Serigny Ex Rel. Estate of Serigny v. Lafourche Parish Government

Case: 13-30362 Document: 00512449384 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/21/2013

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
November 21, 2013

No. 13-30362 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

JACKIE B. SERIGNY, Individually and on behalf of the Estate of Wayne A.
Serigny,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

LAFOURCHE PARISH GOVERNMENT, through Charlotte Randolph,
Parish President,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No:2:10-CV-3205

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jackie Serigny appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Lafourche Parish Government in her wrongful death suit against the
parish. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Jackie Serigny (“Serigny”) brings this appeal on behalf of herself and the
estate of her late husband, Wayne Serigny. Mr. Serigny served a 30-day
sentence in the Lafourche Parish Detention Center that began on September 21,
2009. Serigny v. Lafourche Parish Gov’t, No. 10-3205, 2012 WL 3548029 (E.D.
La. Aug. 16, 2012). Initially, Mr. Serigny showed no signs of emergency medical
needs and denied that he had fever, chills, night sweats, or weight loss. During
his incarceration, however, Mr. Serigny complained of pain in his throat and
mouth. He was treated at the prison infirmary, whose staff was contracted
through Correcthealth Lafourche, LLC (“Correcthealth”). Upon his release, Mr.
Serigny sought treatment from a personal physician and specialist who
diagnosed him with incurable throat cancer. Mr. Serigny died on December 16,
2009.
All clinical staff members of Correcthealth are licensed or certified health
care providers in the State of Louisiana. Correcthealth as a company was not
enrolled with the Louisiana patient’s compensation fund until August 10, 2011.
Serigny initially alleged claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations
of the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as well
as state law negligence claims against a wide array of defendants involved in the
provision of medical care at the prison. The district court dismissed Serigny’s
claims against the parish one by one, culminating in an August 16, 2012
summary judgment order dismissing with prejudice all claims against the
parish.
After the dismissal, Serigny made a motion to amend the judgment,
requesting that the court vacate its order granting summary judgment. Serigny

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argued that this was appropriate because she had new evidence that
Correcthealth was not properly licensed and qualified. The evidence presented
was a one-page letter from the Department of Health and Hospitals, Bureau of
Health Services Financing, stating that “there are no records available for
Correcthealth Lafourche, LLC.” The court denied the motion. Serigny appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the district court. Wiltz v. Bayer CropScience,
Ltd. P’ship, 645 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2011). This court reviews a denial of a
Rule 59 motion under an abuse of discretion standard. Johnson v. Diversicare
Afton Oaks, LLC, 597 F.3d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 2010).
DISCUSSION
Serigny raises two issues: the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
parish and the denial of her Rule 59 motion. Both contentions concern the
proper reading of section 703 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, which reads as
follows:
In lieu of appointing a physician, the governing authority of any parish
may enter into a contract with a health care provider, licensed or
regulated by the laws of this state, to provide requisite health care
services, as required in this Section. . . . The sole responsibility of the
governing authority of each parish which is mandated by the provisions
of this Section with respect to providing health care services for
prisoners shall be the appointment of a physician and the payment of
the salary of that physician or its contractual obligations with a health
care provider selected in accordance with this Section. The parish and
its governing authority shall not be liable for any action arising as a
result of the actions or inactions of the physician or health care
provider, whether ex delicto or ex quasi delicto or ex contractu, by a
prisoner or his representative to recover damages or any other losses,
including those for the death of the prisoner, unless the governing

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authority exercises gross negligence or willful misconduct in the
performance of its duties and obligations imposed by this Section, and
such gross negligence or willful misconduct was a substantial factor in
causing the injury.

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:703.
The statute defines “health care provider” as
a person, partnership, limited liability partnership, limited
liability company, corporation, facility, or institution licensed or
regulated by the laws of this state to provide health care services
or professional services as a physician and qualified as such in
accordance with R.S. 40:1299.42.

Id. Section 40:1299.42 is Louisiana’s Medical Malpractice Act, which provides
a limitation on liability in exchange for health care providers “qualifying” by
paying into a patient compensation fund. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40.129.42(A).
I. Grant of Summary Judgment
Serigny argues that the parish failed to comply with section 703(B) of Title
15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes and that its noncompliance divests it of
immunity. Serigny has presented some evidence that Correcthealth was not
properly qualified under the Medical Malpractice Act because the company had
not filed under the Act at the time they were treating the prisoner. As the
district court noted, though, the Chief Legal Officer for Correcthealth declared
that “all clinical staff members of Correcthealth are licensed or certified health
care providers in the State of Louisiana.” Serigny, 2012 WL 3548029 at *3.
Since a health care provider may either be a “limited liability company” or a
“person,” we likewise conclude the district court was not in error in finding that
the parish government fulfilled its obligation to provide a health care provider
under the statute, and was not liable absent gross negligence that was a

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substantial cause of Mr. Serigny’s injuries. Serigny has presented no evidence
of gross negligence on the part of the parish and no evidence that the parish’s
actions were a substantial cause in Mr. Serigny’s death.
II. Denial of Rule 59 Motion
Serigny contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to
grant her Rule 59(e) motion.
A motion to reconsider based on an alleged discovery of new evidence
should be granted only if (1) the facts discovered are of such a nature that
they would probably change the outcome; (2) the facts alleged are actually
newly discovered and could not have been discovered earlier by proper
diligence; and (3) the facts are not merely cumulative or impeaching.

Johnson, 597 F.3d at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Serigny argues that she presented significant newly discovered evidence.
The letter she submitted suggests that Correcthealth was not properly licensed
in the state of Louisiana. We find this evidence is essentially cumulative with
the evidence previously presented. Both tend to establish that Correcthealth
was not properly licensed and qualified in the state. This new fact does not
change our analysis: since the health care providers themselves were qualified
and certified, the parish fulfilled its obligations under Section 703. We hold that
the district court did not abuse its discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.

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