IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-20335
Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RUBEN SANCHEZ-PEREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-00-CR-628-ALL
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December 12, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ruben Sanchez-Perez (Sanchez) appeals his guilty-plea
conviction for illegally reentering the United States after
having been deported and convicted of an aggravated felony. He
argues that the district court’s failure to affirmatively
determine that he and his counsel had read and discussed the
presentence report (PSR) amounted to a violation of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32(c)(3)(A) not subject to the plain-error analysis;
therefore, this court must "automatically reverse" his conviction
and remand the matter for resentencing.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-20335
-2-
Rule 32(c)(3)(A), Fed. R. Crim. P. provides that before
imposing sentence, the district court must "verify that the
defendant and defendant’s counsel have read and discussed the
presentence report." Because Sanchez failed to raise the issue
of noncompliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(A) in the district court, we
will correct the alleged error only if it was plain and affected
Sanchez’s substantial rights. See United States v. Esparza-
Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 2001). We decline to
interpret Rule 32(c)(3)(A) as creating an absolute requirement
that the district court specifically ask a defendant whether he
has read the PSR. Instead, we will draw reasonable inferences
from court documents, the defendant’s statements, and counsel’s
statements to determine whether the defendant has been given an
opportunity to read the PSR with his counsel. See id.
The transcript of the sentencing hearing provides
information from which the district court could reasonably have
inferred that Sanchez and his counsel had reviewed the PSR.
However, even if it is assumed that the district court failed to
meet the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(A), Sanchez has not
demonstrated plain error as result of the court’s error.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.