NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-4565
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IN RE: MICHELLE L. WEYANDT, a/k/a Michelle Geiger, Debtor
MICHELLE L. WEYANDT a/k/a Michelle Geiger,
Appellant
v.
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION
RONDA J. WINNECOUR,
Intervenor-Appellee
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Nos. 2-11-cv-00957, 2-11-cv-01012, 2-11-cv-01013)
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 27, 2013
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Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 18, 2013)
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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Debtor Michelle Weyandt appeals the District Court’s affirmance of a Bankruptcy
Court order dismissing the adversary proceeding she filed against the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) related to her Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceedings. The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order on the grounds
that Weyandt lacked standing. For the reasons explained below, we will affirm.
I.
Weyandt owned a residential property located in Irwin, Pennsylvania that was
subject to a mortgage held by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (“Wells Fargo”). In
November 2009, the mortgage went into default for a second time. Wells Fargo
commenced a foreclosure action against Weyandt, and on July 22, 2010, the Court of
Common Pleas of Westmoreland County entered a default judgment in favor of Wells
Fargo for $87,166.15. Wells Fargo subsequently purchased the property at a sheriff’s
sale for $1,460.97. The name recorded on the deed to the property reflecting the sale was
Freddie Mac.1 Weyandt refused to leave the property, and Freddie Mac initiated an
ejectment action.
Following the sale of the property, Weyandt filed her bankruptcy petition. She
listed the value of her residence as $125,000, with a net equity of $22,741.85. Freddie
1
The parties’ submissions differ somewhat with respect to how and when the transfer of
ownership from Wells Fargo to Freddie Mac occurred. Weyandt represents that Freddie
Mac’s involvement began when the deed was recorded following the sheriff’s sale. The
Trustee for Weyandt’s estate, though, represents that Freddie Mac obtained the mortgage
after it went into default for the first time, and that it was Freddie Mac who obtained the
default judgment in 2010 and purchased the property at the sheriff’s sale the following
year. While we note the differences between the accounts, they have no effect on our
analysis.
2
Mac filed a motion seeking relief from the automatic stay triggered by the bankruptcy
filing in order to resume its eviction proceeding against Weyandt. In response, Weyandt
filed an action of her own purporting to exercise the bankruptcy Trustee’s avoidance
powers to overturn the sheriff’s sale as a preference or a fraudulent transfer under 11
U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, or 548.
The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing to address Freddie Mac’s motion for relief
from the stay as well as Weyandt’s adversary proceeding. The Trustee for the estate,
who appears here as an intervenor, attended the hearing to state that she would not
exercise her avoidance powers with respect to the property because to do so would not
benefit the estate. She explained that even if the estate recovered the property, there
would be insufficient equity in the property to benefit unsecured creditors.
Following the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court issued a memorandum order finding
that Weyandt lacked standing to assert the Trustee’s avoidance powers and that, even if
Weyandt was permitted to assert those powers, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar
the Bankruptcy Court from avoiding the sheriff’s sale and overturning the state court’s
default foreclosure judgment. Because Weyandt admitted that the reason she filed her
bankruptcy petition was to recover her residential property, her inability to avoid the sale
meant that the purpose of filing for bankruptcy was frustrated. Accordingly, the
Bankruptcy Court entered three orders: one dismissing Weyandt’s bankruptcy case, one
dismissing Weyandt’s adversary proceeding, and one granting Freddie Mac relief from
the automatic stay.
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Weyandt appealed all three orders, and the District Court upheld the Bankruptcy
Court’s orders based only on Weyandt’s lack of standing. Weyandt timely appealed to
this Court and argues that she was entitled to derivative standing, that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine would not prevent her action to avoid the foreclosure sale, and that she
properly alleged a prima facie case for an avoidable preference or fraudulent transfer
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, or 548.
III.
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
157 and 1334 and the District Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s
order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
“In reviewing the decision of the bankruptcy court, we exercise the same standard of
review as the district court. Legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Factual
determinations are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.” Sovereign Bank v.
Schwab, 414 F.3d 450, 452 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
Weyandt’s standing is a threshold issue; if her argument is unsuccessful, we must
affirm. In finding that Weyandt lacked standing, the District Court relied primarily on In
re Knapper, 407 F.3d 575 (3d Cir. 2005), to conclude that a debtor in Weyandt’s situation
could not exercise the Trustee’s avoidance powers under §§ 544, 547, or 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code because those powers are exclusively granted to the Trustee. Weyandt
does not contest the District Court’s conclusion that she lacked direct standing under In re
Knapper, but rather suggests that the District Court erred in finding that she also lacked
derivative standing. Weyandt Br. 5.
4
A derivative action is one that a bankruptcy court may authorize under its
equitable powers when the Bankruptcy Code’s envisioned scheme breaks down. Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 553 (3d
Cir. 2003) (en banc). “Even if permitted under the Bankruptcy Code, derivative standing
is the exception rather than the rule.” In re Baltimore Emergency Servs. II, Corp., 432
F.3d 557, 562 (4th Cir. 2005). In Cybergenics, this Court carefully considered pre-Code
bankruptcy practice, the text of relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions, and policy
objectives to determine that derivative standing was appropriate in some Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases. Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 559-76. We held that when a trustee fails to
comply with his or her fiduciary duties, the bankruptcy court is empowered under the
Bankruptcy Code to use its equitable powers to confer derivative standing on another
party. Id. at 572.
Weyandt faces two hurdles in her attempt to assert derivative standing under
Cybergenics. First, she must explain why the Chapter 11 derivative standing found in
Cybergenics should be extended to the Chapter 13 context. Second, she must show that
derivative standing is appropriate here because the Trustee failed to carry out her Trustee
duties in declining to initiate an avoidance action directly. See In re Gibson Grp., Inc., 66
F.3d 1436, 1442 (6th Cir. 1995) (observing that in the Chapter 11 context “perhaps the
most important prerequisite to derivative standing is that [the party with authority to act
under the Bankruptcy Code] has abused its discretion in failing to avoid a preferential or
fraudulent transfer”). Otherwise there would be no reason for the Bankruptcy Court to
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subvert the Bankruptcy Code’s usual scheme and grant Weyandt derivative standing to
exercise powers normally granted exclusively to the Trustee.
At this time we do not take a position on whether derivative standing may be
appropriate in some Chapter 13 contexts, an issue Weyandt acknowledges in her brief is
an unsettled one. We note, however, that the question of whether such an extension is
appropriate would require an in-depth examination of the form and purpose of Chapter 13
bankruptcies, which Weyandt has not provided. Instead we hold that even assuming
derivative standing may be available in some Chapter 13 bankruptcies, Weyandt cannot
prevail because she has not shown that a grant of derivative standing would be
appropriate under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Trustee and the
Bankruptcy Court agreed that avoiding the foreclosure sale would bring no benefit to the
estate because there would be insufficient equity in the property once existing liens,
exemptions, and costs were taken into account to leave any funds for creditors. The
District Court did not clearly err in reaching the same conclusion. Weyandt has offered
no alternative account explaining how a sale would benefit her creditors. It appears,
therefore, that the Trustee did not violate any of her duties in failing to pursue an
avoidance action. Weyandt is thus not entitled to derivative standing and the Bankruptcy
Court was correct to dismiss her adversary action.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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