IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-50757
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL BRETT JACQUINOT,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
_____________________________________________
July 17, 2001
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Brett Jacquinot appeals his conditional guilty plea
conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute
marijuana. He argues that the district court erred by: (1)
denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a
roving border patrol stop of the truck in which he was a
passenger and (2) applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) to increase his
base offense level for possession of a firearm. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Michael Brett Jacquinot was indicted for possession with the
intent to distribute between 100 and 1,000 kilograms of
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Jacquinot
1
moved to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of the stop
of a vehicle in which he was riding, asserting that the border
patrol agents did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle.
An evidentiary hearing was held on Jacquinot’s motion.
Border Patrol Agent Andrew P. Graham, a three-year veteran of the
Border Patrol, testified that he and eleven-year veteran Border
Patrol Agent Jay Snodgrass were stationed in Alpine, Texas, and
were assigned to patrol a 140-mile area of the United
States/Mexican border, including the Big Bend National Park.
While Graham’s patrol experience was all in the Alpine, Texas,
area, Snodgrass had transferred to Alpine a few months earlier,
having previously served at the Marfa Sector Area Operations
Center and the Laredo, Texas, border area. During his tenure
with the Border Patrol, Graham had been involved with at least 30
narcotics cases and 15 to 20 alien smuggling cases.
Texas Highway 385 is notorious for smuggling, and in the
prior six months, Agent Graham had noticed an increase in alien
and smuggling apprehensions on that highway. Agent Graham
attributed this increase in activity on Highway 385 to the Border
Patrol’s enhanced enforcement on other nearby highways.
In the early morning hours of Sunday, January 16, 2000,
Agents Graham and Snodgrass were parked on Highway 385,
approximately 75 miles north of the United States/Mexican border.
At 5:45 a.m., the agents were notified by Marfa Sector
Communications that vehicle sensors located inside Big Bend
2
National Park and well within 50 miles of the United
States/Mexican border had indicated two northbound vehicles
traveling from within the park. The area in which the sensors
are located is very remote and is intersected only by ranch
roads. The fact that two vehicles activated the sensors at
approximately the same time made Graham suspicious that one may
be a lead car and the other a load car carrying contraband.
Subsequent vehicle sensors were triggered, indicating to Agent
Graham that the two vehicles that had triggered the first sensor
were continuing toward their location.
At approximately 6:45 a.m., Agent Graham observed two
vehicles pass by his location. Agent Graham believed that these
were the vehicles that had activated the first sensor within the
park, and he and Agent Snodgrass began to follow them in separate
marked Border Patrol vehicles. The first vehicle that had passed
the agents’ location was a late model four-door sedan carrying an
older Anglo couple and bearing a park registration receipt taped
to the windshield and a Mississippi license plate. The vehicle
appeared typical of the tourist traffic coming out of the park.
Agent Graham got directly behind the vehicle to check its
registration, and the vehicle continued to drive normally. Agent
Graham concluded that the first vehicle was probably not involved
in any illegal activity.
The second vehicle was a large white Ford pickup truck with
a lot of equipment in its bed; it appeared to be a work truck and
did not have a park sticker on its windshield. Agent Graham was
3
able to see only that the driver was a small-framed person
wearing a baseball cap. Agent Graham was surprised to see a work
truck coming out of the park on a Sunday morning before six
o’clock. He normally saw construction vehicles leaving the park
in groups at the end of the work day or on Friday evenings at the
end of the work week. The truck bore a Kansas license plate,
which made Agent Graham suspicious because the park typically
hires contractors from the local area. Additionally, Agent
Graham was aware of a recent narcotics smuggling operation in the
Alpine area destined for locations in Kansas.
Agent Graham got to within two car lengths of the truck to
read the registration and then followed the truck from ten car
lengths. Agents Graham and Snodgrass continued to follow the
truck while they awaited registration information on it. The
truck slowed to fifteen miles per hour below the average speed
limit. Typically, Agent Graham does not see vehicles
dramatically change their speed unless the vehicle was not
traveling the speed limit before being followed by an agent.
The agents were unable to obtain the registration
information because of computer-system problems, but they
continued to follow the truck. As the truck approached Marathon,
Texas, it stopped at a stop sign, activated its left turn signal,
and then remained stopped for five seconds before turning left
onto Highway 90. Agent Graham found the truck’s pause at the
stop sign to be much longer than what he normally sees. Agent
Graham also found the truck’s left turn to be strange because
4
most vehicles coming up Highway 385 would continue straight on
that road toward Fort Stockton and Interstate 10. By turning
left, the truck began traveling toward Alpine; however, the most
direct and logical route of travel from Big Bend to Alpine is
Highway 118. In Agent Graham’s experience, most visitors to such
a remote area with limited gas stations have a map and know which
roads to take.
The truck then drove through Marathon at 20 miles per hour.
There was a school zone sign limiting speeds to 20 miles per hour
when the sign was flashing, but the sign was not flashing, it was
a Sunday morning, and there were no pedestrians, children, or
other vehicles on the street. Agent Graham felt that the truck
was trying to avoid being pulled over. Agent Graham confirmed
Agent Snodgrass’ prior observation that the truck was carrying
tool boxes, a spare gas tank, and an air tank. After following
the truck for a total of approximately fifteen minutes, Graham
determined that it was more likely than not that the truck was
involved in illegal activity. His determination was based on:
the unusual hour that this apparently non-tourist work vehicle
left the park; the truck’s Kansas license plate, since he had
personal experience with a smuggling organization transporting
marijuana from the Big Bend area to Kansas; the absence of a park
registration sticker on the vehicle, indicating that it had not
been in the park for any length of time; the fact that the truck
appeared to have transited the park from the west side to the
east side, which was a tactic smugglers had recently been using
5
to circumvent Border Patrol traffic or checkpoint operations;
Highway 385's reputation for the smuggling of aliens and
narcotics; and the driver’s behavior when they were following the
truck. Agent Graham stopped the truck 70 or 80 miles from the
United States/Mexico border.
The district court denied Jacquinot’s motion, determining
that the agents’ stop of the truck was justified by reasonable
suspicion and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Jacquinot
entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to
appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The presentence
report (“PSR”) applied a two-level adjustment to Jacquinot’s base
offense level for the possession of a dangerous weapon, as two
unloaded handguns had been found in the truck. See U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(b)(1). Jacquinot filed an objection to the adjustment,
arguing that it was clearly improbable that the weapons had been
connected to the drug offense. The district court overruled
Jacquinot’s objection to the two-level adjustment.
The district court sentenced Jacquinot to 46 months’
imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, a $2,500 fine, and
a $100 special assessment. Jacquinot filed a timely notice of
appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
a. Roving Border Patrol Stop
Jacquinot asserts that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop of the
truck. He contends that the circumstances known to the border
6
patrol agents did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
the truck was involved in illegal activities.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the
district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error,
and its legal conclusions, including whether there was reasonable
suspicion for a stop, are reviewed de novo. United States v.
Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1994). A factual finding
is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of
the record as a whole. United States v. Shipley, 963 F.2d 56, 58
(5th Cir. 1992). Further, “[t]he evidence presented at a pre-
trial hearing on a motion to suppress is viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party.” Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 721.
A border patrol agent conducting a roving patrol may make a
temporary investigative stop of a vehicle only if the agent is
aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion
that the vehicle’s occupant is engaged in criminal activity. See
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). Factors that may
be considered in an analysis of reasonable suspicion include:
(1) proximity to the border; (2) characteristics of the area;
(3) usual traffic patterns; (4) agent’s previous experience in
detecting illegal activity; (5) behavior of the driver;
(6) particular aspects or characteristics of the vehicle;
(7) information about recent illegal trafficking in aliens or
narcotics in the area; and (8) the number, appearance, and
7
behavior of the passengers. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-85;
see also Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722. The reasonable suspicion
analysis is a fact-intensive test in which the court looks at all
circumstances together to weigh not the individual layers, but
the laminated total. United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d
877, 881 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 412 (2000).
Factors that ordinarily constitute innocent behavior may provide
a composite picture sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion in
the minds of experienced officers. Id.
In the instant case, the district court found that the
totality of the circumstances provided the agents with reasonable
suspicion to warrant the stop of the truck in which Jacquinot was
driving. The court identified the following Brignoni-Ponce
factors as supporting the validity of the stop.
Proximity to the border
One of the vital elements in the reasonable suspicion test
is whether the agents had reason to believe that the vehicle in
question recently crossed the border. United States v. Melendez-
Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1984). Although this court
does not adhere to a bright line test with regard to this factor,
a car traveling more than 50 miles from the border is usually
viewed as being too far from the border to support an inference
that it originated its journey there. Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d at
881. The proximity element is satisfied, though, if the
defendant’s car was first observed within 50 miles of the United
States/Mexico border, but was stopped more than 50 miles from the
8
border. See United States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 289 (5th
Cir. 1998). If there is no reason to believe that the vehicle
came from the border, the remaining factors must be examined
charily. United States v. Rodriguez-Rivas, 151 F.3d 377, 380
(5th Cir. 1998).
The district court determined that although the truck was
first sighted by the agents approximately 75 miles from the
border, the activation of vehicle sensors in an area much less
than 50 miles from the border, the absence of major roads
intersecting Highway 385 between the border and the point where
the truck was first sighted, and the arrival of the vehicle at a
time consistent with the sensor alerts “unquestionably
indicate[d]” that the truck was traveling through an area very
close to the border prior to the stop. The district court’s
finding in this regard was not clearly erroneous; the finding is
plausible in light of the record as a whole. Inocencio, 40 F.3d
at 721. The district court went on to conclude that the
proximity-to-the-border element supported the agents’ reasonable
suspicion determination.
Jacquinot asserts that the proximity-to-the-border factor
should weigh against a finding of reasonable suspicion, as the
agents had no reason to believe that his truck had recently
crossed the border. However, given the district court’s accepted
factual finding that the precipitate events clearly indicated
that the truck had traveled through an area very close to the
border prior to the stop, the agents did in fact have a reason to
9
believe that the truck had recently crossed the border.
Therefore, this factor does provide support for the stop. Cf.
Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d at 411 (rejecting proximity-to-the-
border factor where vehicle was stopped 60 miles from border and
there was no independent reason to believe that the vehicle had
not started its journey in either of the two towns between the
border and the area of the stop).
Characteristics of the area
Based on Agent Graham’s testimony that Highway 385 has a
reputation as a smuggling route, the district court concluded
that the characteristics of the area supported a finding of
reasonable suspicion. While Jacquinot does not dispute that
Highway 385 is a notorious smuggling route, he notes that it is
also a major highway used by thousands of visitors to Big Bend
National Park, citing Rodriguez-Rivas, 151 F.3d at 380. And he
points out that this court has cautioned that a vehicle’s mere
presence on a road frequently used for illegal activity is not
sufficient to justify a stop, citing United States v. Diaz, 977
F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1992).
Nevertheless, "[i]t is well established that a road's
reputation as a smuggling route adds to the reasonableness of the
agents' suspicion." Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d at 881-82 (emphasis
added) (quotation and citation omitted). This factor weighs in
favor of reasonable suspicion.
Usual traffic patterns
10
Agent Graham testified that traffic is typically very light
coming out of Big Bend before six o’clock in the morning and that
he was surprised to see a work truck leaving the park so early on
a Sunday morning. The district court thus considered the truck’s
presence on the highway at that time to be a deviation from the
typical traffic patterns that added to reasonable suspicion.
Jacquinot argues that leaving Big Bend early in the morning
should not contribute to reasonable suspicion. He notes that
Agent Graham testified that it was not unusual for park visitors
to get an early start on their trip home. However, Agent Graham
specifically testified that he did not believe he had ever seen a
work vehicle leave the park on a Sunday morning and that such
vehicles typically leave in groups at the end of the work day or
work week. The traffic-pattern factor weighs in favor of
reasonable suspicion.
Agents’ previous experience in detecting illegal activity
Agent Graham testified that he had three years’ experience
serving as a Border Patrol agent in the Alpine area and that
Agent Snodgrass had eleven years’ experience as a Border Patrol
agent, with a few months of that experience in the Alpine area.
The district court concluded that the agents’ previous experience
in the region contributed to the reasonable suspicion
determination. This factor supports the stop.
Behavior of the driver
Agent Graham testified that as he followed the truck, it:
slowed dramatically to fifteen miles per hour below the speed
11
limit, although it had not previously been speeding; remained
stopped at a stop sign for five seconds; made an unusual turn and
traveled toward Alpine on an indirect route; and obeyed a school
zone sign that limited speeds while flashing, although the sign
was not then flashing. The district court concluded that the
driver’s behavior added to the agents’ reasonable suspicion.
Jacquinot argues that it was not suspicious for the truck to
slow down after Agent Graham followed it within two car lengths,
passed it, and then got behind it again. He further contends
that it would not be unusual for a prudent out-of-state traveler
to stop at the Highway 385 and Highway 90 intersection for five
seconds to determine the way to the nearest town, which was
Alpine, or to travel at Highway 90's posted speed limit of 20
miles per hour.
Although deceleration in the presence of a patrol car may be
completely innocent behavior, this court has noted that such
behavior may be suspicious if the driver was not speeding when
first observed. See Villalobos, 161 F.3d at 291. And while it
is questionable whether the truck’s five-second pause at the stop
sign and adherence to the school zone speed limit were especially
suspicious, the truck’s indirect travel route from Big Bend to
Alpine does trigger suspicion. See Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d at
884 (approving the district court’s consideration of an indirect
route as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion). This court
affords due weight to the inferences law enforcement officers
draw from historical facts and the events leading up to a stop.
12
Id. Considering the totality of the driver’s behavior, this
factor weighs in favor of reasonable suspicion.
Particular aspects of the vehicle
Agent Graham testified that the truck: was not a tourist-
type vehicle, but a work vehicle carrying tool boxes, a gas tank,
and an air tank; did not have a park sticker on its windshield,
indicating that it had not been in any tourist areas of the park
for any length of time; and bore a Kansas license plate, although
the park uses local contractors. The district court did not err
in determining that the appearance of the truck contributed to
the agents’ reasonable suspicion.
Although the district court did not specifically address it,
the factor regarding information about recent illegal trafficking
in aliens or narcotics in the area is also relevant in this case.
Agent Graham testified that he was personally aware of “a lot of”
recent narcotics smuggling taking place through the Alpine area
that was destined for locations in Kansas. Since the truck in
question bore a Kansas license plate, this information weighs in
favor of Agent Graham’s reasonable suspicion determination.
Finally, as there is no indication in the record that
Jacquinot, the truck’s only passenger, caused any suspicion, the
factor regarding the number, appearance, and behavior of the
passengers is the sole factor that does not support the agents’
reasonable suspicion determination. See Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d
at 884 (stating that not every Brignoni-Ponce factor need weigh
in favor of reasonable suspicion and that an officer need not
13
eliminate all reasonable possibility of innocent travel before
conducting an investigatory stop).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government and considering the totality of the circumstances, the
district court did not err in denying Jacquinot’s motion to
suppress, as the border patrol agents’ stop of the truck in which
he was riding was based on reasonable suspicion that the truck’s
occupants were engaged in illegal activity. See id. at 881;
Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 721.
b. Upward adjustment for weapon possession
Jacquinot also contends that the district court erred in
applying § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s two-level upward adjustment for
possession of a weapon in connection with a drug trafficking
offense. Jacquinot argues that although there were two unloaded
handguns in the truck, the Government failed to prove that it was
not clearly improbable that he possessed those handguns in
connection with his drug offense.
The district court’s decision to apply § 2D1.1(b)(1) is a
factual determination reviewable for clear error. United States
v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 1997). Section
2D1.1(b)(1) provides for a two-level increase in the offense
level for a drug trafficking offense “[i]f a dangerous weapon
(including a firearm) was possessed.” “The government has the
burden of proof under § 2D1.1 of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that a temporal and spatial relation existed between
the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.”
14
United States v. Vasquez, 161 F.3d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). “Applying this
standard, the government must provide evidence that the weapon
was found in the same location where drugs or drug paraphernalia
are stored or where part of the transaction occurred." Id.
(internal quotation and citation omitted). The § 2D1.1(b)(1)
adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless
the defendant establishes that it was clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense. See § 2D1.1(b)(1),
comment. (n.3); United States v. Marmolejo, 106 F.3d 1213, 1216
(5th Cir. 1997).
A PSR is generally considered sufficiently reliable to be
considered by the trial court as evidence in making the factual
determinations required by the sentencing guidelines. United
States v. West, 58 F.3d 133, 138 (5th Cir. 1995). In the present
case, the district court adopted the PSR’s findings that 286.44
pounds of marijuana were found in a toolbox in the bed of the
truck in which Jacquinot was riding and that two unloaded
handguns were found in the cab of the truck. Jacquinot does not
contest these findings and even acknowledges that ammunition was
also found in the truck. Accordingly, the district court did not
err, clearly or otherwise, in finding that § 2D1.1 was applicable
because there was a temporal and spatial relationship between
Jacquinot, the guns, and his drug trafficking offense. See
United States v. Brown, 217 F.3d 247, 261 (5th Cir. 2000)
(applying § 2D1.1(b)(1) adjustment where shotgun found in truck
15
of vehicle used to transport drugs), vacated on other grounds by
Randle v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 1072 (2001); United States v.
Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 929, 932 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying §
2D1.1(b)(1) adjustment where gun found under the seat of car used
in attempted theft of narcotics).
There is no merit to Jacquinot’s argument that because he
was not charged with the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) offense of
possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense
and because Agent Snodgrass’ memo stated that the guns were not
loaded, no attempt was made to use them, and there was no
evidence that the guns had been intended for use against law
enforcement officers, it is clearly improbable that the guns were
connected to his drug trafficking offense. For purposes of the
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) adjustment, "[i]t is not necessary for possession
of the weapon . . . to be sufficiently connected with the crime
to warrant prosecution as an independent firearm offense."
United States v. Villarreal, 920 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1991).
And it is not material that the guns were not loaded; 2D1.1(b)(1)
is an added punishment for drug offenders who heighten the danger
of drug trafficking by possessing a dangerous weapon, and the
mere presence of a gun, loaded or not, can escalate the danger.
See United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 271, 278 (5th Cir. 1994).
Finally, it does not matter whether Jacquinot actually used or
intended to use the guns in his drug-trafficking offense; the
pertinent fact is that “they could have been so used.” United
16
States v. Menesses, 962 F.2d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added). Jacquinot’s sentence must therefore be affirmed.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Jacquinot’s conviction and
sentence.
AFFIRMED.
17
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge, specially concurring.
The absurdity of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as it
relates to the southern border area of Texas, is well illustrated
by Judge Wiener’s dissent in United States v. Zapata-Ibarra. In
addition to the factual scenarios he lists in his dissent that we
have judicially blessed, we can now add spending five seconds at
a Stop sign prior to turning left, and driving 20 mph through a
school zone when the blinking light was off.
The stop was seventy-five miles from the border, well beyond
our artificial fifty mile limit. There is no evidence that the
truck had crossed the border. The articulated reason of lead
car/following car had been dispelled, a fact which decreases the
relevance that at some point (undisclosed for security purposes)
within the park two vehicles passed a sensor. The officers also
mentioned the highly suspicious slowing within the speed limit as
the defendants were being followed and the Kansas license plate
on the vehicle. This last point had particular significance for
one of the officers, since at one point in his career he made a
case involving a Kansas destination.
I find no rational or principled basis upon which to
conclude that either reasonable suspicion or probable cause
existed that would justify the stop in this case. I choose to
specially concur because I recognize that at this point in time,
in this circuit, a dissent would be an exercise in futility. I
remain hopeful that at some point in time, the hysteria regarding
18
the ill-fated war on drugs and its impact on the Fourth Amendment
will subside and the rule of reason will again prevail.
19
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge, specially concurring.
The absurdity of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as it
relates to the southern border area of Texas, is well illustrated
by Judge Wiener’s dissent in United States v. Zapata-Ibarra. In
addition to the factual scenarios he lists in his dissent that we
have judicially blessed, we can now add spending five seconds at
a Stop sign prior to turning left, and driving 20 mph through a
school zone when the blinking light was off.
The stop was seventy-five miles from the border, well beyond
our artificial fifty mile limit. There is no evidence that the
truck had crossed the border. The articulated reason of lead
car/following car had been dispelled, a fact which decreases the
relevance that at some point (undisclosed for security purposes)
within the park two vehicles passed a sensor. The officers also
mentioned the highly suspicious slowing within the speed limit as
the defendants were being followed and the Kansas license plate
on the vehicle. This last point had particular significance for
one of the officers, since at one point in his career he made a
case involving a Kansas destination.
I find no rational or principled basis upon which to
conclude that either reasonable suspicion or probable cause
existed that would justify the stop in this case. I choose to
specially concur because I recognize that at this point in time,
in this circuit, a dissent would be an exercise in futility. I
remain hopeful that at some point in time, the hysteria regarding
20
the ill-fated war on drugs and its impact on the Fourth Amendment
will subside and the rule of reason will again prevail.
21