government by “using
its community development program as a cover for gathering
military intelligence” and by publicly denying knowledge of
human rights violations. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453
F. Supp. 2d at 677. Plaintiffs do not raise the former
point on appeal and we agree with the district court that
publicly denying knowledge of abuses is not “substantial
assistance.”
49
1 human rights abuses, plaintiffs adduce evidence that senior

2 Talisman officials protested to the Government and that

3 security reports shared with senior Talisman officials

4 expressed concern about the military’s use of GNPOC

5 airstrips. Since, however, the proper test of liability is

6 purpose (not knowledge), all this evidence of knowledge (and

7 protest) cuts against Talisman’s liability.

8 Even if Talisman built roads or improved the airstrips

9 with the intention that the military would also be

10 accommodated, GNPOC had a legitimate need to rely on the

11 military for defense. It is undisputed that oil workers in

12 that tumultuous region were subjected to attacks: rebel

13 groups viewed oil installations and oil workers as enemy

14 targets; an e-mail from a Talisman employee describes rebel

15 attacks and the placement of mines in work areas; rebels

16 launched a nighttime mortar attack against a Heglig camp

17 where 700 oil workers were living; and in Block 5A the

18 attacks caused that concessionaire (Lundin Oil AB) to close

19 down operations for an extended period. In these

20 circumstances, evidence that GNPOC was coordinating with the

21 military supports no inference of a purpose to aid

22 atrocities.

50
1 2. At one point, Greater Nile was worried that the

2 Government would terminate GNPOC’s concession on lands south

3 of its existing operations unless GNPOC began to exploit

4 them, and consideration was given to an expansion.

5 Plaintiffs contend that this consideration violated

6 international law. However, the evidence shows that this

7 expansion south did not occur during the time any Talisman

8 affiliate was in the Sudan, and contemplation does not

9 amount to “substantial assistance” in violation of

10 international law.

11 3. The royalties paid by GNPOC may have assisted the

12 Government in its abuses, as it may have assisted any other

13 activity the Government wanted to pursue. But there is no

14 evidence that GNPOC or Talisman acted with the purpose that

15 the royalty payments be used for human rights abuses.

16 4. GNPOC provided fuel for military aircraft taking

17 off on bombing missions, and some of the fuel was paid for

18 by GNPOC rather than the Government. This evidence is

19 insufficient to defeat summary judgment for two reasons.

20 First, there is no showing that Talisman was involved in

21 such routine day-to-day GNPOC operations as refueling

22 aircraft. Second, there is no evidence that GNPOC workers

51
1 provided fuel for the purpose of facilitating attacks on

2 civilians; to the contrary, an e-mail from a Talisman

3 employee to his supervisor, which plaintiffs use to show

4 that the military refueled at a GNPOC airstrip, expresses

5 anger and frustration at the military using the fuel.

6 Plaintiffs’ primary argument is that Talisman supported

7 the creation of a buffer zone around its oil fields,

8 understanding that the Government was displacing huge

9 numbers of civilians from oil-rich regions, decimating as it

10 went the population of southern Sudan. As evidence,

11 plaintiffs cite statements in Greater Nile security

12 memoranda, including this one: “[t]he military strategy,

13 driven it appears by the GNPOC security management, is to

14 create a buffer zone, i.e., an area surrounding both Heglig

15 and Unity camps inside which no local settlements or

16 commerce is allowed.”14

17 Plaintiffs repeatedly cite the forced displacement of

18 people from the oil fields, but they do not allege that such

19 displacement in itself is a violation of international law.

14
Talisman argues that this statement (and others
cited by plaintiffs) references an area of 5km and 8km
around the Heglig and Unity camps, respectively, not a zone
covering the entirety of the concession area.

52
1 That is understandable, because a government has power to

2 regulate use of land and resources. Resource extraction in

3 particular is by nature land-intensive: land is needed for

4 exploration and engineering, equipment, rigs or mines,

5 offices and dormitories in remote areas, transportation

6 infrastructure, and so on. Under the best circumstances,

7 these facilities might require relocation from a development

8 area. But GNPOC was not operating in the best of

9 circumstances. Sudan’s oil was located in an area heavily

10 contested in a civil war, in a region of the country that

11 had suffered through four decades of violence before

12 Talisman arrived. The oil facilities came under frequent

13 rebel attack and oil workers were killed during the relevant

14 time. Safe operation of the oil facilities therefore

15 required tightened security; and displacing civilians from

16 an “area within the security ring road” was not in itself

17 unlawful.

18 It is therefore not enough for plaintiffs to establish

19 Talisman’s complicity in depopulating areas in or around the

20 Heglig and Unity camps: plaintiffs must establish that

21 Talisman acted with the purpose to assist the Government’s

22 violations of customary international law.

53
1 Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the Government

2 violated customary international law; but they provide no

3 evidence that Talisman acted with the purpose to support the

4 Government’s offenses. Plaintiffs do not suggest in their

5 briefs that Talisman was a partisan in regional, religious,

6 or ethnic hostilities, or that Talisman acted with the

7 purpose to assist persecution. To the contrary, the actions

8 of the Sudanese government threatened the security of the

9 company’s operations, tarnished its reputation, angered its

10 employees and management, and ultimately forced Talisman to

11 abandon the venture.

12 Plaintiffs argue that they need no direct evidence of

13 purpose because “‘[genocidal intent may] be inferred from a

14 number of facts and circumstances, such as the general

15 context, the perpetration of other culpable acts

16 systematically directed against the same group, the scale of

17 atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on

18 account of their membership of a particular group, or the

19 repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts.’”

20 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 226

21 F.R.D. 456, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)(alterations in

22 original)(quoting Prosecutor v. Jelisec, No. IT-95-10-A,

54
1 Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 101 (July 5, 2001)). True,

2 intent must often be demonstrated by the circumstances, and

3 there may well be an ATS case in which a genuine issue of

4 fact as to a defendant’s intent to aid and abet the

5 principal could be inferred; but in this case, there were

6 insufficient facts or circumstances suggesting that Talisman

7 acted with the purpose to advance violations of

8 international humanitarian law.

9 The reports that plaintiffs rely upon to prove

10 knowledge also show that Greater Nile security personnel and

11 GNPOC workers were upset by the Government’s actions and

12 possible attacks on civilians. For example, several reports

13 address the company’s efforts to relieve the plight of

14 internally displaced persons, which included stockpiling

15 tons of relief supplies and distributing food, water,

16 medicine, and mosquito nets.

17 There is evidence that southern Sudanese were subjected

18 to attacks by the Government, that those attacks facilitated

19 the oil enterprise, and that the Government’s stream of oil

20 revenue enhanced the military capabilities used to persecute

21 its enemies. But if ATS liability could be established by

22 knowledge of those abuses coupled only with such commercial

55
1 activities as resource development, the statute would act as

2 a vehicle for private parties to impose embargos or

3 international sanctions through civil actions in United

4 States courts. Such measures are not the province of

5 private parties but are, instead, properly reserved to

6 governments and multinational organizations.

7

8 VI
9
10 Plaintiffs argue that the district court failed to

11 consider portions of the summary judgment record and failed

12 to afford the parties an opportunity to argue evidentiary

13 issues. We reject these contentions. The district court

14 did not make a “wholesale blanket ruling” excluding

15 plaintiffs’ evidence and did not exclude evidence in

16 contravention of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover,

17 plaintiffs have cited no relevant authority holding that a

18 district court is confined to a particular evidentiary

19 procedure in ruling on a summary judgment motion.

20 A district court deciding a summary judgment motion

21 “has broad discretion in choosing whether to admit

22 evidence.” Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir.

23 1997). “The principles governing admissibility of evidence

56
1 do not change on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 65-

2 66. “Rule 56(e) provides that affidavits in support of and

3 against summary judgment shall set forth such facts as would

4 be admissible in evidence. Therefore, only admissible

5 evidence need be considered by the trial court in ruling on

6 a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 66 (internal

7 quotation marks and citations omitted). It is difficult to

8 see how a court can decide a summary judgment motion without

9 deciding questions of evidence:

10 Because the purpose of summary judgment
11 is to weed out cases in which “there is
12 no genuine issue as to any material fact
13 and . . . the moving party is entitled to
14 a judgment as a matter of law,” it is
15 appropriate for district courts to decide
16 questions regarding the admissibility of
17 evidence on summary judgment. Although
18 disputes as to the validity of the
19 underlying data go to the weight of the
20 evidence, and are for the fact-finder to
21 resolve, questions of admissibility are
22 properly resolved by the court. The
23 resolution of evidentiary questions on
24 summary judgment conserves the resources
25 of the parties, the court, and the jury.
26
27 Id. (citations omitted)(alterations in original); see also

28 LaSalle Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 424

29 F.3d 195, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2005)(“Even on summary judgment, a

30 district court has wide discretion in determining which

31 evidence is admissible, [and] we review its evidentiary

57
1 rulings for manifest error.” (internal quotation marks and

2 citations omitted))(alterations in original)).

3 At the outset of the summary judgment opinion in this

4 case, the district court observed that

5 plaintiffs have not distinguished between
6 the admissible and inadmissible. The
7 plaintiffs repeatedly describe ‘Talisman’
8 as having done this or that, when the
9 examination of the sources to which they
10 refer reveals that it is some other
11 entity or an employee of some other
12 company that acted. They assert that
13 this or that event happened, when the
14 documents to which they refer consist of
15 hearsay embedded in more hearsay.
16 Indeed, most of the admissible evidence
17 is either statements made by or to
18 Talisman executives, and the plaintiffs’
19 descriptions of their own injuries, with
20 very little admissible evidence offered
21 to build the links in the chain of
22 causation between the defendant and those
23 injuries.
24
25 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 639.

26 Plaintiffs argue that this prefatory language amounts to an

27 evidentiary ruling and bespeaks a disregard of the

28 plaintiffs’ evidence in whole. However, the district court

29 set aside its concerns about the evidence in describing the

30 facts of the case: “In order to describe as fairly as

31 possible the evidence the plaintiffs present, the

32 description of events that follows is largely taken from the

58
1 documents on which the plaintiffs have placed the greatest

2 reliance, without a careful analysis of the admissibility of

3 this evidence.” Id. at 641-42.

4 In weighing evidence of questionable admissibility, the

5 district court often noted Talisman’s evidentiary objection,

6 and sometimes expressed a view of the objection; but the

7 court never made a blanket exclusion of evidence.

8 Plaintiffs focus on four specific “exclusions”:

9 1. Congressional findings included in the Sudan Peace

10 Act stating that genocide was taking place in the Sudan and

11 that oil profits were contributing to the misery. See Pub.

12 L. No. 107-245, 116 Stat. 1504 (codified at 50 U.S.C.

13 § 1701). This was not excluded; the court described the

14 congressional findings and Talisman’s objections, and

15 explained that in any case plaintiffs had no proof of

16 Talisman’s intent. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F.

17 Supp. 2d at 669-70.

18 2. Evidence from plaintiffs’ experts about the

19 relationship between oil profits and military spending. The

20 district court conceded that “plaintiffs have evidence from

21 which a jury could find that Talisman believed that the

22 Government used oil revenues to buy armaments, even if

59
1 Talisman did not have any direct evidence or knowledge of

2 that fact.” Id. at 676. The district court nonetheless

3 concluded that was not enough, because plaintiffs had not

4 “identified evidence sufficient to support a finding that

5 when Talisman (or [Greater Nile] or GNPOC) paid royalties,

6 it ‘specifically directed’ those payments to the

7 Government’s procurement of weaponry to target civilians and

8 displace them.” Id.

9 3. Security reports by Greater Nile personnel (who

10 monitored threats to GNPOC workers) recording the military’s

11 use of airstrips to conduct bombing runs and other military

12 operations. The district court described these reports in

13 great detail in the background section of its opinion, and

14 explained that the reports painted a complex picture of the

15 situation. Whatever the significance of the information in

16 the reports, there is no question that they were accounted

17 for in the district court’s analysis.

18 4. A declaration from the head of security for Arakis

19 (Robert Norton), stating that he had warned Talisman at the

20 time it purchased Arakis about likely civilian displacement.

21 The district court excluded this declaration because the

22 witness had testified at an earlier deposition that he was

60
1 unaware of any displacement. Presbyterian Church of Sudan,

2 453 F. Supp. 2d at 647 & n.11. The district court explained

3 “[a] witness may not use a later affidavit to contradict

4 deposition testimony in an effort to defeat a motion for

5 summary judgment.” Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F.

6 Supp. 2d at 647 (citing Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196

7 F.3d 435, 455 (2d Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs contend that only

8 declarations from parties contradicting earlier deposition

9 testimony are inadmissible, and that Norton’s declaration

10 did not fit within this rule. We need not decide this

11 question, because [i] there was other evidence of Talisman’s

12 knowledge of displacement of civilians and [ii] Talisman’s

13 notice of this displacement is not enough to show an illicit

14 purpose.

15 Plaintiffs cite United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d

16 133 (2d Cir. 2001), and United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d

17 1173 (2d Cir. 1995), for the proposition that a party must

18 make a specific and contemporaneous objection to the

19 admission of trial evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence

20 103(a)(1). This non-controversial proposition is

21 irrelevant, because the case never went to trial and because

22 Talisman is not objecting to the district court’s admission

61
1 of trial evidence.

2 Finally, plaintiffs rely on an unpublished opinion from

3 the Eleventh Circuit which reversed a district court’s

4 striking of fifty passages from a response to a motion for

5 summary judgment. Mack v. ST Mobile Aerospace Eng’g, Inc.,

6 195 F. App’x 829 (11th Cir. 2006). The district court in

7 that case: [i] failed to give the parties an opportunity to

8 argue the merits of the objections; [ii] failed to analyze

9 and rule on each objection; and [iii] offered only a

10 “blanket declaration that ‘the statements at issue are

11 inadmissible hearsay, double hearsay, opinion, speculation

12 and/or conjecture.’” Id. at 842-43. Moreover, nothing in

13 the submission could be “inadmissible hearsay evidence

14 because the passages [were] not evidence at all--they [were]

15 the plaintiffs’ arguments in their responsive pleading.”

16 Id. at 842 (emphasis in original). Mack is easily

17 distinguishable. First, the district court in this case

18 explained its reasons for excluding evidence. Second, the

19 district court in Mack struck pleadings, not evidence.

20 Third, the Eleventh Circuit reversed in part because it

21 determined (after addressing several specific strikes) that

22 the district court’s evidentiary rulings were wrong on the

62
1 merits. Plaintiffs have pointed to no incorrect rulings in

2 this case (with the possible exception of the Norton

3 declaration, which is not material as to purpose).15

4 In conclusion, there is no evidence that the district

5 court improperly failed to consider plaintiffs’ evidence.

6

7 VII

8 Two weeks before Talisman moved for summary judgment,

9 plaintiffs filed a Proposed Third Amended Class Action

10 Complaint. In denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend, the

11 district court explained that the Second Amended Complaint

12 sought to hold Talisman liable for its own acts, while the

13 proposed pleading, “[w]hen stripped to its essentials, . . .

14 seeks to hold Talisman liable for the actions of GNPOC.”

15 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 679. Thus,

16 while the Second Amended Complaint alleged that Talisman

17 aided and abetted the Government, the Third Amended

18 Complaint alleged that Talisman aided and abetted GNPOC and

15
Plaintiffs also rely on Halbrook v. Reichhold
Chemicals, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), in
which the district court denied summary judgment on a sexual
harassment claim. Halbrook is inapposite because the court
in that case deferred ruling on trial evidence given its
denial of summary judgment. The court did not articulate a
general rule for considering evidence on summary judgment.
63
1 Greater Nile. Id.

2 The district court ruled that, to plead new theories of

3 liability three years after the deadline for amendment

4 specified in the scheduling order, plaintiffs were required

5 to show good cause for delay and the exercise of due

6 diligence. Id. at 680 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16;

7 Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir.

8 2003); In re Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Litig., 02 Civ.

9 2673(DLC), 2004 WL 2244502, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2004)).

10 The court found that plaintiffs failed to show good cause,

11 and that “[i]t could even be said that the plaintiffs acted

12 in bad faith in waiting until the eve of summary judgment

13 practice to file the motion to amend.” Id. at 680.

14 Once the deadline for amendment in a scheduling order

15 has passed, leave to amend may be denied “where the moving

16 party has failed to establish good cause.” Parker v.

17 Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000).

18 “[A] finding of ‘good cause’ depends on the diligence of the

19 moving party.” Id. We review a district court’s denial of

20 leave to amend for abuse of discretion.

21 Plaintiffs argue that they filed the Third Amended

22 Complaint as promptly as they could at the conclusion of

64
1 discovery. But the district court concluded that it was

2 unreasonable for plaintiffs to hold the proposed amendment

3 until discovery ended. Plaintiffs also argue that the

4 proposed amendment would not have required new discovery and

5 that the dates in the scheduling order were irrelevant

6 because the theories pled in the Third Amended Complaint

7 were already in the case. However, the Second Amended

8 Complaint reads as if Talisman operated directly in the

9 Sudan with no intervening subsidiaries and it does not

10 allege that Talisman acted through GNPOC. While references

11 to GNPOC are sprinkled throughout the Second Amended

12 Complaint, the gravamen is that Talisman conspired directly

13 with the Sudanese government. Thus, the Third Amended

14 Complaint, which alleged that Talisman aided and abetted

15 GNPOC and that it conspired with Greater Nile, substantially

16 revised plaintiffs’ theory.

17 It is true that the issue of joint venture liability

18 was mentioned early in the case by Judge Schwartz in a 2003

19 decision denying Talisman’s motion to dismiss on the ground

20 that GNPOC was a necessary party. In that decision, the

21 district court considered and rejected a number of arguments

22 as to why the litigation could not proceed without GNPOC.

65
1 Judge Schwartz explained that “nearly every paragraph

2 describes alleged unlawful acts by Talisman, not GNPOC.”

3 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 352. In a

4 footnote, the district court added that “[t]o the extent

5 that the Amended Complaint alleges acts by GNPOC, . . .

6 Talisman may potentially be held liable for the acts of

7 other GNPOC members under a theory of joint venture

8 liability.” Id. at 352 n.50 (citation omitted)

9 Plaintiffs cite this footnote as evidence that the

10 district court and Talisman were aware from early in the

11 litigation that plaintiffs might proceed against Greater

12 Nile and GNPOC on theories of joint liability. But Judge

13 Cote observed that the Third Amended Complaint “dramatically

14 alter[ed] the plaintiffs’ theories of liability and the

15 focus of the entire case,” Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453

16 F. Supp. 2d at 680, and Talisman vigorously contests the

17 idea that the substance of the amended complaint was already

18 understood to be part of the case. The district court

19 supervised this case for three years before the filing of

20 plaintiffs’ motion and was thoroughly familiar with the

21 facts and allegations, having written several lengthy

22 opinions in the matter. We owe deference to the district

66
1 court’s analysis.

2 The district court also denied leave to amend on the

3 alternative ground that amendment would be futile. The

4 court assessed whether plaintiffs could pierce the corporate

5 veils of GNPOC and subsidiaries between GNPOC and Talisman:

6 the court held plaintiffs could not pierce and that Talisman

7 could not be liable on theories of joint venture or agency.

8 Id. at 683-89.

9 We have not considered what law would be applied in

10 seeking to pierce a corporate veil in the ATS context, and

11 this case does not require us to reach the question. The

12 district court discussed the issue in an abundance of

13 caution; but we have no occasion to do so given our

14 affirming the denial of leave to amend on good-faith

15 grounds.

16 Finally, plaintiffs argue that even absent amended

17 pleading, the district court should have considered their

18 agency, joint venture, and veil piercing theories. We

19 disagree. The district court concluded that these theories

20 were insufficiently pled, and our independent review of the

21 Second Amended Complaint supports the district court’s

67
1 conclusion. 16

2

3 CONCLUSION

4 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

5 court is affirmed.

16
Plaintiffs also appeal from the denial of their
motions for class certification. Because we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment as to all claims
against Talisman, we do not reach that issue.
68