T.C. Memo. 2013-287
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ARTHUR MASON DUPRE, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 2793-12. Filed December 19, 2013.
Arthur Mason DuPre, pro se.
Sze Wan Florence Char, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
WELLS, Judge: Respondent determined the following deficiencies in
petitioner’s Federal income tax and accuracy-related penalties pursuant to section
6662(a)1 for his 2007 and 2008 tax years:
1
Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue
(continued...)
-2-
[*2] Penalty
Year Deficiency sec. 6662(a)
2007 $18,149 $3,630
2008 14,555 2,911
After petitioner’s concessions,2 the remaining issues that we must decide are (1)
whether petitioner is entitled to deduct on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions,
expenses of $35,3113 and $35,358 for his 2007 and 2008 tax years, respectively;
(2) whether petitioner is entitled to deduct on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From
Business, expenses of $55,722 and $33,4704 for his 2007 and 2008 tax years,
1
(...continued)
Code of 1986, as amended (Code) and in effect for the years in issue, and Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all
monetary amounts to the nearest dollar.
2
In the notice of deficiency respondent determined that petitioner had not
included interest income of $200 in his 2008 taxable income. The parties have
stipulated that petitioner received the taxable interest income during his 2008 tax
year and that petitioner did not report that income on his 2008 Federal income tax
return. Petitioner makes no additional claims with regard to that income.
Accordingly, we deem petitioner to have conceded this issue. See Rule 149(b).
3
On his 2007 Federal income tax return petitioner incorrectly reports total
Schedule A expenses of $35,311. However, we believe that petitioner made a
mathematical error of $5, and the correct tally of amounts reported is $35,306.
4
On his 2008 Federal income tax return, petitioner incorrectly reports total
Schedule C expenses of $33,470. However, we believe that petitioner made a
mathematical error of $100, and the correct tally of amounts reported is $33,370.
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[*3] respectively; and (3) whether petitioner is liable for the accuracy-related
penalties pursuant to section 6662(a) for his 2007 and 2008 tax years.5
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts and certain exhibits have been stipulated. The parties’
stipulated facts are incorporated in this opinion by reference and are found
accordingly. Additionally, petitioner is deemed to have admitted undenied
allegations set forth in respondent’s requests for admissions. See Rule 90(c). At
the time of filing the petition, petitioner resided in New Jersey.
During 2007 and 2008, petitioner was a part-time professor of mathematics
and computer science at Felician College in Lodi, New Jersey; Rutgers University
at Newark, New Jersey; the College of New Jersey in Ewing, New Jersey; Rider
University in Lawrenceville, New Jersey; and William Paterson University of New
Jersey in Wayne, New Jersey (collectively, colleges). Petitioner taught classes up
to six days per week; he spent approximately 60 hours per week teaching and 30
hours per week grading student material, preparing lectures, researching, and
traveling to, from, and between colleges. Petitioner maintained a Web site for
some of the courses that he taught, but colleges managed enrollment of students
5
The remaining adjustments in the notice of deficiency are computational
and will be resolved by our holdings on the aforementioned issues. Consequently,
we do not specifically address the remaining adjustments in this opinion.
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[*4] and dictated class schedules, subjects to be covered, and course duration. All
but one of colleges provided books and other materials for petitioner’s classes.
The colleges provided petitioner with shared office space. Petitioner was paid a
fixed amount for each class that he taught, and each of the colleges reported
petitioner’s earnings to him on a Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement.
On his 2007 and 2008 Federal income tax returns petitioner reported on
Schedules A the following unreimbursed employee expenses that he claims are
related to his employment with colleges:
Schedule A expense 2007 2008
Course-related books $5,763 $5,840
Home office expenses:
Secretarial word processing 6,400 6,400
Desktop computer 2,684 1,843
Printer 325 142
Computer software 5,027 5,135
Rent 3,450 3,553
Electricity 824 867
Office supplies 1,242 1,356
Telephone and cable modem 2,132 2,263
New Brunswick Library copy services 2,046 1,731
-5-
[*5]
Travel 3,229 3,628
Meals 2,184 2,600
Total 35,306 35,358
During 2007 and 2008, petitioner also attempted to restart his flute making
shop at which he created flutes from bamboo and other raw materials. Petitioner
sold some of the flutes at a flea market, but he also gave some to friends.
Petitioner also used some of the bamboo and other raw materials to make other
instruments and furniture. From 2002 to 2006, petitioner did not generate any
profit from his flute making and selling. Petitioner did not track or record the
number of hours he spent flute making, the prices he charged for finished flutes
and other instruments, the flutes and other instruments that he sold, the inventory
of raw materials to finished products, or the expenses that he incurred. Petitioner
did not create a separate bank account for his flute making activity, advertise his
finished products, or maintain a Web site.
On his 2007 and 2008 Federal income tax returns petitioner reported on
Schedules C the following expenses that he claims are related to his flute making
activity:
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[*6]
Schedule C expense 2007 2008
Electricity $1,563 $1,420
Rent 8,600 8,600
Bamboo 18,000 8,920
Lacquer and polyurethane 1,842 1,620
Propane 848 1,200
Shop furniture and equipment 8,654 3,840
Musical tuning and recording equipment 3,880 1,930
Miscellaneous tool and supplies 12,335 5,840
Total 55,722 33,370
Throughout 2007 and 2008, petitioner had no savings but provided financial
support to and performed household chores for his former girlfriend and her 24-
year-old son, who has cerebral palsy. Petitioner testified that he paid her rent for
use of her basement as his flute making workspace. During 2008, petitioner
alleges, the basement flooded, ruining his receipts and equipment. However,
neither petitioner nor his former girlfriend filed an insurance claim for the flood
damage.
On October 25, 2011, respondent issued petitioner a notice of deficiency
regarding his 2007 and 2008 tax years, determining an income tax deficiency
and an accuracy-related penalty pursuant to section 6662(a) for each year. On
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[*7] January 30, 2012, petitioner’s petition was filed with this Court, challenging
respondent’s contentions.6
OPINION
I. Burden of Proof
Generally, the Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency is presumed
correct, and the taxpayer has the burden of proving it incorrect. Rule 142(a);
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Section 7491(a)(1) provides an
exception that shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner as to any factual
issue relevant to a taxpayer’s liability for tax if: (1) the taxpayer introduces
credible evidence with respect to that issue and (2) the taxpayer satisfies certain
other conditions, including substantiation of any item and cooperation with the
Government’s requests for witnesses, documents, other information, and meetings.
Sec. 7491(a)(2); see also Rule 142(a)(2). The taxpayer bears the burden of
6
We note that petitioner failed to comply with the Court’s orders to file a
posttrial brief. When a party fails to file a brief altogether, such a failure has been
held by this Court to justify the dismissal of all issues as to which the nonfiling
party has the burden of proof. See Rule 123; Stringer v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.
693 (1985), aff’d without published opinion, 789 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1986). While
we are unwilling to enter a default judgment against petitioner for failure to file a
brief, we view his failure as an indication of his tenuous position with regard to
the issues in question. See McGee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-308, 2000
WL 1434240, at *6.
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[*8] proving that the taxpayer has met the requirements of section 7491(a). Rolfs
v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 471, 483 (2010), aff’d, 668 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012).
Petitioner did not argue that the burden should shift, and he failed to comply
with the substantiation and cooperation requirements. Accordingly, the burden of
proof remains on petitioner.
II. Schedule A Expenses
We first consider whether petitioner is entitled to deduct Schedule A
expenses of $35,311 and $35,358 for his 2007 and 2008 tax years, respectively.
A. Home Office Expenses
Petitioner claimed home office expense deductions on his 2007 and 2008
Federal income tax returns. Section 280A(c)(1) permits a deduction for the
portion of a residence that is, inter alia, regularly or exclusively used (1) as the
principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer or (2) as a
place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or
dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business. However,
if the taxpayer is an employee, the home office must be for the convenience of the
employer; it cannot be only a place at which the employee chooses to do some of
his work. Sec. 280A(c)(1) (flush language); Frankel v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.
318, 323, 326 (1984). Moreover, it must be used exclusively for the employer’s
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[*9] work and not for personal use. Sec. 280A(c)(1); Cadwallader v.
Commissioner, 919 F.2d 1273, 1275 (7th Cir. 1990), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1989-356.
Petitioner has not proved that his home office was used exclusively in
connection with his employment or that the home office was used for the
convenience of colleges. Petitioner’s own testimony revealed that colleges
provided him with an office and that he likely did not use his home office
exclusively for his work for colleges. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to
deduct home office expenses pursuant to section 280A(c)(1) on his 2007 and 2008
Federal income tax returns.
B. Travel, Meal, and Other Expenses
Petitioner claims that the remaining expenses were unreimbursed employee
expenses deductible pursuant to section 162. Section 162(a) permits a taxpayer to
deduct the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on a trade or business. See Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971). In order for a taxpayer “to be engaged in a trade
or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and
regularity and * * * the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity
must be for income or profit.” Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35
(1987). An expense is ordinary if it is normal, usual, or customary within a
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[*10] particular trade, business, or industry or arises from a transaction “of
common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved.” Deputy v. du
Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). An expense is necessary if it is appropriate and
helpful for the development of the business. See Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. at 353; Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 471
(1943). Section 262(a) disallows deductions for personal, living, or family
expenses. See also sec. 1.162-17(a), Income Tax Regs.
The term “trade or business” as used in section 162(a) includes the trade or
business of being an employee. See Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 377
(1970); Martell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-115, at *24. However, to
deduct expenses incurred through the performance of services as an employee, the
taxpayer must not have the right to reimbursement for such expenses from his or
her employer. See Orvis v. Commissioner, 788 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1984-533. Along with other miscellaneous itemized deductions,
unreimbursed employee expenses are subject to the 2% of adjusted gross income
limitation under section 67(a). See sec. 67(a) and (b).
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the
burden of proving that he is entitled to any claimed deductions. INDOPCO, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). This includes the burden of
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[*11] substantiation. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89
(1975), aff’d per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); Martell v. Commissioner,
at *24; sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs. Taxpayers must maintain records
relating to their income and expenses and must prove their entitlement to all
claimed deductions, credits, and expenses in controversy. See sec. 6001; Rule
142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. at 84; Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. at 115.7 A claimed expense (other than those subjected to heightened
scrutiny under section 2748) may be deductible even where the taxpayer is unable
to fully substantiate it. Christine v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-144, 2010
7
One method of substantiating an ordinary and necessary business expense
is through “preparation of a daily diary or record of expenditures, maintained in
sufficient detail to enable * * * [the employee] to readily identify the amount and
nature of any expenditure, and the preservation of supporting documents,
especially in connection with large or exceptional expenditures.” Sec.
1.162-17(d)(2), Income Tax Regs.
8
Petitioner claims travel and meal expense deductions on the Schedules A of
his 2007 and 2008 Federal income tax returns. Travel expenses, including meals
and lodging away from home, are subject to the specific and more stringent
substantiation requirements of sec. 274. See sec. 274(d). To deduct these
expenses, the taxpayer must substantiate by adequate records or sufficient
evidence to corroborate the taxpayer’s own testimony: (1) the amount of the
expense; (2) the time and place of the travel or meal expenditure; and (3) the
business purpose of the expense. Id. However, because we conclude that
petitioner has not satisfied the less stringent standard for substantiation of sec. 162
expenses in general, it is unnecessary to further discuss the more stringent
substantiation requirements of sec. 274.
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[*12] WL 2640125, at *2, aff’d, 475 Fed. Appx. 259 (9th Cir. 2012). The
regulations provide that “[w]here records are incomplete or documentary proof is
unavailable, it may be possible to establish the amount of the expenditures by
approximations based upon reliable secondary sources of information and
collateral evidence.” Sec. 1.162-17(d)(3), Income Tax Regs. However, there must
be sufficient evidence in the record to provide a basis upon which an estimate may
be made and to permit us to conclude that a deductible expense, rather than a
nondeductible personal expense, was incurred in at least the amount allowed.
Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957); Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930); Vanicek v. Commissioner,
85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985); Christine v. Commissioner, 2010 WL 2640125, at
*2. In these instances, the Court is permitted to make as close an approximation
of the allowable expense as it can, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose
inexactitude is of his or her own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d at
543-544. In making such an approximation,
due consideration will be given to the reasonableness of the stated
expenditures for the claimed purposes in relation to the taxpayer’s
circumstances (such as his income and the nature of his occupation),
to the reliability and accuracy of records in connection with other
items more readily lending themselves to detailed record-keeping, and
to all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case.
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[*13] Sec. 1.162-17(d)(3), Income Tax Regs. In deciding whether a taxpayer has
satisfied his or her burden of substantiating a deduction, we are not required to
accept the taxpayer’s self-serving, undocumented testimony. Niedringhaus v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 219-220 (1992); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
74, 77 (1986).
Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof. Although it generally may
be “possible to establish the amount of the expenditures by approximations based
upon reliable secondary sources of information and collateral evidence”, see sec.
1.162-17(d)(3), Income Tax Regs., we conclude that petitioner failed to submit
sufficient reliable evidence to provide a basis upon which an estimate could be
made and to permit us to conclude that he incurred a deductible expense, rather
than a nondeductible personal expense, see Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. at
742-743. Petitioner has not submitted any written substantiation whatsoever of
the Schedule A expenses reported on his 2007 and 2008 Federal income tax
returns but instead admits that he has no such written substantiation. Petitioner
relies only on his oral testimony, which we find to be uncorroborated, self-serving,
and unreliable. See Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. at 77. Moreover,
petitioner has failed to prove that his claimed unreimbursed employee business
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[*14] expenses were, in fact, not reimbursable.9 See Orvis v. Commissioner, 788
F.2d at 1408. Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to deduct
Schedule A unreimbursed employee expenses of $35,311 and $35,358 for his
2007 and 2008 tax years, respectively.
III. Schedule C Expenses
We next consider whether petitioner is entitled to deduct Schedule C
expenses of $55,722 and $33,470 for his 2007 and 2008 tax years, respectively.10
Petitioner claims that these expenses were related to his flute making activity and
are deductible as either ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses
pursuant to section 162 or as expenses incurred in transactions entered into for
9
At trial petitioner alleged for the first time that he was not an employee but
an independent contractor. Petitioner did not raise this matter in his petition or
amend his pleadings to include it. We do not consider an issue that has not been
pleaded. See, e.g., Frentz v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 485, 491 (1965), aff’d, 375
F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1967); Sicanoff Vegetable Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.
1056, 1066 (1957) (and the cases cited thereat), rev’d on other grounds, 251 F.2d
764 (7th Cir. 1958). This is particularly true in a case like this where the issue
cannot be considered without surprise and prejudice to the other party. See Estate
of Mandels v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 61, 73 (1975). Accordingly, we will not
consider petitioner’s allegation that he was an independent contractor.
10
In the notice of deficiency, respondent fully disallowed the Schedule C
expenses for both his 2007 and 2008 tax years but allowed petitioner to deduct on
his Schedule A the flute making expenses for his 2007 taxable year to the extent of
the gross receipts amount of $13,264. As is the case with other Schedule A
expenses, the allowed deduction is subject to the 2% of adjusted gross income
limitation pursuant to sec. 67(a).
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[*15] profit pursuant to section 212. Respondent contends that petitioner is not
entitled to a deduction because he failed to properly substantiate these expenses
and because the expenses are not deductible pursuant to section 183.11
As we stated above, deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the
taxpayer bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to any claimed deductions,
including the burden of substantiation. Sec. 6001; INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. at 84; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 89; Martell
v. Commissioner, at *24; sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner has
failed to carry that burden. As was the case with his Schedule A expenses,
petitioner has not submitted any written substantiation of the Schedule C expenses
reported on his 2007 and 2008 Federal income tax returns and relies only on his
oral testimony, which we find to be uncorroborated, self-serving, and unreliable.
See Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. at 77. Petitioner admits that he did not
maintain records as he should have and instead depended on his own unreliable
estimates to track costs, inventory, merchandise prices, and hours spent flute
making. Petitioner could not produce bank records because he did not maintain a
11
Generally, sec. 183 limits the deductions for an “activity not engaged in
for profit” to the amount of gross income received from the activity. Sec. 183(a)
and (b). We do not consider whether petitioner engaged in his flute making
activity for profit because we sustain respondent’s disallowance of petitioner’s
Schedule C expenses on account of petitioner’s lack of substantiation.
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[*16] separate bank account for his flute making activity; and he could not
produce credit card statements because he paid all of his expenses with cash or
checks.
Petitioner alleges that his minimal records from his flute making activity,
which consisted of receipts, were destroyed in a flood during 2008. If a taxpayer’s
records are no longer available on account of circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s
control, such as a fire, flood, or other casualty, then the taxpayer is expected to
substantiate deductions by records reconstructed through contacts with third
parties and other reasonable means. Gizzi v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 342, 345
(1975); Fernandez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-216, 2011 WL 3875061, at
*2. Petitioner not only failed to provide any reconstruction of the lost receipts; he
also has not proved that there was a flood. Petitioner did not offer into evidence
any insurance claim or elicit testimony from his former girlfriend who owned the
house in which the flood occurred. He relies only on his own testimony, through
which he admits that the flood is not listed in the city’s records and that the flood
was not a flood, but a “particular water circumstance”.
We conclude that petitioner has not properly substantiated his expenses
related to his flute making activity and, consequently, that petitioner is not entitled
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[*17] to deduct Schedule C expenses of $55,722 and $33,470 for his 2007 and
2008 tax years, respectively.
IV. Accuracy-Related Penalties
Section 6662(a) imposes an accuracy-related penalty of 20% of any portion
of an underpayment that is attributable to causes specified in subsection (b).
Subsection (b) applies the penalty to any underpayment attributable to, inter alia, a
“substantial understatement” of income tax. An “understatement” is the excess of
the amount of tax required to be shown on the return over the amount of tax that is
actually shown on the return, reduced by any rebate. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(A). A
“substantial understatement” of income tax exists if the amount of the
understatement for the taxable year exceeds the greater of (1) 10% of the tax
required to be shown on the return or (2) $5,000. Sec. 6662(d)(1)(A).
Generally, the Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to
any penalty, including the accuracy-related penalty. Sec. 7491(c); Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). To meet that burden, the Commissioner
must come forward with sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to
impose the relevant penalty. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 446. However,
once the Commissioner has met the burden of production, the burden of proof
remains with the taxpayer, including the burden of proving that the penalty is
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[*18] inappropriate because of substantial authority or reasonable cause under
section 6664. See Rule 142(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 446-449.
Respondent contends that the section 6662 penalties for petitioner’s 2007
and 2008 tax years are justified on the basis of substantial understatement of
income tax.12 See sec. 6662(b)(2). For his 2007 tax year petitioner reported a tax
liability of $5,295 and respondent determined a correct tax liability of $23,444.
Petitioner understated his tax liability by $18,149, an amount which exceeds
$5,000, which is greater than $2,344, 10% of the amount required to be shown on
their return. For his 2008 tax year petitioner reported a tax liability of $14,264 and
respondent determined a correct tax liability of $28,819. Petitioner understated his
tax liability by $14,555, an amount which exceeds $5,000, which is greater than
$2,882, 10% of the amount required to be shown on their return. Accordingly, we
12
Respondent also contends that petitioner was negligent because he failed
to substantiate any of his Schedule A and Schedule C expenses for his 2007 and
2008 tax years. However, only one accuracy-related penalty may be applied with
respect to any given portion of an underpayment, even if that portion is subject to
more than one of the types of misconduct described in sec. 6662. Jaroff v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-276, 2004 WL 2809568, at *6 (citing sec.
1.6662-2(c), Income Tax Regs.). Because we conclude that petitioner is liable for
the accuracy-related penalties for substantially understating his income tax for his
2007 and 2008 tax years, it is unnecessary to consider whether petitioner was
negligent.
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[*19] conclude that respondent met his burden of production in showing that
petitioner substantially understated his income tax for his 2007 and 2008 taxable
years.
The amount of an understatement on which the penalty is imposed will be
reduced by the portion of the understatement that is attributable to the tax
treatment of an item (1) that was supported by “substantial authority” or (2) for
which the relevant facts were “adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement
attached to the return” and “there is a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of
such item”. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(B). Petitioner does not argue that the amounts of his
understatements should be reduced because he had substantial authority for an
item or because his position with respect to an item was adequately disclosed.
Accordingly, we do not reduce petitioner’s understatements pursuant to section
6662(d)(2)(B).
Additionally, section 6664(c)(1) provides that the accuracy-related penalty
shall not apply to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was
reasonable cause for the taxpayer’s position with respect to that portion and that
the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to that portion. The determination of
whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith within the
meaning of section 6664(c)(1) is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
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[*20] all of the pertinent facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income
Tax Regs. The most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to
assess his proper tax liability for the year. Id. “Circumstances that may indicate
reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law
that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including the
experience, knowledge, and education of the taxpayer.” Id. Taxpayers
demonstrate reasonable cause when they exercise ordinary business care and
prudence. Richardson v. Commissioner, 125 F.3d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 1997), aff’g
T.C. Memo. 1995-554.
Petitioner has not established reasonable cause for the underpayments or
that the returns were prepared in good faith. See sec. 6664(c)(1); Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 448-449. Petitioner contends that he had no savings
and that he provided financial support to and performed household chores for his
former girlfriend and her 24-year-old son, who has cerebral palsy. While we
sympathize with petitioner for his financial hardship and commend him for his
charitable endeavors, we do not conclude that either his hardship or his charity
qualifies as a reasonable cause to excuse his underpayments of tax. Consequently,
on the basis of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is liable for accuracy-related
penalties pursuant to section 6662(a) for his 2007 and 2008 tax years.
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[*21] V. Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that (1) petitioner is not entitled to deduct Schedule A
expenses of $35,311 and $35,358 for his 2007 and 2008 tax years, respectively;
(2) petitioner is not entitled to deduct Schedule C expenses of $55,722 and
$33,470 for his 2007 and 2008 tax years, respectively; and (3) petitioner is liable
for the accuracy-related penalties pursuant to section 6662(a) for his 2007 and
2008 tax years. Consequently, we sustain respondent’s determinations that
petitioner is liable for income tax deficiencies and for accuracy-related penalties
for his 2007 and 2008 tax years.
In reaching these holdings, we have considered all the parties’ arguments,
and, to the extent not addressed herein, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant,
or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered for
respondent.