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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11770
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-24064-UU
EFRAIN CLAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DR. A. TORRES,
Official Medical Chief; individually & his official capacity,
NURSE VASSEL,
individually & in her official capacity, Et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(December 16, 2013)
Before JORDAN, FAY, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Efrain Clas, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, alleging
inadequate medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Clas filed the
present suit against several state officials, including Drs. Torres, Castillo, Medina,
Dieguez, and Nurse Vassel, of the South Florida Reception Center (“SFRC”). He
sought damages and an injunction to prevent defendants from rendering further
inadequate care. From March-September 2012, Clas saw each of the defendants
for intense symptoms of head pain he was experiencing. Drs. Castillo and Dieguez
prescribed him migraine medication, and Castillo also ordered an X-ray. Nurse
Vassel assisted Dr. Castillo. During those months, Dr. Torres approved multiple
medical requests; but the appointments were often cancelled or postponed. In
September, Dr. Medina ordered a CT scan, but Clas never received it because he
was transferred out of SFRC the following week to another facility.
Clas filed a timely amended complaint in which he alleged that (1) he also
suffered from hepatitis C; (2) the SFRC staff insisted they were monitoring his
labs; and (3) they told him that was all they could do. The district court did not
consider the amended complaint prior to its sua sponte dismissal of the original
complaint.
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On appeal, Clas argues that the district court erred in dismissing sua sponte
his complaint.
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) de novo, using the same standards governing Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals: accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mitchell v. Farcass,
112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th
Cir. 2003). We are also required to raise jurisdiction issues sua sponte, and we
review such issues de novo. United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2009).
A complaint should contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se
pleadings are liberally construed. Tannanbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,
1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
The Eighth Amendment forbids “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to
include “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291 (1976). For a prisoner to state an
Eighth Amendment inadequate medical treatment claim under § 1983, the
allegations must show (1) an objectively serious medical need; (2) deliberate
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indifference to that need by the defendant; and (3) causation between the
indifference and the plaintiff’s injury. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291,
1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009).
A “serious medical need” is one that poses a substantial risk of serious harm
if left unattended, including a medical need that has been diagnosed by a physician
as requiring treatment or that a lay person would easily recognize as requiring
medical attention or a need where a delay in treatment worsens the condition. Id.
at 1307.
To show deliberate indifference by a prison employee, a prisoner must
establish that the employee (1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm,
(2) disregarded the risk, and (3) displayed conduct beyond gross negligence. Id.
Deliberate indifference must be more than a medical judgment call or an accidental
or inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-
06, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92. The question of whether additional diagnostic techniques
or alternate forms of treatment should be employed constitutes “a classic example
of a matter for medical judgment” and does not support an Eighth Amendment
claim. Id. at 107, 97 S.Ct. at 293.
If a plaintiff can no longer obtain meaningful relief due to events that
occurred after the plaintiff filed suit, the case is moot. Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 315
F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002). A moot case or claim must be dismissed
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because mootness is jurisdictional, and a decision on the merits of a moot issue or
case would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. Id.
Absent class certification, an inmate’s claim for injunctive and declaratory
relief under § 1983 generally becomes moot once the inmate is transferred. Spears
v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988). Thus, where a prisoner has
been released from custody, no case or controversy is presented because the chance
of a repeated injury due to a prisoner’s return to an offending facility is too
speculative. See Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985).
Upon review of the record and consideration of Clas’s brief, we affirm in
part, and dismiss in part.
As an initial matter, we note that the district court should have considered
the amended complaint prior to its sua sponte dismissal. Nevertheless, we affirm
the dismissal with respect to Clas’s claim for damages because neither complaint
sufficiently alleged an Eighth Amendment violation by any of the defendants.
First, accepting Clas’s allegations of intense migraine-like symptoms as
demonstrative of a serious medical need, he nonetheless failed to establish
deliberate indifference to that need because he admitted receiving medical
attention for his symptoms. The attention was significant. Dr. Torres granted all
of Clas’s medical attention requests; Dr. Castillo prescribed him medication for
his symptoms and ordered an X-ray; Nurse Vassel assisted Dr. Castillo; Dr.
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Dieguez also prescribed him medication for his headaches; and Dr. Medina
ordered a CT scan, though it was never rendered due to Clas’s transfer. There
might have been some delays but nothing amounting to a constitutional violation.
Although Clas felt these responses were inappropriate or inadequate, a doctor’s
choice of treatment and testing is a matter of medical judgment and does not state
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107,
97 S.Ct. at 293. Second, although Clas also alleged that he had hepatitis C, he
abandoned any argument concerning the treatment of that condition on appeal. See
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Besides, a claim based on
his hepatitis C fails on the merits because he failed to show the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to, or that some defendants were even aware of, the
condition. In fact, he admitted that the SFRC monitored his hepatitis C; and he did
not allege that his lab results were abnormal or demonstrated a need for treatment.
Nor did he allege that his migraines were connected to the condition.
Based on the above considerations, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Clas’s complaint with respect to his claim for monetary relief.
We also note that Clas has a pending habeas petition before our Court and
that the record from that appeal shows that he was released altogether from custody
in August 2013 due to the expiration of his sentence. (See Ct. App. Case No. 13-
11771, Doc. 11 at 3, Exh. A). Given the release from custody, we dismiss Clas’s
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claim for injunctive relief as moot. See Cotterall, 755 F.2d at 780; Sierra Club,
315 F.3d at 1299.
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
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