12‐5079‐cv
SEC v. David Amsel and Mayer Amsel
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of January, two thousand
fourteen.
PRESENT:
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
PETER W. HALL,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
____________________________________
United States Securities and Exchange Commission,
Plaintiff ‐ Appellee,
v. 12‐5079‐cv
East Delta Resources Corp., Victor Sun,
Defendants,
David Amsel, c/o Mayer Amsel, Mayer Amsel,
Defendants ‐ Appellants.
______________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLEE: Anne K. Small, General Counsel;
Michael A. Conley, Deputy General
Counsel; Jacob H. Stillman, Solicitor;
Susan S. McDonald, Senior Litigation
Counsel; Jacob R. Loshin, Attorney;
United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, Washington,
D.C.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: Mayer Amsel, pro se, Brooklyn, NY.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: David Amsel, pro se, Brooklyn, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Feuerstein, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Mayer and David Amsel, proceeding pro se, appeal the district court’s
judgment for the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
finding them liable for fraud in violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a), § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b‐5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b‐5; and registration improprieties in violation of § 5(a) and (c) of
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the Securities Act, 17 U.S.C. § 77e(a) and (c). We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.1
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, for substantially
the reasons set forth by the district court. There was no genuine dispute that the
Amsels conducted wash sales and other prohibited coordinated trades, that they
recklessly disregarded the misleading nature of their trades, and that the sales
involved securities sold in interstate commerce.
The Amsels challenge the district court’s factual findings at trial and the
sufficiency of the evidence. We decline to consider their arguments regarding the
reliability of the SEC’s expert’s testimony and the relevance of certain deposition
transcripts, as these arguments were not raised before the district court. See
Virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2005). “[A] party is not
entitled to challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury’s verdict on a given issue unless it has timely moved in the district court for
1
The standards of review are neither contested nor determinative. See L.I. Head
Start Child Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Econ. Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau Cnty., 710 F.3d 57, 65
(2d Cir. 2013) (sufficiency of the evidence); Jimico Enters., Inc. v. Lehigh Gas Corp., 708
F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary judgment and size of a damages award);
Serricchio v. Wachovia Secs., LLC, 658 F.3d 169, 191 (2d Cir. 2011) (decision to award
damages); City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, L.L.C., 645 F.3d 114, 131 (2d Cir. 2011)
(entry of default judgment).
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judgment as a matter of law on that issue.” Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d
149, 164 (2d Cir. 1998). The same principle applies at bench trials. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(c). We perceive no manifest injustice that would warrant reaching
these waived claims.
The Amsels have failed to demonstrate that the district court clearly erred
in accepting the SEC’s calculations as a reasonable approximation of their unjust
enrichment. See S.E.C. v. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1475 (2d Cir. 1996).
They contend that the SEC’s calculations turn on the physical impossibility that
they sold more shares than they owned. Not so. The SEC noted that the Amsels
sold more shares than they purchased, which was true: they sold the shares given
to them free of charge for their role as consultants, including those issued
pursuant to an invalid S‐8 registration.
Liberally construed, the Amsels’ brief challenges the district court’s
personal jurisdiction over David Amsel, in light of his Canadian citizenship and
residency. He waived this defense by failing to raise it in the district court and,
instead, proceeding with the litigation. See Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067,
1070 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
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We further affirm the district court’s default judgment against David
Amsel. David Amsel did not explain his absence to the court, and Appellant
Mayer Amsel could not do so on his behalf. Cf. Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d
137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 1654. This justified the entry of
default judgment. Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64
(2d Cir. 1986).
Finally, we decline to reach the Amsels’ waived, non‐jurisdictional
argument that the U.S. securities laws do not apply to their trades because some
of their brokerage accounts were in Canada. See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank
Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
We have considered all of the Amsels’ arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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