United States v. Christopher Harris

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4101 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER HARRIS, a/k/a Christopher Todd Harris, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. C. Weston Houck, Senior District Judge. (2:10-cr-01198-CWH-3) Submitted: October 25, 2013 Decided: November 4, 2013 Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis H. Lang, CALLISON TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Nick Bianchi, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Christopher Harris pleaded guilty to manufacturing and possession with intent to distribute marijuana plants pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court sentenced Harris to 240 months of imprisonment, a variance sentence below the Guidelines range, and he now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. Harris argues on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his career offender status or investigate his predicate convictions. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Moreover, we may address a claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal only if the lawyer’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the record. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that Harris has failed to demonstrate that ineffective assistance of counsel conclusively appears on the record. We therefore decline to address this argument on direct appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 2 before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3