FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 09 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GLEN BROEMER, No. 11-56043
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-05515-MMM-
RZ
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF MEMORANDUM*
INVESTIGATION; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 19, 2013**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Glen Broemer, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
in his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
alleging that defendants have followed, threatened, and physically injured him for
many years. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal
after plaintiff indicates intent to stand on complaint); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297
F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal as barred by the doctrine of res judicata);
Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1996) (summary judgment on the basis
of Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) exemption). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Broemer’s FOIA
claim against the National Security Agency because the agency provided an
affidavit establishing that Exemption 3 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), precludes
acknowledgment of the existence of the requested documents. See Minier, 88 F.3d
at 800-01 (describing how a government agency establishes that Exemption 3
applies and explaining that the agency may issue a “Glomar Response” refusing to
confirm or deny the existence of certain records if the FOIA exemption would
itself preclude the acknowledgment of such documents).
The district court properly dismissed Broemer’s claims alleging that
defendants followed, threatened, and physically injured him before May 30, 2008,
the date of judgment in one of Broemer’s prior actions, because his claims were
raised or could have been raised in that action. See Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956 (res
2 11-56043
judicata bars litigation in a subsequent action of “‘any claims that were raised or
could have been raised’ in a prior action” (emphasis and citation omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Broemer’s claims alleging that
defendants followed, threatened, and physically injured him after May 30, 2008,
because Broemer failed to identify which defendants were liable for any of the
alleged misconduct. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (plaintiff
must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
Broemer’s request that this court take judicial notice of filings in other cases,
set forth in his reply brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 11-56043