UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4460
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY MCINTOSH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:12-cr-00039-AW-1)
Submitted: January 23, 2014 Decided: January 27, 2014
Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Harold M. Vaught, Norwalk, California, for Appellant. April J.
Anderson, Jessica Dunsay Silver, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony McIntosh seeks to appeal his conviction and
sentence for falsification of records in a federal
investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).
McIntosh pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement and
was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
counsel for McIntosh filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning the calculation of
McIntosh’s sentence. McIntosh has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief despite notice of his right to do so. The
Government has moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by
McIntosh’s waiver of the right to appeal, included in the plea
agreement.
We review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver.
United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 126 (2013). We generally will enforce a
waiver “if the record establishes that the waiver is valid and
that the issue being appealed is within the scope of the
waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th
Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 196 (2012). A defendant’s waiver is valid if he agreed to
it “knowingly and intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592
F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010).
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Upon review of the plea agreement and the transcript
of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we conclude that McIntosh
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his
conviction and sentence. Because the Government seeks to
enforce this knowing and voluntary waiver, we grant the motion
to dismiss in part and dismiss McIntosh’s appeal as to the
claims raised in the Anders brief, which are clearly within the
waiver’s scope. As to any remaining issues, we have reviewed
the entire record in accordance with Anders and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment as to all
issues not encompassed by McIntosh’s valid waiver of appellate
rights.
This court requires that counsel inform McIntosh, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If McIntosh requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on McIntosh.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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