UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4181
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT HUBBARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:12-cr-00157-RDB-1)
Submitted: January 8, 2014 Decided: January 31, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan S. Skelton,
Appellate Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, H. Brandis Marsh, Jr.,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Hubbard appeals his fifteen-year mandatory
minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012) imposed by the
district court after the jury convicted him of being a felon in
possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). On appeal, Hubbard contends that the district court
erred in imposing the sentence, because § 924(e) conflicts with
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) and the sentence was based on facts
that were not charged in the indictment or submitted to the jury
in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. We affirm.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using
an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. McManus, 734
F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). A statutorily required sentence is per se
reasonable. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th
Cir. 2008). We review questions of statutory interpretation and
constitutional challenges de novo. United States v. Under Seal,
709 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Hubbard first argues that the mandatory minimum in
§ 924(e) conflicts with § 3553(a) and that we should interpret
the statutes so that § 3553(a) “trumps” § 924(e). We disagree.
Courts must sentence defendants in accordance with the
provisions and purposes of § 3553(a) “[e]xcept as otherwise
specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2012). “Thus, the
2
general sentencing provisions in § 3553(a) give way to specific
mandatory sentencing provisions elsewhere in the criminal code.”
United States v. Carter, 696 F.3d 229, 232 (2d Cir. 2012); see
also United States v. Graham, 711 F.3d 445, 455 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 449 (2013); United States v. Robinson,
404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Crittendon,
883 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 1989).
In his second issue, Hubbard challenges the continued
viability of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224
(1998), and argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
were violated by the district court increasing his statutory
maximum under § 924(e) based on facts that were not charged in
the indictment or submitted to the jury. However, we remain
“bound by Almendarez-Torres unless and until the Supreme Court
says otherwise.” Graham, 711 F.3d at 455; see also United
States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 352-54 (4th Cir. 2005).
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3