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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-10663
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cr-00053-GAP-TBS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff -Appellee,
versus
WILLIE JEROME SANDERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(January 15, 2014)
Before PRYOR, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Willie Jerome Sanders appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a), and 924(e).
After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
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Sanders was charged with possession of a Winchester 12-gauge shotgun and
ammunition. Because Sanders had several prior convictions, he faced a mandatory
minimum term of fifteen years’ imprisonment. At trial, Sanders stipulated that he
possessed the firearm and ammunition and that he had prior convictions, but he
argued that the government had to prove that his purely intrastate possession of a
firearm and ammunition “substantially” affected interstate commerce rather than
merely showing some “minimal nexus.”
The government proffered evidence and testimony that the firearm and
ammunition had been manufactured outside of Florida and recovered in the state.
Sanders moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that this testimony was
insufficient to establish a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. The court
overruled the motion, noting that the argument was foreclosed by precedent. The
jury found Sanders guilty.
The presentence investigation report identified Sanders as an armed career
criminal under § 924(e) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b), which subjected him to a fifteen-
year mandatory minimum sentence. Without the enhancement, Sanders would
have faced a sentencing range of 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment and a statutory
maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Sanders
objected, arguing that the court should not enhance his sentence because his prior
convictions had not been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. At an
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evidentiary hearing, the government proffered evidence and testimony to establish
the validity of the prior convictions and Sanders’s identity as the perpetrator of
those offenses. The district court overruled Sanders’s objections and, although it
agreed that the mandatory minimum sentence was arbitrary and unjust, sentenced
Sanders to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
Sanders now appeals, raising two arguments: First, Sanders contends that §
922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to him. Second, he argues that his sentence is
invalid because the government did not prove his prior convictions to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. We address each in turn.
I. Section 922
Sanders argues that § 922(g) is unconstitutional because something more
than a minimal interstate nexus is required under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995). He notes that his conduct was purely intrastate. We review the
constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099,
1107 (11th Cir. 2010).
Sanders’s argument is squarely foreclosed by precedent. See, e.g., United
States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding § 922(g)
constitutional as applied because “[t]he jurisdictional requirement is satisfied when
the firearm in question has a ‘minimal nexus’ to interstate commerce” such as
travelling in interstate commerce). “We are bound by prior panel decisions unless
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or until we overrule them while sitting en banc, or they are overruled by the
Supreme Court.” Id.
II. Prior convictions
Sanders next argues that, for the court to impose an enhanced mandatory
minimum sentence, the government had to prove his prior convictions to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. We review constitutional sentencing issues de novo.
United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 978 (11th Cir. 2008).
The fact of a prior conviction is not an element of the offense that needs to
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, 239–40 (1998). We have previously noted that, until the Supreme Court
specifically overrules itself, we are bound by Almendarez–Torres. United States v.
Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006).
As Sanders concedes, the Supreme Court has not overruled Almendarez–
Torres. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. at ___ n.1, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2160 n.1
(2013) (explaining that the Court was not reconsidering its decision in
Almendarez–Torres). Thus, it remains binding precedent, and the government was
not required to prove Sanders’s prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Greer, 440 F.3d at 1273.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sanders’s conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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