UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4429
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TREMAINE KENDRICK JETER, a/k/a Toby,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:02-cr-00248-GRA-17)
Submitted: January 22, 2014 Decided: February 6, 2014
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tremaine Jeter appeals the district court’s judgment
sentencing him to twenty-two months’ imprisonment after
revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, Jeter’s
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether Jeter’s revocation sentence
is plainly unreasonable. Although notified of his right to file
a supplemental brief, Jeter has not done so. We affirm.
The district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, we
will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release if it is within the governing statutory range and is not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). “[W]e follow generally the procedural
and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of
original sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to
take into account the unique nature of supervised release
revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-39.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court has considered the Policy Statements contained in Chapter
Seven of the Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012),
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440, and has adequately explained the
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sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in as
much detail as when imposing the original sentence. Thompson,
595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court states a proper basis for its imposition of a
sentence up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
The district court based the sentence imposed on Jeter
in part on the seriousness of the offense that led to the
revocation of Jeter’s supervised release and the need to provide
just punishment, factors derived from § 3553(a)(2)(A), which are
not factors that the district court is authorized to consider
when revoking a term of supervised release under § 3583(e).
However, “a district court’s reference to the § 3553(a)(2)(A)
sentencing considerations, without more, [does not]
automatically render a revocation sentence unreasonable.”
United States v. Webb, __ F.3d __, __, 2013 WL 6671392, at *3
(4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2013). We conclude that the district court’s
consideration of these factors was substantially in conjunction
with the enumerated § 3553(a) factors and, therefore, that its
sentence was not plainly unreasonable. Id. In addition, we
conclude that the district court sufficiently stated its reasons
for imposing its release revocation sentence, which was below
the statutory maximum term of imprisonment.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal.
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We therefore affirm the district court’s revocation judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Jeter, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Jeter requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jeter.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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