NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAN 15 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JILL THORNSBERRY, No. 12-55655
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-CV-02459-MDD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 5, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, WARDLAW, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Jill Thornsberry (Thornsberry) appeals the district court’s order entering
summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security
(Commissioner). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The district court did not err in concluding that substantial evidence
supported the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) to accord the treating
physicians’ opinions little weight. The treating physicians’ opinions were
conclusory, brief and inconsistent with the record. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, a doctor’s opinion
that a claimant is disabled is not itself a medical opinion but an issue reserved
exclusively for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1). The ALJ had
no duty to recontact the treating physicians before finding Thornsberry not
disabled because the doctors’ reports were neither ambiguous nor insufficient to
make a disability determination. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217
(9th Cir. 2005).
Nor did the district court err in finding that the ALJ properly applied res
judicata to Thornsberry’s application. See Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691, 693
(9th Cir. 1988). Thornsberry did not present any evidence to suggest that her
condition deteriorated, or that circumstances changed since the denial of benefits in
2004. Our opinion in Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 512 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc), does not apply, as the matter before us does not involve Chevron
deference.
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Finally, the district court did not err in concluding that substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. The ALJ provided
“specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting Thornsberry’s statements
about the intensity, persistence and limiting effect of her symptoms to the extent
they were inconsistent with the residual functional capacity assessment.
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The
ALJ correctly considered Thornsberry’s daily activities, her unexplained failure to
seek consistent treatment and the state medical expert’s opinion that Thornsberry’s
subjective complaints of pain and limitations appeared disproportionate to her
diagnoses. See id.
AFFIRMED.
3