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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-13549
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:02-cr-00243-EAK-MAP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MYRON BOBO COOK,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(February 24, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Myron Cook appeals the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to
reduce his 240-month sentence. Because the district court correctly concluded
Cook was ineligible for a reduction, we affirm.
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A jury found Cook guilty of three crack cocaine offenses in 2003. At
sentencing, the district court calculated his sentencing guidelines range as 235 to
293 months in prison. The court also concluded, however, that Cook’s prior
convictions, when coupled with the 254.16 grams of cocaine base attributable to
him, triggered a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months’
imprisonment, which was the sentence the court ultimately rendered. In 2012,
Cook moved the district court to reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(2), arguing
that Amendment 750 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines would reduce the
range he was subject to at sentencing. The court denied Cook’s motion, and this is
his appeal of that ruling.
We review de novo a district court’s conclusion about the scope of its
authority under § 3582(c)(2) to modify a defendant’s sentence. United States v.
Liberse, 688 F.3d 1198, 1200 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012). In United States v. Hippolyte,
we concluded a crack cocaine offender was not entitled to a sentence reduction
when Amendment 750 would have lowered his sentencing guidelines range but he
was actually sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum. 712 F.3d 535, 542
(11th Cir.), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 181 (2013). Cook acknowledges the similarity
of that case to his, but argues it is not controlling because Hippolyte’s mandatory
minimum exceeded his entire guidelines range while Cook’s minimum became the
bottom of his guidelines range. That difference, Cook points out, means that
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different sections of the guidelines dictated the range of sentences available to the
court when he was sentenced. Under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), Hippolyte’s range
became the mandatory minimum because that number exceeded his entire range as
calculated under the guidelines. By contrast, § 5G1.1(c) dictated only that Cook’s
sentence could not be lower than the mandatory minimum, which became the
bottom of his guidelines range.
That distinction, however, does not matter. Relief under § 3582(c)(2) is
available only when the defendant’s “sentencing range has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. Absent exceptions not applicable
here, a district court “may not reduce a defendant’s sentence to a term below the
amended guidelines range.” Liberse, 688 F.3d at 1201. Cook’s guidelines range
even with Amendment 750 could not go below the sentence he actually received
because that sentence was set by statute, not the sentencing commission. Thus,
although Cook is correct that Amendment 750 would affect the top of his range, it
could have no effect on his sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c); see also United
States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that defendant “is
not to receive,” on a § 3582(c)(2) motion, “a lower sentence than he would have
received if the amendment had been in effect at the time of his sentencing”).
“Section 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a sentence reduction if a guidelines
amendment does not have the effect of reducing the defendant’s sentence.”
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Hippolyte, 712 F.3d at 542. Cook has abandoned his argument that alterations
Congress made to the drug quantity triggers for mandatory minimum sentences in
the Fair Sentencing Act should retroactively apply to him. And he offers no other
basis upon which we or the district court could circumvent the statutory mandatory
minimum sentence that set the bottom of his guidelines range and that he actually
received. Therefore, we conclude the district court correctly decided Cook was
ineligible for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction.
AFFIRMED.
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