FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 10 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERRIS R. JONES, Sr., No. 12-16574
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00435-KJD-PAL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LAS VEGAS VALLEY WATER
DISTRICT; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 19, 2013**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Terris R. Jones, Sr., appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his employment action alleging race discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation under Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo. Russell Country Sportsmen v. U.S. Forest Serv., 668 F.3d 1037,
1041 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the individual
employee defendants because individual employees cannot be held liable under
Title VII. See Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jones’ race
discrimination and retaliation claims because Jones failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether he was subjected to an adverse employment
action. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2000)
(elements of prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, including “adverse
employment action”); Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115,
1124-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (elements of prima facie case of discrimination under Title
VII, including “adverse employment action”). Moreover, Jones failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies regarding his allegations of confusion about his shift
assignment. See B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099-100 (9th Cir.
2002) (Title VII plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies, and courts may
only consider incidents not listed in the original EEOC charge if they are “like or
reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jones’ racial
harassment claim because Jones failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the
alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his
employment. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642-44 (9th
Cir. 2004) (requirements for racial harassment under Title VII).
The district court properly denied Jones’ second motion for partial summary
judgment because Jones failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (setting forth requirements for summary
judgment); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (moving party
bears initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact).
Jones’ contentions regarding judicial bias, wrongdoing by defendants’
counsel, and his state tort law claims are unpersuasive and unsupported by the
record.
We do not consider Jones’ argument concerning the denial of his request for
an injunction because Jones made that request in a separate action.
AFFIRMED.
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