IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-31451
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHANEY L. PHILLIPS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 97-CR-68-1-B
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October 10, 2001
Before DUHÉ and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI*, District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
Chaney L. Phillips appeals his sentence for his convictions
of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud, and engaging in
an illegal monetary transaction. Phillips challenges the
district court’s findings and corresponding increases to his
offense level on the Count Three conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§§ 3B1.1(a), 3C1.1, 3B1.3, and 2S1.2(b)(1)(B). Phillips contends
also that the district court should have sentenced him based on
*
Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
the fraud guideline rather than on the money-laundering
guideline.
We review for clear error the district court’s determination
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) that Phillips was an organizer or
leader of criminal activity that was otherwise extensive. See
United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 360 (5th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1161 (2001). The district court properly
considered all conduct linked to the transaction, even if the
conduct fell “outside the four corners of the conviction
itself.” United States v. Mir, 919 F.2d 940, 946 (5th Cir.
1990). Phillips has not shown clear error in the district
court’s finding that the criminal activity was otherwise
extensive. See United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 252-53
(5th Cir. 1991); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.3).
We review the district court’s factual finding that a
defendant has obstructed justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for clear
error. United States v. Storm, 36 F.3d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir.
1994). Section “3C1.1 does not require the obstructive conduct
to be directly related to the offense of conviction.” United
States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 688 (5th Cir. 1996). There was a
sufficient nexus between the fraud and Phillips’ Count Three
conduct. Phillips has not shown that district court’s finding
that he obstructed justice with respect to Count Three was
clearly erroneous. See United States v. Valencia, 44 F.3d 269,
272 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding on sentencing factor is not clearly
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erroneous if finding is plausible in light of the record read as
a whole).
Phillips challenges the two-level increase applied pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 to his offense level on Count Three for abuse
of a position of trust. Phillips asserts that he did not do
anything to significantly facilitate Emerson C. Newman’s
negotiation of the $15,000 life insurance benefit check and that
any abuse of trust occurred in connection with the fraud
offenses.
We review the district court’s enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1 for clear error. See United States v. Iloani, 143 F.3d
921, 922 (5th Cir. 1998). Phillips held the position of tax
assessor for St. Helena Parish, a position that qualifies as
being characterized by the privilege of exercising “substantial
discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable
deference.” Iloani, 143 F.3d at 922-23 (quotation marks and
citation omitted); United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 407
(5th Cir. 2000). Phillips underwrote the steps that were
necessary for Emerson C. Newman to obtain the check for the life
insurance money upon Jean Newman’s death. See Phillips, 219 F.3d
at 417. Phillips has not shown clear error regarding the
district court’s imposition of the two-level increase under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.
In his challenge to the district court’s imposition of a
two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.2(b)(1)(B),
Phillips contends that the Government did not prove that he knew
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that the criminally derived property, i.e., the $15,000 life
insurance check, was the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.
The presentence report contained sufficient information to
warrant the increase, and Phillips has not provided reliable
evidence to rebut the presentence report. See United States v.
Vital, 68 F.3d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1995) (PSR considered reliable
evidence, which the district court can rely on for sentencing
purposes; defendant must submit affidavits or other evidence to
rebut information in PSR).
Finally, Phillips contends that the nature of his crimes was
fraud and that the district court erred by sentencing him under
the money laundering guideline for crimes that were outside the
heartland of the money-laundering guideline. Phillips has not
identified anything in the record to indicate that the district
court believed that it lacked the authority to depart. See
Davis, 226 F.3d at 359. Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
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