NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEC 10 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
STANLEY A. ANTLOCER, No. 11-15275
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01072-GMS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC;
GEOFF ADAMS, AKA Action Adams,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 19, 2013**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Stanley A. Antlocer appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal and
summary judgment order in his action arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo both a district
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
court’s dismissal with leave to amend and a grant of summary judgment. Sameena
Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Antlocer’s claims against defendant
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC because the allegations in Antlocer’s first amended
complaint did not “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief,” and Antlocer failed
timely to amend the deficiencies in his claims as instructed by the court. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009); see also Zadrozny v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 720
F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Arizona law recognizes a successor trustee’s
authority to initiate and conduct a foreclosure sale after the borrowers’ default,
without any requirement that the beneficiary demonstrate possession of the note
underlying the deed of trust.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Antlocer’s
trespass claim against defendant Adams because Antlocer failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Antlocer owned the property at the time of
the alleged trespass. See State ex rel. Purcell v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa
Cnty., 535 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Ariz. 1975) (under Arizona law, trespass is “any
unauthorized physical presence on another’s property”).
We do not consider whether the district court’s denial of Antlocer’s request
for a preliminary injunction was proper because that issue has “merged” with
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Antlocer’s substantive appeal regarding his claims. See SEC v. Mount Vernon
Mem’l Park, 664 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1982).
Antlocer’s request for judicial notice of the fact that writing his name in
capital letters on court orders constitutes an attempt to make a corporation out of
him, and that this court cease doing so, set forth on the cover of his reply brief, is
denied.
Antlocer’s contentions regarding judicial misconduct and alleged delays by
defendants in answering his pleadings are unpersuasive and unsupported by the
record.
AFFIRMED.
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