FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 30 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-30154
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:09-cr-00120-BR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ALEXANDER LUKASHOV, Jr., a.k.a.
Aleksandr Lukashov, Jr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 17, 2013**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Alexander Lukashov, Jr., appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the $4,814.69 in restitution imposed following his jury-trial conviction
for aggravated sexual abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The parties’ joint motion
that this case be submitted on the briefs without oral argument is granted.
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Lukashov contends that the district court erred by imposing restitution
because there was not sufficient evidence showing that the victim’s therapy costs
were caused by Lukashov’s sexual abuse. We review for clear error the district
court’s factual findings supporting a restitution order. See United States v. Yeung,
672 F.3d 594, 600 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court did not clearly err in finding
that Lukashov’s sexual abuse of the victim proximately caused her need for
therapy. See id. (“[A] defendant’s conduct need not be the sole cause of the
loss.”).
Lukashov also contends that the district court erred by imposing restitution
after the 90-day limit outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5). We review for harmless
error any failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 3664. See
United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2006). Because
Lukashov has not shown any actual prejudice from the delay in the entry of the
restitution order, the district court’s failure to comply with the 90-day time limit
was harmless. See id.
AFFIRMED.
2 12-30154