Filed 2/3/14 In re D.P. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re D.P., A Person Coming Under the B247977
Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. CK97013)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DIAMOND P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Albert J. Garcia, Juvenile Court Referee. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Affirmed.
Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the County Counsel, John F. Krattli, County Counsel,
James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________________
Diamond P. (mother) challenges the juvenile’s court’s jurisdictional finding that
her two-year-old daughter, D.P., suffered serious physical harm or was at substantial
risk of suffering serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by mother. Mother
contends that there was no substantial evidence showing that she abused D. or that D.
was at risk of abuse by mother. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
D. was born in May 2011. Mother lived with Matthew F. (father) at paternal
great-grandmother’s house until D. was seven or eight months old. At that time, mother
and father separated, but maintained joint custody over D. D. moved from one parent’s
home to the other, staying with each parent for one to two weeks at a time.
On December 14, 2012, mother dropped D. off at father’s home after a two week
stay. When D.’s hat and jacket were removed, father and great-grandmother noticed
that D. had bruises on her face, bruising and scab wounds that looked like bite marks on
her shoulders and chest area, and a swollen eye. Father called the police and D. was
taken to the hospital. D. was diagnosed as having a “scalp hematoma” that was “most
likely caused by trauma.” Two doctors at the hospital said that the trauma was most
likely non-accidental.
The police reported the case to the Department of Children and Family Services
(Department), and the Department interviewed mother. Mother said she did not know
how D. suffered the head injury, but denied that D. had fallen or hit her head against
anything. She said the marks on D.’s body were caused by other small children who bit
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her at a party. Mother further stated that during the two weeks D. was with her, only
mother and her roommate took care of the child.
The social worker also interviewed mother’s boyfriend, who lived with her, and
mother’s cousin. The boyfriend denied having caused D.’s injuries, but admitted to
using cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamines. Mother’s cousin said that both
mother and her boyfriend smoked marijuana frequently. The cousin believed mother
was also using other illicit drugs because mother had recently “ ‘dramatically lost
weight’ ” and her behavior had changed: mother had recently stopped seeing her
family, and mother’s boyfriend appeared to be “controlling her.” The cousin further
said she had noticed that D.’s cheeks were bruised and her ears swollen, but when she
asked mother what happened, mother ignored her questions.
On December 19, 2012, the Department filed a petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivisions (a)2 and (b),3 alleging that D.’s injuries
“would not ordinarily occur except as the result of deliberate[,] unreasonable and
neglectful acts by the mother,” that mother failed to obtain timely necessary medical
treatment for D., that mother had a history of illicit drug use and currently used
1
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
Section 300, subdivision (a) provides that a child comes within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court when the child has suffered “serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.”
3
Section 300, subdivision (b) provides a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction when
the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical
harm or illness as a result of the parent’s failure to adequately supervise or protect the
child.
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marijuana, and that mother endangered D. by allowing her boyfriend, who abused illicit
drugs, to have unlimited access to the child. The court detained D., and released her to
father.
In the Jurisdiction/Disposition Report, the Department reported the results from
its recent interviews with mother and other family members. Mother continued to
maintain that she did not know how D. had been injured. However, mother
acknowledged that she had noticed D.’s cheek was swollen, and opined that “maybe she
hit her head on the car seat when I was driving.” Father said that he did not think
mother had injured D., but that she “might be covering up for [her boyfriend] . . . . ”
Paternal great-grandmother and her boyfriend also said that they did not think mother
had injured D.
The Department also reported to the court the results of Dr. Janet Clark’s review
of D.’s medical records. Dr. Clark concluded that the marks on D.’s body were
“consistent with adult bite marks” and that the “most likely explanation” for the
“extensive swelling . . . to the entire left side of the head” was “non-accidental or
inflicted trauma.” On February 28, 2012, the court sustained the jurisdictional findings
under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and ordered mother to participate in
individual counseling to address issues of parenting, drugs, and domestic violence.
Mother timely appealed.
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CONTENTIONS
Mother contends that there was no substantial evidence supporting the juvenile
court’s finding that D. had suffered, or there was a substantial risk D. would suffer,
serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by mother.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
“We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for sufficiency of the
evidence. [Citations.]” (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828.) “In so
doing, we consider the evidence favorably to the prevailing party and resolve all
conflicts in support of the trial court’s order. [Citation.] ‘Substantial evidence’ means
evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value; it must actually be substantial
proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case. [Citation.]” (In re
Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.)
2. The Merits of Mother’s Appeal Should Be Addressed
Mother appeals the juvenile court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (a),
and does not challenge the court’s alternative bases for jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b). The Department argues that the appeal is moot because “[a]s long as
there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be
inappropriate. [Citations.]” (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979.)
“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that
a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm
the [juvenile] court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
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bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial
evidence.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) However, we may also
exercise our discretion to reach the merits of a challenge to any jurisdictional finding
when the finding may be prejudicial to the appellant, and here, the finding that mother
intentionally hurt her daughter has the potential to impact future dependency
proceedings. (In re D.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1015.)
3. There Was Substantial Evidence That D.P. Was a Child
Described By Section 300, Subdivision (a)
Section 300, subdivision (a), provides for jurisdiction when the child suffered or
is at substantial risk of suffering “serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon
the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” Mother does not dispute that the evidence
established that D.’s injuries were nonaccidental, but contends that there was no
substantial evidence that mother intentionally inflicted those injuries or would do so in
the future.
According to mother, she and her roommate were the only people that took care
of D. during the period when D. sustained her injuries. Yet mother had no plausible
explanation for how D. had suffered a head trauma. When mother was questioned by
her cousin regarding the injuries, she ignored her cousin. In addition, when mother was
questioned by the social worker, she did not volunteer any plausible circumstances that
would suggest that the trauma was accidental, (for example, that she heard D. fall in
another room and cry out), or that another person was responsible for the injuries (for
example, that D. presented with these injuries after having spent time with mother’s
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roommate). Mother’s suggestion that “maybe [D.] hit her head on the car seat” was not
consistent with a severe trauma and appeared to be only speculation, not a credible
observation.
Mother also had no plausible explanation for the bite marks on D.’s body.
Although mother claimed that they were inflicted by other children, Dr. Clark found
that the marks were consistent with adult bite marks. The undisputed evidence of
nonaccidental trauma and mother’s failure to explain how D. was injured in her care
constituted substantial evidence that mother was responsible for inflicting these injuries
on D.
4. Section 355.1 Established a Presumption That D.P. Was
A Minor Described Under Section 300, Subdivision (a)
Mother also argues that the court erred to the extent it applied the presumption
under section 355.1 that D. was a minor described under section 300, subdivision (a).
Mother argues that the application of section 355.1 violated her right to due process
because she was never given notice that the Department intended to rely on this statute.
Mother further argues that the presumption was rebutted by evidence in her favor.
Section 355.1 provides that “[w]here the court finds, based upon competent
professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or detrimental condition sustained by
a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the
unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent . . . that finding shall be
prima facie evidence that the minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d)
of Section 300.” (Section 355.1, subd. (a).)
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Although mother contends she was never given notice that the Department
intended to rely on section 355.1, the petition’s allegations under section 300,
subdivision (a) borrowed language from section 355.1: the petition alleged that D.’s
injuries “would not ordinarily occur except as the result of deliberate[,] unreasonable
and neglectful acts on the part of the mother . . . . ” Those allegations adequately gave
mother notice that the Department was relying, at least in part, on the presumption
created by section 355.1. (See Seiser and Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and
Procedure (2013) § 2.110 [6] [notice that the Department is relying on section 355.1
“can be accomplished by including the applicable language of Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 355.1 in the petition . . . . ”]; but see In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 243
[“When the [petitioner] intends to rely on [section 355.1, subdivision (a)] to shift the
burden of production to the parents to show that neither they nor other caretakers caused
the child’s injuries, it must do so in a clear-cut manner. It should, of course, cite
section 355.1, subdivision (a) in the petition along with the applicable subdivision of
section 300. [Citation.]” [Italics omitted.])
Once the petitioner establishes a prima facie case under section 355.1 the burden
of producing evidence shifts to the parent to show that she can properly care for the
child. (In re Stephen W. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 629, 644.) “The effect of
a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact
to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced
which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall
determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and
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without regard to the presumption.” (Evid. Code, § 604.) Section 355.1, subdivision (a)
“shifts to the parents the obligation of raising an issue as to the actual cause of the
injury or the fitness of the home.” (In re James B. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 934, 937
(Italics added).)
Here, three doctors concluded that D.’s injuries were nonaccidental and mother
did not dispute that the injuries occurred while she was caring for D.: this constituted
prima facie evidence that D. was a person described by section 300, subdivision (a).
Mother argues that the presumption was rebutted by evidence that certain relatives did
not think mother would have deliberately hurt D. Even if this evidence was sufficient to
rebut the presumption, any application of the presumption was harmless error.
While the presumption under section 355.1 “disappears upon the introduction of
evidence which would support a finding of its nonexistence (Evid. Code, § 604), the
trier of fact, here the juvenile court, must still weigh the inferences arising from the
[professional’s] testimony which gave rise to the presumption against the contrary
evidence . . . and resolve the conflict. [Citation.]” (In re Katrina C. (1988)
201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.) Thus, the juvenile court here was free to accept the
inferences arising from the doctors’ statements combined with evidence that mother was
with D. when she was injured, and to refuse to accept those inferences arising from the
opinions of relatives. “Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, the appellate court is without power to substitute its deductions
for those of the trier of fact. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) In light of these principles, we find
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that the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding under section 300,
subdivision (a).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CROSKEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
KLEIN, P. J.
ALDRICH, J.
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