Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-12866
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00174-CAR-CHW
WAYNE REDDING,
a.k.a. Wayne Reddick,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF GEORGIA,
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
WARDEN, BALDWIN STATE PRISON,
RODNEY SMITH,
Unit Manager, Baldwin State Prison,
JORDAN,
Nurse, Baldwin State Prison, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(February 18, 2014)
Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 2 of 10
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a pro se civil rights action by a former Georgia prison inmate, Wayne
Redding. He seeks damages against former prison officials under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for, among other things, subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, 1 and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 13121 et seq. Redding alleged that from
September 2011 to September 2012, while housed at Baldwin State Prison, he was
denied a bottom bunk assignment, a wheel chair, and medication. His complaint
asserted that without a wheel chair, he fell and injured himself while attempting to
transfer from his bunk to the toilet or to get medication. As a result of not
receiving his medication, he suffered seizures, elevated blood pressure and injuries
to his heart, brain and kidneys. He filed grievances and for that was subjected to
“excessive and unnecessary forces” and “assault and battery,” his wheel chair was
taken away, and he was excluded from participation in services, programs and
activities in violation of the ADA. According to his complaint, Redding was a
qualified disabled person and the prison officials deliberately refused to
1
The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed.2d 758
(1962).
2
Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 3 of 10
accommodate his disability related needs, including providing him with a bottom
bunk assignment.
The district court, on the defendants’ motion, dismissed all of Redding’s
claims—with the exception of his Eighth Amendment and ADA claims—for
failing to exhaust his administrative remedies in the prison system as required by
the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The court
dismissed his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim relating to his
lone relevant exhausted grievance—an assignment to a top bunk despite having a
bottom bunk profile—and his ADA claim, both for failure to state a claim for
which relief may be granted.
Redding now appeals, arguing that it would have been fruitless for him to
exhaust the prison’s grievance procedure, that he alleged a valid Eighth
Amendment claim, and that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether his
assignment to a top bunk violated the ADA.
I.
The dismissal of a district court action for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is reviewed de novo. Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1155 (11th
Cir. 2005).
The PLRA requires that “such administrative remedies as are available”
must be exhausted before any action can be brought under federal law regarding
3
Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 4 of 10
prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is
mandatory even in situations when utilizing a prison’s administrative procedures
would prove fruitless. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998).
There is a two-step process for reviewing a motion to dismiss based on
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077,
1082 (11th Cir. 2008). First, the court looks at the factual allegations in the motion
for dismissal and in the plaintiff’s response, and taking them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, determines whether the defendant is entitled to have the
complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. If the
complaint is not subject to dismissal under the plaintiff’s version of the facts, the
court must make specific findings of fact to resolve whether exhaustion occurred,
with the burden on the defendant to show that it did not. Id. The exhaustion bar is
applied at the time the legal action is first brought. Goebert v. Lee County, 510
F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).
Redding argues on appeal that he should be excused from his failure to
exhaust the prison’s grievance procedure, because doing so would have been a
futile exercise. However, this contention is off-base because exhaustion is always
mandatory under the PLRA. Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326. Furthermore, the
district court made specific findings, based on reliable evidence attached to the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, that Redding had exhausted his administrative
4
Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 5 of 10
remedies on only two grievances before filing his complaint, and that one of the
two exhausted complaints was irrelevant to Redding’s complaint. See Bryant, 530
F.3d at 1373 (holding that a failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the
PLRA should be treated as a matter in abatement, and therefore the district court
did not err by acting as a factfinder). Therefore, the district court did not err in
concluding that Redding had exhausted his administrative remedies for only one
relevant grievance, and dismissing all of his claims not related to that grievance.
II.
We review an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim de novo. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP,
634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). In doing so, allegations in the complaint are
accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Timson
v. Simpson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008).
A complaint stating a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). The plaintiff’s factual allegations must give rise to more than a
speculative right of relief, assuming all allegations in the complaint are true. Bell
Atl. Comp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
facts to support a facially plausible claim of relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
5
Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 6 of 10
678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Conclusory allegations are
not entitled to a presumption of truth, and legal conclusions must be supported by
factual allegations. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2010).
To prevail on a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must
show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under the
color of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir.
2001). While the Constitution does not require comfortable prisons, the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments does mandate that
prison officials “must provide humane conditions of confinement” ensuring
inmates receive adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment does not authorize judicial reconsideration of
every governmental action affecting a prisoner’s well-being, and only the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998, 117 L.Ed.2d
156 (1992).
Eighth Amendment challenges to conditions of confinement are subject to a
two-part analysis. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
First is the “objective component,” requiring a prisoner to prove the condition they
complain of is “sufficiently serious” to violate the Eighth Amendment, meaning
6
Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 7 of 10
that, at the very least, it presents an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his or
her future health or safety. Id. The risk must be “so grave that it violates
contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.”
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2481, 125 L.Ed.2d 22
(1993). Second, the “subjective component” of the analysis requires the prisoner
to show that the defendant prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind,
judged under a “deliberate indifference” standard. Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289. To
prove deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that the defendants had
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, and disregarded that risk through
conduct constituting more than gross negligence. Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718
F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013).
The district court correctly concluded that Redding had not alleged sufficient
facts to satisfy the subject prong of the conditions of confinement analysis. It may
have been negligent to assign Redding a bunk contrary to his profile, but an Eighth
Amendment claim requires conduct rising to a level above even gross negligence.
Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332. That was not shown here, as Redding did not allege
facts showing a culpable state of mind on the defendants’ part. As such, the
district court did not err in concluding Redding did not state a claim under the
Eighth Amendment.
III.
7
Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 8 of 10
Title II of the ADA, which prohibits public entities from discriminating
against disabled individuals, applies to prisoners in state correctional facilities. See
42 U.S.C. 12132; Pa. Dep’t of Corr.v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952,
1954-55, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998). To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must
show
(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was
either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public
entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise
discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that the exclusion,
denial of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s
disability.
Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Shotz v.
Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir. 2001)).
The Eleventh Amendment, however, bars a damages action against a state in
federal court, unless there has been a waiver by the state or valid congressional
override. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3107, 87
L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). This bar also applies to suits against state officials sued for
damages in their official capacity. Id. A state is not immune where Congress has
(1) unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the states’ immunity through a
clear legislative statement, and (2) acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional
authority. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73, 80, 120 S.Ct. 631,
640, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (citations omitted). The ADA states that “[a] State
8
Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 9 of 10
shall not be immune under the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the Constitution of the
United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for
a violation of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12202. The Supreme Court has held that
because the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce its
provisions, Title II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity to the
extent that it creates a cause of action for damages against states for conduct that
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158-
59, 126 S.Ct. 877, 881-82, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).
First, Redding’s argument fails because he failed to allege that his
assignment was discriminatory in any way. He stated that he was given a top
bunk despite being prescribed a bottom bunk, not that his disability led prison
officials to give him a top bunk despite his bottom bunk profile. To the extent
Redding claimed discrimination could be inferred from the absence of legitimate
penological reasons for his assignment, he merely made a conclusory allegation,
which was not specific enough to survive a motion to dismiss. See Randall, 610
F.3d at 709-10.
Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment also precluded Redding’s ADA
claim. As explained above, Redding’s allegations did not show that the
defendants’ conduct violated Redding’s constitutional rights, so they were entitled
9
Case: 13-12866 Date Filed: 02/18/2014 Page: 10 of 10
to Eleventh Amendment immunity against his ADA claims. Therefore, the district
court did not err by dismissing Redding’s ADA claim for failure to state a claim.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
10