UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1384
JOSE ARMANDO AB EL-AMAYA, a/k/a Jose Armando Abel Amaya,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: February 20, 2014 Decided: March 5, 2014
Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen C. Fleming, LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN C. FLEMING, State
College, Pennsylvania, for Petitioner. Stuart F. Delery,
Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer Levings, Song Park, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Armando Ab El-Amaya, a native and citizen of El
Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“Board”) order dismissing his appeal from the
immigration judge’s order denying his applications for
withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.
El-Amaya first disputes the Board’s agreement with the
immigration judge’s rejection of his claim that he was entitled
to withholding of removal because he suffered past persecution,
and feared future persecution, on account of his membership in
the particular social group of individuals who resist and oppose
gang membership. Our review is limited to evaluating whether
the Board’s denial of withholding of removal on this basis is
manifestly contrary to the law or an abuse of discretion. See
Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2012)
(stating standard of review as set forth in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(D) (2012)).
Unfortunately for El-Amaya, our decisions in Zelaya
and Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011),
squarely foreclose his position. In Zelaya, we clearly held
that opposition to gangs “is an amorphous characteristic
providing neither an adequate benchmark for determining group
membership nor embodying a concrete trait that would readily
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identify a person as possessing such a characteristic.” Zelaya,
668 F.3d at 166; see also Lizama, 629 F.3d at 447. Thus, this
proposed social group fails on the particularity ground,
articulated by the Board in In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579,
584-86 (BIA 2008), and to which we accord deference. See
Zelaya, 668 F.3d at 166-67. We accordingly conclude that the
Board’s denial of withholding of removal on this basis is not
manifestly contrary to the law or an abuse of discretion. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).
El-Amaya next argues that, taken together, his
credible testimony and background evidence on conditions in El
Salvador constitute substantial evidence of his claimed fear of
future torture. We review for substantial evidence the denial
of relief under the CAT. Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 124
(4th Cir. 2007).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case,
including all of the background evidence, and conclude that it
simply does not compel the conclusion that the gangs operate
with the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government or even that
the government turns a blind eye to their criminal activities.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(1), (2), 1208.18(a)(1), (7) (2013).
We thus hold that substantial evidence supports the finding that
El-Amaya was not eligible for relief under the CAT.
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For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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