12-963
Vucaj v. Holder
BIA
Hom, IJ
A099 589 984
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 7th day of February, two thousand fourteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 PASHKO VUCAJ,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 12-963
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _______________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Charles Christophe, New York, New
24 York.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy
27 Assistant Attorney General; Shelley
28 R. Goad, Assistant Director; Laura
29 Halliday Hickein, Trial Attorney,
30 Office of Immigration Litigation,
31 United States Department of Justice,
32 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Pashko Vucaj, a native and citizen of
6 Albania, seeks review of a February 13, 2012 decision of the
7 BIA which affirmed the March 30, 2010 decision of an
8 immigration Judge denying his application for asylum,
9 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
10 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Pashko Vucaj, No. A099 589
11 984 (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2012), aff’g No. A099 589 984 (Immig.
12 Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 30, 2010). We assume the parties’
13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
14 in this case.
15 We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA.
16 See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520,
17 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are
18 well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng
19 v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, we
20 presume Vucaj’s testimony to be credible. See Yan Chen v.
21 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005); 8 U.S.C. §
22 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
23
2
1 To establish asylum and withholding of removal
2 eligibility, an applicant must show that he has suffered
3 past persecution, or has a well-founded fear or likelihood
4 of future persecution, and “that race, religion,
5 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
6 political opinion was or will be at least one central reason
7 for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C.
8 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 U.S.C.
9 § 1101(a)(42); see also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec.
10 341, 343 (BIA 2010). If the applicant is found to have
11 suffered past persecution, it is presumed that he has a
12 well-founded fear of future persecution on the basis of the
13 original claim. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1), 1208.16(b)(1).
14 The agency did not err in finding that Vucaj failed to
15 demonstrate a nexus between the harm he suffered and a
16 protected ground, and that he failed to establish a well-
17 founded fear and likelihood of persecution.
18 To establish persecution based on political opinion,
19 the “applicant must [] show, through direct or
20 circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to
21 persecute arises from the applicant’s political belief.”
22 Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005).
3
1 Here, the agency was not compelled to find that Vucaj
2 established such a nexus, as he offered only conclusory
3 testimony that the Albanian police’s search of his home for
4 weapons was a pretext and that their real motive was his
5 political opinion, particularly given his inconsistent
6 testimony as to whether the police targeted him for being
7 critical of the Democratic Party or for opposing the
8 Socialist Party. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C.
9 § 1231(b)(3)(A); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
10 478, 481-83 & n.1 (1992).
11 Similarly, the agency did not err in finding that Vucaj
12 failed to establish that he suffered harm on account of his
13 membership in a particular social group. In order to
14 demonstrate persecution based on membership in a particular
15 social group, an alien must establish both that the group
16 itself was cognizable, see Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d
17 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007), and that the alleged persecutor(s)
18 targeted the alien “on account of” his membership in that
19 group, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). For a group to be
20 cognizable, it must (1) exhibit a shared characteristic that
21 is socially visible to others in the community, and
22 (2) be defined with sufficient particularity. See Ucelo-
4
1 Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73. As the agency found, Vucaj’s
2 particular social group was not cognizable. See id.
3 Accordingly, because Vucaj failed to demonstrate past
4 persecution on account of a protected ground, he was not
5 entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear or
6 likelihood of future persecution on account of a protected
7 ground. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1), 1208.16(b)(1).
8 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish
9 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating an independent well-
10 founded fear of future persecution on account of race,
11 religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
12 group, or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);
13 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). To establish a well-founded fear
14 of persecution, an applicant must show that he subjectively
15 fears persecution and that this fear is objectively
16 reasonable, Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d
17 Cir. 2004), or “that there is a pattern or practice in his
18 or her country of nationality . . . of persecution of a
19 group of persons similarly situated to the applicant,”
20 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A).
21 Here, the agency did not err in finding that Vucaj
22 failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution
23 given that he has not been a member of the Democratic Party
5
1 since 2000 and that authorities have not expressed interest
2 in him for ten years. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d
3 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that a fear is not
4 objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the
5 record and is merely “speculative at best”). Furthermore,
6 Vucaj did not establish a pattern or practice of persecution
7 of similarly situated individuals, given that the country
8 conditions evidence did not indicate that Albanian
9 authorities are interested in former Democratic Party
10 members. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A); In re A-M-,
11 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005). Because Vucaj did not
12 meet his burden of showing that he had a well-founded fear
13 on account of any protected ground, he was not eligible for
14 asylum or withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
15 §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A); see also Paul
16 v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
17 Finally, the agency did not err in finding that Vucaj
18 failed to establish his eligibility for CAT relief because
19 there is no evidence that the police interfere with or fail
20 to protect former Democratic Party members, and the evidence
21 shows that the Albanian government is active in curbing
22 violence due to blood feuds. See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361
23 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (requiring that “government
6
1 officials know of or remain willfully blind to [torture] and
2 thereafter breach their legal responsibility to prevent
3 it”).
4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
5 DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this
6 petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
7 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
8 34.1(b).
9 FOR THE COURT:
10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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