FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 27 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-30075
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 1:12-cr-00057-JDS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DAVID JOSEPH SANDERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Jack D. Shanstrom, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 18, 2014**
Before: ALARCÓN, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
David Joseph Sanders appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 135-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction
for distribution and possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and we affirm.
Sanders contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
consider his policy and mitigating arguments and by failing to explain the
sentence. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608
F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none. The record reflects that the district
court considered Sanders’s mitigating and policy-based arguments and found them
unpersuasive. See United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[D]istrict court’s are not obligated to vary from the child pornography Guidelines
on policy grounds if they do not have, in fact, a policy disagreement with them.”).
Moreover, the court adequately explained the sentence. See United States v. Carty,
520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Sanders also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Sanders’s sentence. See Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The sentence in the middle of the
Guidelines range is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. See id.
AFFIRMED.
2 13-30075