UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-30217
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID J. MARSHALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(96-CR-50060-1)
August 20, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
For his guilty-plea conviction for bank robbery, David J.
Marshall appeals his sentence of 150 months’ imprisonment,
resulting from an upward departure from the guideline range.
An upward departure is reviewed only for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803, 807 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995). If the
district court gives acceptable reasons for the departure and it is
reasonable, we will affirm. Id.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
Marshall contends the district court gave inadequate departure
reasons. The court found Marshall’s criminal history score (V)
underrepresented his criminal history and inadequately reflected
his propensity for recidivism. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. At
sentencing, Marshall admitted his involvement in 12 prior armed
bank robberies. Only five were prosecuted to conviction, and they
resulted in a three-year sentence. Within approximately three
months after Marshall’s release from prison, he committed the
present offense. Marshall was 24 years old at the time of
sentencing. In the light of this record, the court’s departure
reasons were adequate. See United States v. Rosogie, 21 F.3d 632,
634 (5th Cir. 1994).
Marshall next claims the court failed to comply with the
requisite methodology for determining the extent of the departure.
As is well-established, we do not “require the district court to go
through a ritualistic exercise in which it mechanically discusses
each criminal history category [or offense level] it rejects en
route to the category [or offense level] that it selects.” United
States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). As
Marshall concedes, it is apparent from the record that the district
court utilized a seven-step sequence to arrive at a guideline range
containing the 150-month sentence. Because we can ascertain a
basis by which the district court rejected category VI and
intermediate offense levels to reach the sentence, its implicit
methodology was sufficient. See id.
2
Finally, Marshall maintains the extent of the departure was
unreasonable (from a range of 63 to 78 months up to the 150
months). In the light of the aforementioned evidence of Marshall’s
criminal conduct, which was not reflected in the criminal history
calculation, and Marshall’s propensity for recidivism, the district
court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v.
Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
900 (1995); Ashburn, 38 F.3d at 810.
AFFIRMED
3