UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4098
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NATHAN A. SILLA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:11-cr-00157-AW-1)
Submitted: October 29, 2013 Decided: November 8, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael D. Montemarano, MICHAEL D. MONTEMARANO, PA, Columbia,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Nicolas A. Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shortly after his April 2012 jury trial began, Nathan
Silla pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1349 (2012); two counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1344 (2012); and aggravated identity theft, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2012). The district court
sentenced Silla to 144 months’ imprisonment, consisting of 120
months on the first three counts and twenty-four months,
consecutive, on the aggravated identity theft count. The 120-
month sentence for the grouped counts was at the top of the
applicable Guidelines range. Silla timely appealed.
Counsel for Silla initially filed this appeal pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Subsequent to the
Government moving to dismiss the appeal as to Silla’s
conviction, counsel moved to withdraw the Anders brief and to
pursue the appeal on the merits. We grant this motion and
review the issue raised in the merits brief: Silla’s contention
that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is
greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012). *
*
We have nonetheless considered the issues raised in
Silla’s pro se supplemental brief and his opposition to the
Government’s motion to dismiss and find them without merit.
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This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness,
applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). Where, as here, the
defendant does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of
his sentence, we review the sentence only for substantive
reasonableness under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at
51; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010).
The sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of sentencing].” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). In reviewing a sentence for substantive
reasonableness, we evaluate “the totality of the circumstances.”
United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir.
2010). If the sentence is within the properly calculated
Guidelines range, we presume on appeal that the sentence is
substantively reasonable. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278,
289 (4th Cir. 2012). Such a presumption is rebutted only by
showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes–Pineda, 445
F.3d 375, 379 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Silla argues that a sentence at the top of the
Guidelines range was not warranted because (1) his low criminal
history score — one point — reflects the low likelihood that he
will recidivate; and (2) his fraudulent conduct was, in his
view, of a “limited nature.” (Appellant’s Br. at 20). Silla
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does not dispute any of the Guidelines calculations determined
by the sentencing court, including the amount of loss finding.
He argues more globally, though, that the district court should
have disregarded the fraud guidelines because of their “inherent
unfairness . . . and their lack of any empirical grounding in
research and analysis.” (Id. at 13-14).
“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion
when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.
2011). In imposing a sentence at the top of the Guidelines
range, the district court focused on the financial harm that
befell the victims of Silla’s fraudulent scheme, of which the
court found that Silla was the master mind. This harm was
evidenced in the victim statements received at sentencing and
the calculation of the intended loss amount. And while the
court could have, as an exercise of its discretion, disregarded
the Guidelines method for calculating the loss amount, it
certainly was under no obligation to do so. See United States
v. Rivera–Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 274 (2012). Because the district court did not abuse
its discretion in according significant weight to these and the
other sentencing factors the court deemed relevant, including
Silla’s demonstrable lack of respect for the law and refusal to
accept responsibility for his crimes, we conclude that Silla has
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failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness accorded his
within-Guidelines sentence.
Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw his
Anders brief and affirm Silla’s sentence. We deny as moot the
Government’s motion to dismiss this appeal as to Silla’s
conviction. Finally, we deny Silla’s pro se motion to be
transferred to another correctional facility. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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