UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4058
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RODOLPHO TRUJILLO, a/k/a Rudy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:11-cr-00288-MOC-1)
Submitted: November 25, 2013 Decided: December 4, 2013
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew G. Pruden, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, PLLC, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rodolpho Trujillo appeals the 135-month sentence
imposed by the district court following his guilty plea,
pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute at least
five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2012), and conspiracy to commit money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2012). On
appeal, Trujillo’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether
Trujillo’s trial counsel was ineffective. Trujillo filed a pro
se supplemental brief, in which he claims that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, that the drug amount on which
his sentence was based was erroneous, that there was
insufficient evidence to support the money laundering conviction
and related increase to his base offense level, and that there
exists an unwarranted sentencing disparity between himself and a
co-conspirator. Finding no error, we affirm.
The sole issue raised in the Anders brief is whether
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to take the steps
necessary to ensure that Trujillo received the benefit of the
safety valve provision. “A defendant can raise the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel . . . on direct appeal if and
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only if it conclusively appears from the record that his counsel
did not provide effective assistance . . . .” United States v.
Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 979 (4th Cir. 1998). To prove
ineffective assistance the defendant must satisfy two
requirements: (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). In the
context of a guilty plea, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). The present record
does not conclusively demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.
Thus, Trujillo’s claim is not cognizable on direct appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record, including Trujillo’s pro se arguments, and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district
court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform
Trujillo, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Trujillo requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for
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leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Trujillo. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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