United States v. Brian Bishop

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4356

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BRIAN KEITH BISHOP,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00395-CMH-1)

Argued: December 11, 2013 Decided: January 28, 2014

Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Diaz and Judge Thacker joined.

ARGUED: Joseph Michael Hannon, Jr., HANNON LAW GROUP, LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: William Coffield, COFFIELD LAW GROUP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney,
Ronald L. Walutes, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2778,

regulates the export of “defense articles” such as ammunition,

and subjects to criminal liability anyone who “willfully”

violates its requirements. Brian Keith Bishop was convicted

under the law for attempting to export small-arms ammunition to

Jordan without a license. He appeals his conviction on two

grounds: first, that he did not willfully violate the AECA

because he did not know that it applied to the ammunition he

attempted to export, and second, that there was insufficient

evidence that he even knew that exporting the ammunition was

generally illegal rather than merely a violation of

administrative policy. We reject Bishop’s contentions and

affirm his conviction.

I.

A.

In 2011, Bishop worked as a financial-management Foreign

Service Officer (FSO) at the U.S. embassy in Amman, Jordan.

Pursuant to the State Department’s policy of shipping employees’

personal effects overseas at government expense, Bishop sought

in the summer of 2011 to ship certain personal possessions from

his parents’ home in Alabama to Jordan via a government contract

carrier, Paxton Van Lines (Paxton). Bishop, who describes

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himself as an “avid hunter and sportsman,” Appellant’s Br. at 2,

included nearly 10,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition in his

shipment: 9mm, 7.62X39mm (for use in AK-47 assault rifles), and

.45-caliber rounds, as well as 12-gauge shotgun shells. Bishop

had purchased the ammunition from Cabela’s Sporting Goods

(Cabela’s), and, pursuant to federal law, the Cabela’s boxes

containing the ammunition were labeled “ORM-D” and “cartridges,

small arms.”

The day before the movers arrived, Paxton’s subcontractor

dispatched one of its employees, Brian Davis, to survey the

shipment. Davis testified that Bishop informed him that Bishop

was moving “weights” and neglected to mention ammunition. When

workers loaded Bishop’s shipment the next day, some of the

ammunition remained in the Cabela’s boxes, while the rest had

been transferred to unlatched hard-shell pelican cases.

Bishop’s father testified that, when the shippers asked Bishop

what was inside the cases, Bishop replied “bullets.” The

inventory of shipped items signed by Bishop, however, did not

reference the 366 pounds of ammunition included in his household

effects, instead listing them as weights. Bishop also signed a

statement certifying that his belongings did not include “any

unauthorized explosives, destructive devices or hazardous

materials.” An internal email between Paxton employees

suggested that Bishop “did not like [the movers] questioning him

3
on what he was shipping,” and that he had organized his

possessions so as to discourage the movers from inspecting them.

The movers transferred Bishop’s items to a Paxton warehouse

in Springfield, Virginia. At the warehouse, Paxton employees

determined that certain items required repackaging, and Bishop’s

ammunition was discovered during the repacking process.

According to one employee, the ammunition was removed from boxes

labeled “weights” on the inventory, but that one of the boxes

did in fact contain a single small weight. Two days later,

Paxton alerted the State Department, and special agents with the

State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) ultimately

took custody of the ammunition. The Paxton employee in charge

of Bishop’s shipment testified that, when she called Bishop and

told him that ammunition had been discovered, he asked her

whether the State Department knew how much ammunition he had

attempted to ship. She also testified that Bishop told her that

the ammunition was a gift for a government official for which he

would be repaid, and that she should not speak with any of the

Jordanian nationals at the embassy about the shipment.

A little over a year later, DSS agents interviewed Bishop

and informed him that an arrest warrant had been issued for

violations stemming from his attempted shipment of the

ammunition. Bishop waived his Miranda rights and, according to

the agent who interviewed him, admitted to the attempted

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shipment. The agent testified that Bishop claimed the

ammunition had been intended for his recreational use at firing

ranges and for shooting with “veteran tribesmen in the desert,”

and that he attempted to ship the ammunition because it would

have been prohibitively expensive to purchase it in Jordan. The

agent also testified that Bishop admitted that he had known that

the embassy prohibited FSOs from having firearms, that he had a

shotgun in his residence without his wife’s knowledge, and that

he had lied the previous year when he told a DSS agent that he

did not have any firearms in his residence.

B.

In September 2012, a federal grand jury returned a two-

count indictment against Bishop relating to his attempted

transportation of the ammunition. As amended, Count I of the

indictment charged Bishop with a violation of the AECA and its

implementing regulations. Specifically, the indictment alleged

that Bishop “knowingly and willfully attempt[ed] to export from

the United States to Jordan, without having first obtained from

the Department of State a license for such export, or written

authorization for such export, defense articles, to-wit:

approximately 7,496 rounds of 9mm and 7.62 X 39mm ammunition,

which are designated as defense articles on the United States

Munitions List, Category III.” Count II charged Bishop with

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delivering ammunition to a common and contract carrier, Paxton,

without notice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e). Count II

covered not only the ammunition identified in Count I, but also

the nearly 2,000 rounds of .45-caliber and 12-gauge shotgun

ammunition included in the shipment.

Bishop waived his right to a jury trial. At the bench

trial, the government argued that Bishop willfully shipped the

prohibited ammunition in violation of the AECA. The government

relied in part on an email sent by Paxton to Bishop’s wife (and

then forwarded to Bishop) which stated that ammunition was a

“prohibited item in th[e] shipment.” Among the witnesses the

government called was a DSS agent who testified that, prior to

traveling to Alabama to arrange his effects, Bishop had asked

the agent if he was permitted to use firearms while in Jordan,

and was told that he was “not allowed to have firearms in

accordance with mission policy.”

The government also called Mette Beecroft, a State

Department official responsible for educating State Department

employees on the rules and regulations governing travel.

Beecroft testified that the State Department maintains a Foreign

Affairs Manual (FAM), a collection of regulations for FSOs,

including those governing travel and transportation. The FAM

prohibits the shipment of ammunition in household effects in

three separate sections. One section identifies 27 C.F.R. § 478

6
as authority for the FAM’s ammunition provisions. This

regulation, in turn, states that ammunition exports are subject

to the AECA. Another FAM section puts employees on notice that

shipping ammunition may require special accommodations. It

notes, for instance, that household effects may not include

ammunition and further states that federal law may “prohibit

commercial shipment of certain articles in” this section. 14

U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 611.5. The third

section informs employees that “[a]mmunition, a hazardous cargo,

requires special handling and labeling,” and that it is the

responsibility of each FSO to check with their post “to

determine the restrictions and limitations, if any, that are

placed upon the shipment of personally owned firearms or

ammunition into the country of assignment.” Id. § 611.6-2.

According to Beecroft, all State Department employees are

required to participate in an orientation program that

introduces them to the rules contained in the FAM, including

those pertaining to the transport of ammunition. Beecroft

testified that, in every training class, she stresses that

shipping ammunition is not permitted. Beecroft also described a

manual entitled “It’s Your Move,” which is mentioned during

training and is available to all State Department employees both

in print and online. The manual repeatedly prohibits the

shipment of ammunition as a household effect, and notes that the

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penalties for improper shipment of hazardous items include

imprisonment. On cross-examination, Beecroft admitted, “I can’t

tell you what the State Department’s reasoning is” for

prohibiting the shipment of ammunition.

In response, Bishop called Luis Roque, former branch chief

for the State Department’s transportation-management bureau and

the individual who initially dealt with the ammunition when

Paxton contacted the State Department. Roque testified that,

despite overseeing the shipment of all household effects for the

State Department, he was “desperate” for advice on how to

proceed upon being alerted of the discovery of the ammunition.

He initially instructed Paxton to dispose of the ammunition with

the assistance of the fire marshal. He subsequently contacted

diplomatic security experts, who countermanded his prior

instruction.

Bishop also called the Regional Security Officer at the

embassy in Jordan, who explained that, under the Mission

Firearms Policy, which governs FSOs stationed there, Bishop was

permitted to possess ammunition in his residence. He also

stated that the disciplinary action prescribed by the policy for

any violation is purely administrative.

Another one of Bishop’s witnesses testified to Bishop’s

general law-abidingness, emphasizing his diligence and skill at

understanding and following complex regulations. The witness,

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an attorney, recounted an incident in which Bishop had conducted

independent research on a legal issue confronting an embassy and

reached a conclusion nearly identical to the guidance ultimately

provided by State Department headquarters.

At the conclusion of the one-day trial, the district court

convicted Bishop of Count I and acquitted him on Count II. With

respect to intent under Count I, the court found that the

“evidence is clear that [Bishop] knew what he was doing was

unlawful and simply went ahead and did it.” Regarding Count II,

the district court found “that the markings on [the Cabela’s]

boxes clearly provided notification to [Paxton] that ammunition

was being transported.”

Bishop subsequently filed a motion to vacate the judgment

and for a new trial, alleging that the government had introduced

insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Bishop had the

requisite intent to violate the law. The district court denied

this motion and sentenced Bishop to two-years probation and six-

months home confinement subject to work release, in addition to

a $25,000 fine. Bishop now appeals his conviction.

II.

Count I of the indictment charged Bishop with attempting to

export 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition without a license in willful

violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The AECA regulates

9
the export of arms, ammunition, and other military and defense

technology. It delegates to the President the tasks of creating

the United States Munitions List (USML), which designates

certain items as “defense articles and defense services,” and of

promulgating “regulations for the import and export of such

articles and services.” 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). The President

has delegated this authority to the State Department, see Exec.

Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (Jan. 24, 1977), which

publicly maintains the USML, see 22 C.F.R. § 121.1. With

limited exception, anyone seeking to export items on the USML

must first apply for and receive an export license from the

State Department. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2); 22 C.F.R.

§ 123.1(a). A defendant who “willfully violates any provision”

of the AECA may be punished with a fine of up to a million

dollars, a prison term of up to 20 years, or both. 22 U.S.C.

§ 2778(c).

Bishop raises two challenges to his conviction. First, he

argues that, for his conduct to have been willful, he needed to

have known not only that exporting the 9mm and 7.62X39mm

ammunition was generally unlawful, but that the ammunition was

specifically covered by the AECA. Second, Bishop argues in the

alternative that there was insufficient evidence to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew his conduct was illegal,

10
rather than merely prohibited by State Department policy. We

address each argument in turn.

A.

Bishop and the government disagree over what constitutes a

“willful” violation of the AECA. Bishop contends that the

government must show not only that he knew that his conduct was

illegal, but also that he knew why: because 9mm and 7.62X39mm

ammunition were listed on the USML. The government, by

contrast, argues that it was enough that Bishop knew exporting

the ammunition was illegal as a general matter. On this point,

we agree with the government.

Bishop frames the issue as whether a conviction under the

AECA requires specific intent. See Appellant’s Br. at 17.

Courts regularly use the language of specific versus general

intent in discussing the AECA’s willfulness requirement. See,

e.g., United States v. Chi Mak, 683 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir.

2012). Unfortunately, the terms are often left ill-defined and

used inconsistently, and as the Supreme Court has observed, the

“venerable distinction” between general and specific intent “has

been the source of a good deal of confusion.” United States v.

Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave,

Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2 (2d ed. 2013) (“The meaning of

the word ‘intent’ in the criminal law has always been rather

11
obscure . . . .”). Other courts have characterized the

willfulness provision as imposing some sort of scienter

requirement. See United States v. Wu, 711 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.

2013); United States v. Lee, 183 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th Cir.

1999). Although courts often use the language of general and

specific intent, scienter, and the related concept of mens rea

interchangeably, see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,

252 (1952), none of these terms by itself adequately defines

willfulness under the AECA.

Rather than struggle with such confusing terminology, we

may simply ask where, on the spectrum of culpability, the AECA’s

willfulness requirement falls. Both Bishop and the government

agree that knowledge of an export’s illegality is necessary to

satisfy the AECA’s willfulness requirement; they disagree over

how precise that knowledge must be. This question is ultimately

one of statutory interpretation, since “determining the mental

state required for commission of a federal crime requires . . .

inference of the intent of Congress.” Staples v. United States,

511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our interpretation of the AECA is guided by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998).

The Bryan Court interpreted the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act

(FOPA), Pub. L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at 18

U.S.C. §§ 921-929), which established a willfulness requirement

12
for certain violations of prohibitions against dealing in

firearms without a license under 18 U.S.C. § 922. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(a)(1)(D). Bryan held that, “to establish a ‘willful’

violation of a statute, the Government must prove that the

defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”

Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191-92 (internal quotation marks omitted).

It rejected the defendant’s argument that the government also

had to prove that he knew of the federal licensing requirement,

holding that, to establish willfulness, “knowledge that the

conduct is unlawful is all that is required.” Id. at 196.

In interpreting FOPA, Bryan distinguished statutes where

the Court had read “willfulness” as requiring knowledge of the

specific criminal prohibition at issue. The Court observed that

these cases -- Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), and

Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) -- addressed

“highly technical statutes” involving taxes and currency

transactions that “presented the danger of ensnaring individuals

engaged in apparently innocent conduct.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at

194. By contrast, the statutory scheme amended by FOPA to

“protect law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition,

possession, or use of firearms for lawful purposes,” id. at 187-

88, did not present comparable risks of criminalizing otherwise-

innocent behavior. Furthermore, this danger was plainly absent

on the facts of the case because, as here, the factfinder “found

13
that [the defendant] knew that his conduct was unlawful.” Id.

at 195.

Bryan is highly relevant to our task here. As with FOPA,

the AECA’s language and structure make clear that Congress

struck a balance between punishing those who intentionally

violate the law and ensnaring individuals who make honest

mistakes. As this court has previously emphasized, the

willfulness requirement ensures that “the government must prove

that a defendant intended to violate the law to obtain a

conviction, thereby eliminating any genuine risk of holding a

person ‘criminally responsible for conduct which he could not

reasonably understand to be proscribed.’” United States v. Hsu,

364 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Sun,

278 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002)).

At the same time, the AECA’s legislative history, while

“sparse,” United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 420 (2d Cir.

1987), makes clear that Congress was especially concerned that

arms exports not become an “automatic, unregulated process,”

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1144, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1378, 1388. To read the willfulness requirement as

narrowly as Bishop proposes would be a step toward such an

unregulated system and undermine congressional intent. The AECA

does not include such highly technical requirements as might

inadvertently criminalize good-faith attempts at compliance.

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Unlike the complicated tax and arcane currency prohibitions

discussed in Cheek and Ratzlaf, the export of 9mm and AK-47

ammunition to Jordan would quickly strike someone of ordinary

intelligence as potentially unlawful. Bishop’s narrow reading

would thus undermine Congress’s purpose in passing the AECA and

deprive it of its rightful authority to define the elements of

federal offenses. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,

424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal

offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the

case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of

statute.”). For it would be unwarranted for courts to draw from

the word “willful” a desire on the part of Congress to require

not simply general knowledge of an export’s illegality, but

specific knowledge of the particulars of a certain list.

Bishop argues that the rule of lenity requires us to view

the AECA’s willfulness requirement in the light most favorable

to him. See Appellant’s Br. at 22. But “the rule of lenity

only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and

purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in

the statute.” Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 (2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted). That there is no such

“grievous ambiguity” in this case is underscored by the fact

that Bishop’s construction would move the AECA, even further

than the willfulness requirement already does, from “the

15
fundamental canon of criminal law that ignorance of the law is

no excuse.” United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 392 (2d Cir.

2004) (Sotomayor, J.). Exceptions to such a venerable rule

should be construed narrowly in the absence of clear

congressional intent to the contrary. We discern nothing in the

language or purpose of the statute to suggest that Congress

wished to jettison altogether the bedrock presumption that each

of us knows the standards applicable to our personal conduct.

Given that both the AECA’s text and purpose support the

government’s position, it is no surprise that this court’s

precedent lends no support to Bishop’s stance. In United States

v. Hsu, we upheld convictions for AECA export violations against

an as-applied void-for-vagueness challenge. We rejected in

passing a defendant’s argument that “the government presented

insufficient evidence . . . that [the defendant] acted

‘willfully’ because of the asserted lack of evidence that [he]

knew the [exported items] were on the [USML] or military items.”

Hsu, 364 F.3d at 198 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). We

noted that “[w]hatever specificity on ‘willfulness’ is required,

it is clear that this extremely particularized definition finds

no support in the case law.” Id.

We draw further support from decisions of other circuits

that have squarely considered the issue. See United States v.

Roth, 628 F.3d 827, 835 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[S]ection 2778(c) does

16
not require a defendant to know that the items being exported

are on the Munitions List. Rather, it only requires knowledge

that the underlying action is unlawful.”); United States v.

Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1992) (“If the defendant knew

that the export was in violation of the law, we are hard pressed

to say that it matters what the basis of that knowledge was.”);

United States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1988)

(upholding a jury instruction that “made clear that conviction

[under the AECA] would not require evidence that defendants knew

of the licensing requirement or were aware of the munitions

list”).

Bishop argues, unconvincingly, that the weight of circuit

authority cuts in his favor. Many of the opinions Bishop cites

in his defense are inapposite, as they merely indicated that

jury instructions as to the defendant’s knowledge of the USML

were sufficient without indicating that the specific

instructions were required. See United States v. Smith, 918

F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Gregg, 829

F.2d 1430, 1437 n.14 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Murphy, 852 F.2d

at 7 n.6 (reading Gregg as not requiring knowledge of the

contents of the USML to sustain a conviction under the AECA).

Moreover, the great bulk of the authority on which Bishop relies

either fails to support his position or, to the extent that it

17
does, antedates the Supreme Court’s analysis of willfulness

requirements in Bryan.

Bishop appears to recognize that the law is against him

when he argues that, even if defendants do not generally need to

know whether a particular item is on the USML for criminal

liability under the AECA, such knowledge is necessary on the

“narrow facts of this case.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.

Bishop grounds this contention in the fact that his shipment

contained a mix of ammunition, some of which was on the USML

(and thus covered by the AECA) and some of which was not. Thus,

he argues, the only way he could have known that his conduct was

illegal was if he knew that 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition were on

the USML. If, as the district court found, Bishop believed that

the “ammunition couldn’t be shipped” and “he knew what he was

doing was unlawful,” he would necessarily have believed that

exporting each type of ammunition -- 9mm and 7.62X39mm included

-– was illegal as well. Under the standard of willfulness

described above, his true belief as to the illegality of

transporting the 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition is sufficient to

establish culpability under the AECA even if unaccompanied by

knowledge of the contents of the USML.

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 B.

Having established that willfulness under the AECA requires

only general knowledge of illegality, we now turn to Bishop’s

argument that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that

he knew his actions were illegal rather than merely violations

of State Department policy. “In assessing the sufficiency of

the evidence presented in a bench trial, we must uphold a guilty

verdict if, taking the view most favorable to the Government,

there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.” Elliott

v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 760-61 (4th Cir. 2003).

“[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of

fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a

conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en

banc).

In reviewing the district court’s judgment, we are mindful

that, as the trier of fact, that court was in a better position

than we are to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, take into

account circumstances, and make reasonable inferences. Thus we

reverse on sufficiency grounds only where “the prosecution's

failure is clear.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17

(1978). Bishop consequently carries a “heavy burden” on his

appeal of this issue. United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239,

1245 (4th Cir. 1995).

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 Bishop argues that the government’s evidence fails to

satisfy even its own interpretation of the willfulness

requirement. He contends that neither the email sent by the

shipping company Paxton to Bishop’s wife, nor the training and

notifications he received as a State Department employee,

explicitly stated that transporting ammunition was illegal,

rather than merely against State Department policy. Bishop also

cites evidence that the legal prohibition on exporting certain

ammunition was not well known: Mette Beecroft’s apparent lack of

knowledge as to why the State Department prohibited shipping

ammunition; a State Department official’s testimony that a

typical law-enforcement officer would likely not know about the

prohibition; Luis Roque’s need for legal guidance after he

discovered that Bishop had attempted to transport ammunition;

and the embassy’s policy of permitting FSOs to keep ammunition

in their homes.

While admittedly probative of Bishop’s knowledge (or lack

thereof) of the legality of his actions, this evidence is

substantially outweighed by that presented by the government,

which we must view on appeal in the light most favorable to the

prosecution.

First, Bishop was thoroughly trained in the rules and

regulations surrounding the State Department’s transportation

policies. He was required to attend training that warned him

20
against transporting ammunition and was provided with numerous

documents that not only informed him that transporting

ammunition was prohibited but also referenced the AECA and

explained that violations could be punished by imprisonment.

These documents included the FAM and the “It’s Your Move”

manual, and specifically referenced criminal, rather than merely

administrative, prohibitions and penalties. Bishop also

received an email from Paxton reiterating that he could not

transport ammunition, and was told explicitly by a DSS agent

prior to his trip to Alabama that he could not keep firearms in

Jordan. Moreover, as befits an FSO charged with the financial

management of a U.S. embassy abroad, Bishop’s own witness

characterized him as skilled at following complex legal rules

and performing sophisticated independent legal research. Even

without the substantial evidence of Bishop’s deception,

discussed below, the gravity of the penalties he was repeatedly

warned about make it highly unlikely that Bishop believed that

shipping ammunition was a simple breach of State Department

policy, rather than a violation of federal law and regulation.

Moreover, Bishop engaged in numerous acts of deception that

clearly indicated his awareness of wrongdoing. Although he

claims to have told the Paxton packers that some of the boxes

contained “bullets,” he falsely described the boxes as generally

containing weights and actively deceived by failing to include

21
ammunition on inventory lists that he signed. Bishop quibbles

that the packers, rather than he, listed weights on the

inventory, Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1, but this assertion

ignores the fact that Bishop packed many of the boxes himself

and knowingly signed an inaccurate inventory as well as a

declaration that he was not transporting hazardous or explosive

items. When Paxton informed him that it had found ammunition in

his shipment, his first instinct was to ask if the State

Department knew how much ammunition he had tried to ship. He

changed his story about why he attempted to ship the ammunition,

first asserting that it was intended as a gift and later that it

was meant for his own recreational use. Finally, when

interviewed by DSS agents, he admitted to deception the year

before about not having a firearm in Jordan in violation of

mission policy.

The district court concluded that Bishop “knew from the

time he was employed at the State Department that this

ammunition couldn’t be shipped. He’d been reminded continually

over the years. I think it’s clear. I find the evidence is

clear that he knew what he was doing was unlawful and simply

went ahead and did it.” We agree. But even if we disagreed

with the district court’s conclusion that Bishop violated a

known legal duty in attempting to export the ammunition, we

would not be, on this record, in a position to disturb it. As

22
we have explained, “The relevant question is not whether the

appellate court is convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

but rather whether, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, any rational trier of facts could

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” See

United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).

That standard is plainly satisfied here.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that there was

sufficient evidence to support the district court’s conclusion

that Bishop willfully violated the AECA. We therefore affirm

his conviction.

AFFIRMED

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