IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-20108
Summary Calendar
ANDRES LOPEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LARRY G. MASSANARI,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,1
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-00-CV-1653
August 29, 2001
Before GARWOOD, BARKSDALE and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:**
Plaintiff-appellant Andres Lopez (Lopez) appeals the district
court’s summary judgment affirming the Social Security
Commissioner’s decision that he is not entitled to supplemental
1
Larry G. Massanari has replaced Kenneth S. Apfel as acting
Commissioner of Social Security and is therefore substituted in
accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
security income benefits.
Our review of a denial of disability insurance benefits is
limited to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal
standards and whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Anthony v.
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). There was substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision that Lopez’s
impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment because he
failed to comply with his prescribed treatment. See id.; 20 CFR §§
404.1530, 416.930; Johnson v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 683, 685 n.4 (5th
Cir. 1990). The medical records for the period June 1994 to April
18, 1995, were not considered by the Commissioner because a
previous administrative decision adjudicated Lopez’s benefit
entitlements through April 18, 1995. See Muse v. Sullivan, 925
F.2d 785, 787 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991). Lopez’s argument that the
district court applied the wrong standard of review in granting the
Commissioner’s summary judgment motion is without merit. This
claim is essentially an argument that there is not substantial
evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision that
Lopez is not disabled.
We need not consider Lopez’s arguments regarding the need for
an electroencephalogram (EEG) as the Commissioner did not dispute
that Lopez had a seizure disorder. Lopez makes the following
arguments for the first time on this appeal, namely: that the
2
Commissioner erred in finding his medication was never increased;
that the Commissioner failed to determine the frequency of his
seizures; that the Commissioner failed to determine why his
Dilantin levels were not in the therapeutic range; that the
Commissioner erred in concluding that toxic levels of Dilantin
indicated noncompliance; that the Commissioner failed to consider
the after-effects of heavier dosages of dilantin; and that the
Commissioner failed to consider that his epilepsy, skeletal
injuries, psychosis, gum swelling, and teeth loss, in combination,
met or equaled the listed impairment of 11.02 (major motor
seizures). Lopez does not explain his failure to raise these
issues before the district court. As this case does not present
exceptional circumstances, we will not address these arguments.
Kinash v. Callahan, 129 F.3d 736, 739 n.10 (5th Cir. 1997).
Inasmuch as Lopez failed to show that the Commissioner’s
decision was not based on the proper legal standards or that it was
not supported by substantial evidence, the district court’s summary
judgment affirming the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is
AFFIRMED.
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