UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1824
WALTER LEE WHITAKER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NASH-ROCKY MOUNT BOARD OF EDUCATION, d/b/a Nash-Rocky Mount
Public Schools; RICHARD A. MCMAHON, Superintendent; CARINA
BRYANT, Southern Nash Middle School Principal,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-cv-00246-BO)
Submitted: October 28, 2013 Decided: November 13, 2013
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Walter Lee Whitaker, Appellant Pro Se. Dan M. Hartzog, Jr.,
Donna Rhea Rascoe, CRANFILL, SUMNER & HARTZOG, LLP, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Walter Lee Whitaker appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Defendants on his claims of racial
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013) (“Title
VII”). * We affirm.
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is
a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district
court should grant summary judgment unless a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence
presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice,
*
To the extent Whitaker summarily contends that the
district court erred in concluding that Title VII does not apply
to claims of disability discrimination, we reject Whitaker’s
contention. Moreover, it is clear that Whitaker never alleged
or produced evidence that he suffers from a qualifying
disability. See Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d
266, 272-73 & n.9 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that claim of
discriminatory discharge under Americans with Disabilities Act
requires showing of disability that substantially limits major
life activity or of being regarded as having such disability).
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nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the
nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir.
2011).
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice
for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.”
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Because Whitaker produced no
direct evidence that discrimination motivated the nonrenewal of
his contract to serve as a probationary teacher, his claim must
be considered under the burden-shifting framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,
284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Whitaker was
required to establish a prima facie case comprising four
elements: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) adverse
employment action; (3) performance at a level meeting his
employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse
employment action; and (4) circumstances that give rise to an
inference of discrimination. Gerner v. Cnty. of Chesterfield,
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674 F.3d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2012); King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d
145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003). Once these elements are established,
“the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”
Hill, 354 F.3d at 285. If the employer provides evidence of a
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the presumption of
discrimination is rebutted, and the employee, who bears the
ultimate burden of persuasion, must show by a preponderance of
evidence that the proffered reason was a pretext for
discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 143, 146-49 (2000).
Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree with
the district court that the evidence failed to indicate that
Whitaker was meeting his employer’s performance expectations or
that the decision not to renew his contract was racially
motivated. Whitaker’s conclusory and unsupported assertions to
the contrary were not sufficient to survive summary judgment.
King, 328 F.3d at 149-50. Thus, Whitaker is not entitled to
relief on his claim that the nonrenewal of his contract was
based on race.
To the extent Whitaker also claims that he was subject
to a racially hostile work environment, he failed to produce
evidence sufficient to carry such a claim past summary judgment.
See EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 175 (4th Cir.
4
2009) (discussing prima facie case). Finally, we reject
Whitaker’s suggestion that Title VII permits him to proceed
against Defendants Richard McMahon and Carina Bryant in their
individual capacities. Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d
177, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1998). If Whitaker intended to raise
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2006), such claims fail
for the same reasons as Whitaker’s Title VII claims. Love-Lane
v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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