Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 70
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No.CR-13-286
HENRY HARMON Opinion Delivered JANUARY 29, 2014
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST DIVISION
[NO. CR2012-515]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE LEON JOHNSON,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
BILL H. WALMSLEY, Judge
A Pulaski County jury convicted appellant Henry Harmon of first-degree murder, two
counts of aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. Considering both his status as a habitual
offender and his use of a firearm in committing the offenses, Harmon was sentenced to an
aggregate term of 105 years’ imprisonment. Harmon argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting the State’s motion in limine regarding DNA evidence. We affirm.
Harmon does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, so only a brief recitation
of the facts is necessary. In the early morning hours on January 5, 2012, there was evidence
that Harmon went to the Heritage House Inn, kicked down the door of a motel room, and
demanded money from the occupants, John Williams and Christine Dyer. The State offered
proof that Harmon shot and killed Williams and then fled. The evidence showed that
Harmon led police officers on a high-speed chase and eventually eluded them. The police
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 70
were later dispatched to Arkansas Children’s Hospital, where there was evidence that Harmon
had abandoned his vehicle, which was still hot to the touch. Police officers and hospital
security personnel located several articles of clothing, including a leather jacket, near the
vehicle. A pistol, later determined to be the murder weapon, was found in the pocket of the
leather jacket.
At trial, Jennifer Beaty, a forensic DNA examiner, testified that she collected known
DNA samples from Harmon and Williams and then compared those to the evidence collected
by police. Beaty found Williams’s blood on the Colt .380 Mustang PocketLite pistol, leather
jacket, sweatshirt, glove, and bandana. Harmon’s DNA was found on the sweatshirt and
bandana. On cross-examination, Beaty explained that, with respect to the sweatshirt and
bandana, there was both a major component and a minor component to the DNA.
Because the trial court had granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude testimony
from Beaty that there was more than one contributor to the DNA profiles, Harmon proffered
her testimony. Beaty testified that there was a DNA mixture on the sweatshirt and bandana.
According to Beaty, when there are major and minor components, there is DNA from at least
two people contributing to the profile. The major components, or stronger signals, belonged
to Harmon, but there were minor components present, meaning that other unknown
individuals had contributed a smaller amount of DNA. Beaty testified that the minor
components were inconclusive for comparative purposes.
While Harmon admitted that the sweatshirt was his, he denied owning the bandana,
explaining that it belonged to previous owners of the vehicle. Harmon testified that a day or
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Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 70
two prior to the murder, he had loaned his vehicle to a prostitute so that she could take her
cousin somewhere and that, on the night of the murder, he had loaned his vehicle to Cedric
Johnson because Johnson was interested in buying the vehicle.
On appeal, Harmon argues that, given that the DNA evidence bolstered the State’s
case, the presence of DNA from other individuals was highly relevant. According to Harmon,
while the proffered testimony could not conclusively identify another party, it could have
established that someone else had worn the articles of clothing and corroborated his testimony
that he had loaned his car to others.
It is well settled that a trial court is vested with wide discretion in admitting evidence,
and an appellate court will not reverse in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Johnson
v. State, 342 Ark. 186, 27 S.W.3d 405 (2000). In Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320
(1993), the Arkansas Supreme Court set forth the standard for admissibility of evidence
tending to incriminate other persons:
A defendant may introduce evidence tending to show that someone other than the
defendant committed the crime charged, but such evidence is inadmissible unless it
points directly to the guilt of the third party. Evidence which does no more than create
an inference or conjecture as to another’s guilt is inadmissible.
Zinger, 313 Ark. at 75, 852 S.W.2d at 323 (quoting State v. Wilson, 367 S.E.2d 589 (N.C.
1988)). The court went on to state:
[T]he rule does not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to
show a third party’s possible culpability . . . [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity
to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a
reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt; there must be direct or circumstantial
evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.
Zinger, 313 Ark. at 76, 852 S.W.2d at 323 (quoting People v. Kaurish, 802 P.2d 278 (Cal.
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1990)).
Beaty’s proffered testimony, at most, created only an inference or conjecture as to
another individual’s guilt. Beaty testified that the minor components of the DNA were
inconclusive, meaning that she could not include or exclude an individual from contributing
to the profile. Although Harmon named a specific individual and suggested that he had the
opportunity to commit the crimes, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence connecting
Johnson to the actual perpetration of the crimes. We therefore hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to admit Beaty’s proffered testimony.
Affirmed.
PITTMAN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
Robert M. “Robby” Golden, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Kent Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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