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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-12302
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cv-00432-JDW-AEP
DELAILAH LORENZI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(December 30, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Delailah Lorenzi appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Social
Security Administration’s denial of her applications for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). On
appeal, Lorenzi argues the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) determination that
she was not disabled was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, she
claims: (1) the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of Lorenzi’s treating physician
and her testimony regarding her hand problems; and (2) the ALJ erred by not
including a functional limitation of the hands in the hypothetical posed to the
vocational expert (VE). After review, we affirm the district court. 1
I.
Lorenzi contends the ALJ improperly rejected her treating physician’s
opinion, which established that her fibromyalgia caused hand problems. Lorenzi
also argues her testimony regarding her hand problems was not properly refuted
and should be accepted as true.
The ALJ must give the testimony of a treating physician “substantial or
considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary.” Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). Good cause
exists when: (1) the opinion “was not bolstered by the evidence,” (2) the “evidence
1
We review the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo, but “we review the resulting
decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence.” Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
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supported a contrary finding,” or (3) the “opinion was conclusory or inconsistent
with the doctor’s own medical records.” Id. at 1240-41. The ALJ must clearly
articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician.
Id. at 1241.
When a claimant attempts to establish disability through her own testimony
concerning pain or other subjective symptoms, she must show evidence of an
underlying medical condition, and either (1) “objective medical evidence
confirming the severity of the alleged pain,” or (2) “that the objectively determined
medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.”
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). If the ALJ fails to
articulate the reasons for discrediting subjective testimony, then, as a matter of law,
the testimony must be accepted as true. Id.
The ALJ did not err by failing to accord the treating physician’s opinion
controlling weight. The ALJ articulated specific reasons for doing so, and those
reasons are supported by substantial evidence. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241.2
The treating physician’s evaluation evidencing hand problems was inconsistent
with a later evaluation by the same physician, which indicated that Lorenzi’s
extremeties were normal and that there was no small joint pain or swelling.
2
Lorenzi argues, for the first time on appeal, that the ALJ erred in finding that a report of the
treating physician was written in January 2009. Because Lorenzi did not present this argument to
the district court, we decline to address it. See Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155,
1161 (11th Cir. 2004).
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Moreover, the later evaluation was internally inconsistent, and stated Lorenzi had
taken a hiatus from treatment, indicating that her symptoms were not very severe.
The ALJ clearly articulated “good cause” for declining to give significant weight
to the treating physician’s evaluation. See id. at 1240-41.
The ALJ’s finding that Lorenzi’s testimony was not entirely credible was
also supported by substantial evidence. Many of Lorenzi’s descriptions of her
hand pain were inconsistent with the medical documentation and with her own
descriptions of her daily activities. See Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225; 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i). Although we have indicated that the “hallmark” of
fibromyalgia is a “lack of objective evidence,” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208,
1211 (11th Cir. 2005), the ALJ did not rely on the absence of objective evidence of
Lorenzi’s hand pain. Rather, the ALJ relied on the inconsistencies between
Lorenzi’s descriptions of her daily activities, the objective medical evidence, and
her claims of pain. The ALJ thus articulated explicit and adequate reasons for
choosing to discredit Lorenzi’s testimony.
II.
Lorenzi also argues the ALJ committed reversible error by giving the VE an
incomplete hypothetical. Lorenzi claims a complete hypothetical would have
included a functional limitation of her hands. However, because substantial
evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Lorenzi’s hand limitation was not
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a functional limitation, the ALJ was not required to include it in the hypothetical
posed to the VE. See Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“The hypothetical need only include ‘the claimant’s impairments,’ not
each and every symptom of the claimant.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the
ALJ properly relied on the VE’s answer to the complete question regarding the
existence of jobs.
AFFIRMED.
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