12‐4181‐cr
United States v. Melendez
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 24th day of January, two thousand
fourteen.
PRESENT:
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
PETER W. HALL,
DENNY CHIN
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 12‐4181‐cr
JUAN CARLOS MELENDEZ,
Defendant‐Appellant.
_____________________________________
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: RANDOLPH Z. VOLKELL, Merrick, NY.
FOR THE UNITED STATES: DEBORAH R. SLATER (Robert M. Spector,
on the brief), Assistant United States
Attorneys, for Dierdre M. Daly, Acting
United States Attorney for the District of
Connecticut, New Haven, CT.
Appeal from a judgement of the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut (Bryant, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgement of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Defendant‐Appellant Juan Carlos Melendez appeals his sentence following
his plea of guilty to a single count of receipt of child pornography in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). He and the government agreed that the sentencing
guidelines recommended a 210‐262 month sentence, but that the statutory
maximum was 240 months. The district court rejected the applicability of one
sentencing enhancement agreed to by the parties, and recalculated the guidelines
at 168‐210 months. The court then sentenced Melendez to 168 monthsʹ
imprisonment. Melendez now appeals his sentence and we affirm. In explaining
our decision, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the case.
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Melendezʹs sole argument is that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. Our substantive review of district court sentencing is deferential.
We reverse “only those sentences that are . . . shockingly high, [or] shockingly
low.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012). We have
recognized that “in the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence
will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be
reasonable in the particular circumstances.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d
19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, we have declined to establish a presumption of
reasonableness for guidelines sentences. United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 183
(2d Cir. 2010).
In this case, the district court carefully considered the guidelines, weighed
the facts, and imposed a sentence that was below what the guidelines would
have called for in the absence of a statutory maximum. The district court found
that Melendez showed little remorse for his actions and that he was likely to re‐
offend if he were released. The court also found that Melendez was more than a
mere passive recipient of his contraband, unlike other child pornography
defendants who had received more lenient sentences. As Melendez points out,
there are a number of factors in his case that favored a lenient sentence. However,
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it is undisputed that the court considered these. In light of all of the district
court’s factual findings, we have no trouble concluding that Melendez’s sentence
was reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgement.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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