UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7257
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JIMMIE VANCE GRUBBS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:06-cr-00048-RJC-CH-1; 3:11-cv-00125-
RJC)
Submitted: December 19, 2013 Decided: January 7, 2014
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jimmie Vance Grubbs, Appellant Pro Se. Kimlani M. Ford,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jimmie Vance Grubbs seeks to appeal the district
court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. In
civil cases in which the United States or its officer or agency
is a party, parties have sixty days after the entry of the
district court’s final judgment or order to file a notice of
appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). A district court may
extend the time to file a notice of appeal upon a party’s motion
for an extension filed within thirty days after the expiration
of the original appeal period and a showing of excusable neglect
or good cause warranting an extension. Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(5)(A); Washington v. Bumgarner, 882 F.2d 899, 900-01 (4th
Cir. 1989).
Grubbs’ sixty-day appeal period expired on July 16,
2013. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Grubbs’ notice of appeal
was filed, at the earliest, on July 30, 2013, outside the sixty-
day appeal period but within the thirty-day excusable neglect
period. Because Grubbs specifically sought additional time to
file an appeal, we construe Grubbs’ notice of appeal as a Rule
4(a)(5) motion for extension of time.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court
for the limited purpose of determining whether Grubbs has
demonstrated excusable neglect or good cause warranting an
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extension of the appeal period. The record, as supplemented,
will then be returned to this court for further consideration.
REMANDED
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