NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FEB 12 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
YOUGUANG CHENG, No. 10-71507
Petitioner, Agency No. A097-881-410
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 6, 2014**
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, MURPHY***, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Youguang Cheng, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming an Immigration Judge’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
(“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review factual findings for substantial evidence,
Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008), and we grant the petition
for review.
1. The BIA’s adverse credibility determination is not supported by
substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s adverse credibility
determination, which was based on perceived inconsistencies in Cheng’s testimony
and asylum application regarding his first alleged incident with the police. Any
inconsistency concerning precisely where on his upper body—whether on his
shoulder or neck—Cheng was beaten by the police with a baton is minor. See
Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 2003) (minor
inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of the claim are insufficient to support an
adverse credibility finding). Likewise, Cheng’s testimony that the baton was
electrified, which was not set forth in his asylum application, does not support an
adverse credibility finding. See Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir.
1996) (“[A]n applicant’s testimony is not per se lacking in credibility simply
because it includes details that are not set forth in the asylum application.”).
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Moreover, in his asylum application, Cheng used the words “slapped” and “beat”
interchangeably; there is no inconsistency with his hearing testimony in which he
stated that he was beaten, but did not specifically testify that he was slapped.
Similarly, substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s adverse
credibility finding based on perceived inconsistencies in Cheng’s testimony and
asylum application regarding his second alleged incident with the police. In his
direct and cross examination, Cheng clarified that during his second alleged
incident with police, he was beaten with an electric baton once—not more than
once, as he stated in his asylum application. He was not asked why he stated in his
asylum application that he was shocked with the electrified baton more than once.
Because he was not asked to explain why his testimony was different from his
asylum application, this perceived inconsistency cannot support an adverse
credibility finding. See Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.
2009). Moreover, where an asylum applicant “gives one account of persecution
but then revises his story so as to lessen the degree of persecution he experienced
rather than to increase it, the discrepancy generally does not support an adverse
credibility finding.” Stoyanov v. INS, 172 F.3d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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We also note that there were major problems with the translator at Cheng’s
hearing, despite the IJ’s finding to the contrary. Even if Cheng understood the
translator, the translator apparently did not understand Cheng at times and he failed
to translate Cheng’s entire testimony.1 We find the translation errors troubling, and
note that they may well account for some of the confusion in Cheng’s testimony.
See Mendoza Manimbao, 329 F.3d at 662 (“[W]e have long recognized that
difficulties in interpretation may result in seeming inconsistencies, especially in
cases, such as this, where there is a language barrier.”); He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d
1
For example, when Cheng was asked by government counsel how he
arrived in the United States, he was translated as saying all the following: (1) he
flew from Hong Kong to Russia to Cuba; (2) there was a transit “layoff” in Cuba
on the way from Hong Kong to Russia; (3) he flew from Hong Kong to Cuba to
Moscow; (4) and, again, he flew from Hong Kong to Russia to Cuba. When asked
if he went “from Hong Kong to Russia to Cuba, and back to Russia,” he replied in
the affirmative. When asked where he flew after the second time he was in Russia,
Cheng replied that he did not go back to Russia, but went “to Moscow and then
crossed the border to San Diego.” Immediately after stating that he understood the
translator, Cheng again affirmed that he flew from Russia to Cuba and back to
Russia. It was not until Cheng’s attorney stepped in, that it was extrapolated that
Cheng was saying “Mexico,” not “Moscow.” The interpreter acknowledged that
he thought Cheng had said “Moscow,” not “Mexico.”
More disturbingly, at one point in the hearing, the translator failed to
translate Cheng’s entire testimony. Evidently believing that Cheng had responded
at greater length than the translator related, the IJ asked the translator if Cheng said
anything else. The translator answered that he recited “basically what Cheng
said.” Even after the IJ admonished the translator for failing to relate Cheng’s
entire testimony, the IJ again caught the translator omitting part of Cheng’s
statement.
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593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[F]aulty or unreliable translations can undermine the
evidence on which an adverse credibility determination is based.”).
The BIA affirmed on the basis of the IJ’s adverse credibility finding alone,
and did not make a determination on the merits of Cheng’s asylum and
withholding of removal claims. Because we find that substantial evidence does not
support the BIA’s adverse credibility determination, we remand to the BIA to
address the merits of Cheng’s asylum and withholding of removal claims. See
Tekle, 533 F.3d at 1056.
2. The BIA and IJ failed to consider country conditions when finding
Cheng ineligible for CAT relief.
Finally, there is no indication that either the IJ or the BIA considered
evidence of country conditions when they determined that Cheng was ineligible for
CAT relief. Failure “to consider evidence of country conditions constitutes
reversible error.” Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010).
We note that the 2007 Country Report on China describes the Chinese
government’s crackdown on Falun Gong activity, including torturing, imprisoning,
and killing thousands of current and former Falun Gong adherents. Falun Gong
members and their families were among those specifically targeted for arbitrary
5
arrest and detention. We therefore remand with instructions to the BIA to
reconsider Cheng’s CAT claim in light of the country conditions in China. Id.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED and REMANDED.
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