FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFebruary 7, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 13-2011
LUIS ALBERTO UGALDE- (D.C. No. 2:11-CR-01007-MV-1)
AGUILERA, (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Luis Alberto Ugalde-Aguilera (Ugalde) appeals his conviction for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846; and possession with
intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal, Ugalde argues that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of several similar drug-
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
transporting trips under Rule 404(b). We affirm.
I
Factual Background
Ugalde and Pablo Chavez-Posada (Chavez) drove semi-trucks for a trucking
company in El Paso, Texas. On January 26, 2011, Ugalde and Chavez began a
trip on which they were to transport automobile parts from El Paso to Toledo,
Ohio. In addition to their legitimate cargo, however, they also carried over 150
pounds of marijuana. Their plan was to deliver the marijuana to Chicago, Illinois,
before continuing on to Toledo.
They did not make it far. In New Mexico, they were stopped at a border
patrol checkpoint, where border patrol agents x-rayed their truck. The scan
revealed what looked like bricks of narcotics behind the passenger seat. Due to a
miscommunication among the border patrol agents, however, when Agent Cesar
Hernandez physically entered the truck to verify the scan, he looked in the wrong
place and found nothing suspicious. Ugalde and Chavez were then released and
they drove away from the checkpoint. Minutes later, Agent Hernandez saw the
scan, realized his mistake, and the agents drove after the truck. After stopping
the truck a second time, the agents obtained consent to search the cabin again, and
Agent Hernandez found large trash bags containing bricks of marijuana. As a
result, Ugalde and Chavez were arrested.
After being Mirandized, Ugalde confessed not only to transporting the
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drugs for which he was arrested, but also to making several similar drug-
transporting trips with Chavez during the preceding year. Likewise, Chavez told
the agents that he and Ugalde had transported marijuana to Chicago on three
occasions in the preceding year. On those prior occasions, according to Chavez,
they delivered the marijuana to a Wrangler warehouse parking lot in the outskirts
of Chicago. At the Wrangler warehouse, the same black Cherokee arrived to
receive the drugs on all three occasions, although different men were driving it
each time.
Procedural History
A grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging Ugalde with
conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846 (Count 1); and with
possessing with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2).
Prior to trial, the government noticed its intent to offer evidence of the
prior deliveries under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Ugalde moved in limine
to exclude the 404(b) evidence. The district court subsequently heard arguments
regarding the 404(b) evidence, but decided to “see how the trial unfolds” before
ruling on the issue. R. Vol. III at 6.
As trial proceeded, however, a series of statements by defense counsel led
the court to conclude that the door had been opened to permit the introduction of
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404(b) evidence. First, during his opening statement, defense counsel stated that
“Mr. Chavez might testify to additional incidents where he committed acts.” Id.
at 36. Defense counsel also referred to Chavez’s knowledge of the men “who
drive a black SUV in the Chicago area” who would receive the marijuana. Id. at
37.
Second, during defense counsel’s cross-examination of Chavez, he asked
Chavez whether Chavez had told the agents that he and Ugalde were carrying
only 50 pounds of marijuana. The government objected, because it was on the
previous trips, not the January trip, when Ugalde and Chavez transported
approximately 50 pounds of marijuana.
Third, defense counsel asked Chavez about apparently conflicting
statements concerning whether Ugalde had loaded the marijuana himself, or
whether Chavez and Ugalde had loaded the marijuana together. This question
was problematic as well, because the two loaded the marijuana together before the
previous trips.
Fourth, defense counsel had the following exchange with Chavez:
Q. Mr. Chavez, you also explained when you met with [an agent]
that – you gave a description as to where you were going to
drop the marijuana off in Chicago, isn’t that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You knew that it was near a Wrangler Jean manufacturing
plant?
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A. I knew that it was a place nearby that had a company name
similar to Wrangler; at least it seemed similar by the letters to
the word Wrangler.
Q. And you also knew, Mr. Chavez, based on that report which is
in front of you, that the men who picked up the marijuana were
driving a black Cherokee, isn’t that right?
A. Yes, sir. I saw them in the mirror.
Id. at 91-92.
Fifth, and finally, defense counsel attempted to impeach Chavez by asking
him about his statement to the border patrol agents that he would receive $1,500
for the January trip. According to the government, however, Chavez’s statement
concerning the $1,500 payment concerned one of the previous trips.
At this point, the district court called a recess and heard argument from
both counsel on the issue of whether defense counsel had opened the door to the
404(b) evidence. The government pointed out that it made no sense for Chavez to
know details about the Wrangler warehouse or the black Cherokee if his
testimony pertained only to the January 2011 trip, because Ugalde had given
agents the push-to-talk number that he was supposed to dial in order to receive
directions on where to deliver the marijuana. Finally persuaded, the district court
addressed defense counsel as follows:
[Y]ou attempted, it appears, to try to make this witness look like he
was lying, or at least very confused about this incident by mixing up
the prior instances of alleged transporting, knowing that I had not
allowed the government to introduce thus far those prior instances
because of 403 concerns.
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I mean, a perfect example is the men in black stuff. The drugs never
made it to the men in black who picked up the marijuana. So it was
clear that the men in black reference was to other instances, the prior
instances, which the Court had clearly not allowed the government to
get into out of concerns of Rule 403 matters. By you raising it twice
already today, jurors are probably wondering, What men in black?
Id. at 111. The court then ruled that the 404(b) evidence could come in, and
Chavez went on to testify as to those prior drug-transporting trips.
As regards the 404(b) evidence, the district gave the jury a limiting
instruction prior to its commencing deliberations. Ugalde was convicted on both
counts.
II
The issue presented is straightforward: Did the district court abuse its
discretion in admitting evidence that Ugalde had been involved in similar drug
transactions on prior occasions? See United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1211
(10th Cir. 2011) (“[O]ur review of a district court’s decision to admit evidence
under [Rule 404(b)] is . . . subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard.”).
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act
is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This
evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as
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proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor
must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of
any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at
trial; and
(B) do so before trial--or during trial if the court, for
good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
“We consider a four factor test when determining the admissibility of
evidence under Rule 404(b).” United States. v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281, 1297 (10th
Cir. 2011). The test requires that:
(1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the
evidence must be relevant; (3) the trial court must make a Rule 403
determination of whether the probative value of the similar acts is
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4)
pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 105, the trial court shall, upon request,
instruct the jury that evidence of similar acts is to be considered only
for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.
Id. (quoting United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 762 (10th Cir. 2000)) (citing
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)).
“Rule 404(b) admissibility is a permissive standard and if the other act
evidence is relevant and tends to prove a material fact other than the defendant’s
criminal disposition, it is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and may
be excluded only under Rule 403.” Id. at 1298 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “We have consistently recognized the probative value of uncharged acts
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to show motive, intent, and knowledge, . . . as long as the uncharged acts are
similar to the charged crime and sufficiently close in time.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The threshold inquiry a court must make before
admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether that evidence is
probative of a material issue other than character.” Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686.
Taking the factors one at a time, the first factor is whether the evidence is
offered for a proper purpose. The purpose was proper here because the evidence
was offered to demonstrate, among other things, that Ugalde had knowledge of
the marijuana he was transporting in his truck.
The second factor is whether the evidence is relevant. “To determine the
relevance of a prior bad act, we look to the similarity of the prior act with the
charged offense.” United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 940 (10th Cir. 2013).
We have identified “several non-exclusive factors” to consider: “(1) whether the
acts occurred closely in time; (2) geographical proximity; (3) whether the charged
offense and the other acts share similar physical elements; and (4) whether the
charged offense and the other acts are part of a common scheme.” Davis, 636
F.3d at 1298. Those factors are met here. Both Ugalde and Chavez stated that
the three prior deliveries took place within the preceding year. The three
deliveries went to Chicago from El Paso, just as this one was supposed to. Each
delivery relied on the same deception: transporting a legitimate cargo to hide their
illegal purpose. They used the same truck for each delivery. The loads were
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packaged in the same way, placed in the same location, and pursuant to the same
financial arrangements. And the deliveries were coordinated using the same
method: a push-to-talk phone. The prior deliveries were eminently similar to the
charged incident.
On top of all that, defense counsel opened the door. “[Ugalde] cannot seek
to exclude as irrelevant . . . testimony regarding [the prior deliveries] after
opening the door for the government.” United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d
672, 678 (10th Cir. 2005). Indeed, “[r]ebuttal evidence serves a legitimate
purpose consistent with the exceptions listed in Rule 404. It allows a party to
explain, repel, contradict or disprove an adversary’s proof.” Id. at 681 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Admission of rebuttal evidence, particularly when the
defendant ‘opens the door’ to the subject matter, is within the sound discretion of
the district court.” United States v. Burch, 153 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998).
By opening the door, Ugalde amplified the probative value of the evidence.
The third factor is whether the probative value of evidence of the prior
deliveries is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. We
discern no problem here either. The probative value of the evidence was high,
because the acts were strikingly similar and defense counsel opened the door. We
conclude, therefore, that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.
The fourth and final factor is whether the trial court was asked to and did
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give a limiting instruction. Here, the court did give a limiting instruction.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence that Ugalde had been involved in similar drug transactions on prior
occasions.
Ugalde marshals four arguments against our conclusion; none are
persuasive. First, he argues that the government cannot prove that the prior
deliveries took place within the same year as the charged incident. Quite to the
contrary, the government had statements from both Ugalde and Chavez that the
previous deliveries took place within a year of their arrest. What is more, one
year is not a per se cutoff for 404(b) purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Record,
873 F.2d 1363, 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding the admission of evidence
of prior acts that occurred two years earlier).
Second, Ugalde points us to our decision in United States v. Commanche,
577 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2009), in which we held that a district court abused its
discretion when it admitted evidence that a man, who was charged with injuring
two others with a box cutter, had been convicted twice before for battering people
with a sharp object. Commanche, 577 F.3d at 1263. The sole disputed issue in
Commanche was self-defense. Id. at 1268. We held that the court should not
have admitted the 404(b) evidence, because those prior incidents were not
relevant to intent when the only issue was self-defense. Id. at 1268-69. Instead,
the prior incidents were relevant only to show a propensity to batter with a sharp
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object, which is not a permissible purpose. Id. Here, by contrast, we have a
proper purpose: knowledge. The issue was whether Ugalde knew the marijuana
was in the truck. Evidence that the January trip mirrored the previous drug
deliveries was probative of such knowledge. Therefore, Commanche is
inapposite.
Third, Ugalde argues that “the Government did not state with particularity
its justification for seeking the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence.” Aplt. Br. at
20. Our review of the record indicates that the government correctly focused its
arguments on knowledge and on rebuttal of the defense’s door-opening. Even if
we accepted Ugalde’s argument that the government did not state its justification
with particularity, however, “the error is harmless as long as a proper purpose is
apparent from the record.” United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1496 (10th Cir.
1993). This record is replete with instances that make the basis for admission
apparent.
Fourth, Ugalde argues that his counsel never opened the door. In short, we
disagree. As the government points out, it made no sense for Chavez to know
details about the Wrangler warehouse or the black Cherokee, because Ugalde was
supposed to call a push-to-talk phone in order to receive directions on where to
deliver the marijuana. Worse, however, were defense counsel’s attempts to
impeach Chavez. Chavez had been instructed by the court not to mention the
prior deliveries. Nevertheless, defense counsel juxtaposed Chavez’s statements
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concerning the prior deliveries with his statements concerning the January
delivery, all the while giving the jury the impression that his questioning
concerned only the January delivery. Chavez was left without a way to both
explain the manufactured inconsistencies and comply with the court’s
instructions. As the prosecutor put it at trial, “[w]e can drive an 18-wheel truck
through the door that he’s opened.” R. Vol. III at 96.
Finally, even if the district court erred, the error was harmless. See
Commanche, 577 F.3d at 1269 (“A harmless error is one that does not have a
substantial influence on the outcome of the trial; nor does it leave one in grave
doubt as to whether it had such effect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
evidence of Ugalde’s guilt was overwhelming. Not only was Ugalde caught
transporting 150 pounds of marijuana, and his partner implicated him in the
conspiracy, but also Ugalde confessed to the crime, and this confession came into
evidence through Agent Jesus Morales, Jr.’s testimony. Even if there was an
error to be found here, it did not have a substantial influence on the outcome of
the trial.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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