IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-40267
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MELISSA STRINGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. C-00-CR-314-1
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October 15, 2001
Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Melissa Stringer appeals her sentence, following a guilty-
plea conviction, for one count of distribution of child
pornography and one count of possession of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2552(a)(4), (b)(1), and (b)(2).
Stringer does not contest her prison term or her term of
supervised release. Instead, for the first time on appeal, she
challenges the imposition of special conditions of supervision.
These claims are reviewable for plain error only. United States
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-40267
-2-
v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
First, Stringer argues that the district court’s oral
pronouncement of the supervised-release condition prohibiting her
from owning a computer contradicted the court’s written
pronouncement, by which the court stated that she could not “own,
possess or use a computer.” Although an oral pronouncement
controls when there is a “conflict” between a written sentence
and an oral pronouncement, Stringer has not shown that the
distinction in her case is anything other than an “ambiguity,”
which would require this court to examine the entire record to
determine the district court’s true intent. See United States v.
Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001). She has not shown
“clear” or “obvious” error. See Calverley, 37 F.3d at 162.
Second, Stringer contends that a supervisory condition that
prohibited her from working around children and the computer-use
condition were both vague and overbroad. Although it appears
that the district court could have tailored these two conditions
more specifically to correspond to Stringer’s personal and
criminal background, Stringer has cited no precedential
decisional authority to demonstrate that any error by the
district court was clear or obvious. Accordingly, Stringer has
not shown plain error as to her second set of arguments, either.
See Calverley, 37 F.3d at 162-64.
The sentence is AFFIRMED.
Stringer’s motion to seal her motion for downward departure
is GRANTED.