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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-12969
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:11-cv-62119-WPD
KANTI PONAMGI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SAFEGUARD SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 6, 2014)
Before PRYOR, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Kanti Ponamgi appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Safeguard Services, LLC (Safeguard), as to her claims of gender discrimination
under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (EPA). After review, 1 we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Ponamgi, a female, was employed by Safeguard from June 2006 until May
2011 as an “Insurance Specialist III,” more commonly known as a data analyst.
Safeguard’s former program director, Barbara Atlas, explained that data analysts
were paid varying salaries within established ranges based on their skills and
experience. Atlas stated that Ponamgi’s work performance was subpar, and her
starting salary was justified based on the fact she had the least prior relevant
experience of all employees hired as an Insurance Specialist III. Ponamgi’s
responsibilities were extremely limited and distinct from all other data analysts in
her classification due to her limited skills and experience. These statements were
all confirmed by Chris Anghelescu, one of Ponamgi’s former supervisors.
Atlas also explained Safeguard hired new employees at a more competitive
salary after it received a substantial contract in 2009 (the Zone 7 contract), which
created a pay disparity between old and new employees. The evidence confirmed
that Safeguard discussed internally the need to attract and retain more qualified
1
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Weeks v. Harden
Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002).
2
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individuals and proposed increasing salaries to accomplish that goal. Old
employees’ salaries were not increased in line with the new compensation policy.
Of employees designated as an Insurance Specialist III, a female hired in
December 2006 was the highest paid employee in 2009 and 2010. The ten next
highest paid employees were hired in, or later than, October 2009. The lowest paid
employee was a male hired in September 2000. The only male hired prior to
October 2009 paid more than Ponamgi had a salary of $50,000, as compared to
Ponamgi’s salary of $47,500.
II. DISCUSSION
Ponamgi asserts the district court improperly evaluated Safeguard’s motion
for summary judgment through the burden-shifting regime of McDonnell
Douglas. 2 She contends Safeguard’s assertion that new employees’ salaries were
higher because of the Zone 7 contract is insufficient to support a grant of summary
judgment. As to the experience argument, she argues Safeguard did not
substantiate its claim the new employees had sufficient experience to justify the
pay disparity. Conversely, the evidence shows Ponamgi has significant experience
and qualifications to color her claim of discrimination.
2
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
3
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To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the EPA, a plaintiff
must show that her employer paid employees of the opposite sex more for equal
work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and that are
performed under similar working conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Once a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer may avoid liability by proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the pay differences are based on any factor
other than sex. Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1078 (11th Cir. 2003).
The burden to prove this affirmative defense is heavy and it must be demonstrated
that gender provided no basis for the difference in wages. Id. An employer may
consider factors that constitute unique characteristics of the same job such as:
(1) an individual’s experience, training, or ability; or (2) special exigent
circumstances connected with the business. Id. Evidence of an employer’s routine
practices is relevant to prove that its conduct at a particular time conformed to its
routine practices. Id. If the employer meets its burden, the employee must rebut
the explanation by showing with affirmative evidence that the employer’s offered
explanation is pretextual or offered as a post-event justification for a gender-based
difference. Id.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
Safeguard. Even if Ponamgi could establish a prima facie case of gender
discrimination under the EPA, the evidence shows the salary disparity was based
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upon factors other than gender. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). First, Ponamgi
possessed limited technical skills, could not perform the same work as her
coworkers, and had the least prior experience in data analysis at her position.
Second, all of the male employees that were paid more than Ponamgi were hired
after the award of the Zone 7 contract and corresponding increase in starting
salary, or had the same salary that Ponamgi started with and would have been
receiving were it not for her poor performance review in 2010.
Ponamgi has not produced affirmative evidence to contradict Safeguard’s
defense and prove that her lower salary was based on her gender. See Steger, 318
F.3d at 1078. Although Ponamgi argues that the district court improperly
evaluated Safeguard’s motion for summary judgment through McDonnell Douglas,
the court did not rely upon McDonnell Douglas in evaluating her claim and the
record does not support her assertion. Although she asserts her experience and
qualifications warranted higher pay, this argument does not contradict Safeguard’s
assertions the pay disparity was based upon her coworkers’ superior experience
and skill, and market exigencies. Accordingly, we affirm the district court. 3
AFFIRMED.
3
Ponamgi does not raise any specific arguments as to her motion to alter or amend
judgment in her brief and that argument is thus abandoned. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of
Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989).
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