IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 00-41335
Summary Calendar
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JOHNNIE Y. ROBERTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:99-CV-632
_________________________________________________________________
October 31, 2001
Before JOLLY, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Johnnie Roberts filed the instant Title VII action against her
former employer, the Texas Department of Human Services (“DHS”),
alleging racial discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work
environment. The district court dismissed most of Roberts’ claims
on the basis of res judicata. As to the remaining claims, the
district court granted summary judgment for DHS because Roberts
could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation and had not
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
presented sufficient evidence of a hostile work environment.
Finding no error, we affirm.
I
Johnnie Roberts began working as a Medicaid Eligibility worker
at DHS in 1981. She was promoted in 1986 and again in 1988.
In 1995, after filing a charge with the EEOC, Roberts filed a
Title VII action in federal court, alleging race discrimination and
retaliation. The district court granted partial summary judgment
for DHS. The case proceeded to trial in 1998, and a jury returned
a verdict for DHS on all remaining claims.
Roberts continued to work at DHS, but her relationship with
her co-workers began to deteriorate in late 1998. As the district
court noted, Roberts was disciplined for not following instructions
from her supervisor, sending derogatory e-mail messages, and
angrily confronting co-workers and a hospital administrator.
Finally, in June 1999, Roberts’ employment was terminated.
Roberts filed this Title VII action in November 1999. In
October 2000 the district court granted DHS’ unopposed motion for
judgment on the pleadings, leaving only Roberts’ claims of Title
VII retaliation and a hostile work environment. The district court
then granted DHS’ motion for summary judgment on these remaining
claims. Roberts has appealed the summary judgment order only.
II
A
Roberts alleges that she experienced a hostile work
environment. To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work
environment that violates Title VII, Roberts must create a fact
issue on each element: (1) racially discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule and insults; (2) that are sufficiently severe or
pervasive; (3) so as to alter the conditions of employment; and (4)
create an abusive working environment. Walker v. Thompson, 214
F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000).
As noted by the district court, most of Roberts’ claims of a
hostile work environment either were or could have been litigated
in her first lawsuit. Res judicata prohibits either party in a
prior action from raising any claim or defense in a later action
that was or could have been raised in support of or in opposition
to the cause of action asserted in the prior action. Res judicata
insures the finality of judgments, conserves judicial resources,
and protects litigants from multiple lawsuits. United States v.
Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir. 1994). Res judicata has four
elements: the parties in a later action must be identical to (or
at least be in privity with) the parties in a prior action; the
judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; the prior action must have concluded with
a final judgment on the merits; and the same claim or cause of
action must be involved in both suits. Id.
In the instant lawsuit, the parties are the same as those in
the prior lawsuit. The court which tried the first lawsuit was a
court of competent jurisdiction. The lawsuit ended in a final
judgment on the merits for DHS. Finally, most of Roberts’ hostile
environment allegations involve incidents that occurred prior to
the trial of her 1998 lawsuit. These claims were or could have
been tried in Roberts’ prior lawsuit, and are therefore barred from
retrial by res judicata.
Roberts has one remaining claim that involves incidents
subsequent to her first lawsuit. She alleges that she was subject
to demeaning statements by whites about blacks, and that she
complained to her supervisor Deason about this but Deason did
nothing. In order to establish a claim for hostile environment
harassment, Roberts must demonstrate that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her
employment and to create an abusive working environment. Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). Sporadic racial
comments during casual conversation do not establish the necessary
elements for a prima facie case. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833
F.2d 1406, 1412 (10th Cir. 1987). Roberts must prove more than
just a few isolated incidents of racial enmity. See Snell v.
Suffolk Co., 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986); Gilbert v. City of
Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 972, 104 S.Ct. 2347, 80 L.Ed.2d 820 (1984). It is only a
violation of Title VII when the workplace is so “heavily polluted
with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and psychological
stability of the minority [employee].” Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
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234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
Roberts has pointed to only two incidents when other employees
made derogatory remarks. In the first instance a clerk and
subordinate of Roberts’ claimed that Roberts hired only black
employees. In the second instance, Roberts alleges that an
employee in her unit said she heard other employees state that
Roberts only hired black employees and the employee was asked how
she could work in a black unit. These incidents did not so
“heavily pollute” the work environment and were not so severe or
pervasive as to alter the conditions of Roberts’ employment or to
create an abusive working environment, as to constitute a violation
of Title VII. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on this claim.
B
Roberts alleges that her discharge was retaliatory. The first
two elements of Roberts’ prima facie case are uncontested -- that
she participated in a protected activity and that she suffered an
adverse employment action. DHS contends, however, that Roberts
failed to established a causal connection between the two.
On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, this court views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Lee v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 249 F.3d 362, 364 (5th Cir.
2001). Roberts was fired by her supervisor, Deborah Deason.
Roberts has failed to adduce any evidence that would prove that
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Deason knew of Roberts’ 1995 EEOC claim when Deason fired Roberts.
Further, Roberts has presented no evidence that links her EEOC
charge and her subsequent discharge. Her subjective belief that
she was subject to discrimination is not alone sufficient to
support her claim. See Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d
330, 337 (5th Cir. 1997). It does not help Roberts’ case that four
years passed between the filing of her complaint and her discharge.
See Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, 14 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir.
1994) (passage of ten months time between complaint to supervisor
of age discrimination and discharge “suggests that a retaliatory
motive was highly unlikely”). Thus, Roberts has failed to produce
evidence that would establish a causal link between her EEOC charge
and her termination, and has not met her prima facie burden of
establishing retaliatory discrimination. We therefore affirm the
grant of summary judgment to DHS on Roberts’ retaliatory
discrimination claim as well.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to DHS and the district court’s dismissal
of Roberts’ complaint.
AFFIRMED
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