UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4451
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEREMY LEE BAILEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:10-cr-00010-WO-1)
Submitted: January 23, 2014 Decided: March 7, 2014
Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark E. Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeremy Lee Bailey appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence
of sixteen months’ imprisonment. Bailey pled guilty to
threatening the President of the United States and was
originally sentenced to thirty days’ imprisonment and a three-
year term of supervised release. Bailey violated the terms and
conditions of his supervised release when he was found in
possession of child pornography. After sentencing Bailey to
sixty months’ imprisonment on the child pornography offense, the
district court revoked Bailey’s supervised release and imposed a
revocation sentence of sixteen months’ imprisonment, to run
consecutively to his child pornography sentence.
On appeal, Bailey’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning
whether the district court erred by running Bailey’s sentences
consecutively. We have already addressed this issue in Bailey’s
prior appeal of the child pornography judgment, where we
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it chose to run Bailey’s sentences consecutively. United
States v. Bailey, 521 F. App’x 145 (4th Cir. 2013) (No 12-4666).
Bailey is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.
Bailey has filed a pro se supplemental brief alleging
that his revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable. The
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district court has broad discretion to impose a sentence upon
revocation of a defendant’s supervised release. United States
v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, we will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the governing statutory range and is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40
(4th Cir. 2006). “[W]e follow generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that we employ in our review of
original sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to
take into account the unique nature of supervised release
revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-39.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court has considered the Policy Statements contained in Chapter
Seven of the Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012),
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440, and has adequately explained the
sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in as
much detail as when imposing the original sentence. Thompson,
595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court states a proper basis for its imposition of a
sentence up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
The district court based its sentence, in part, on
factors derived from § 3553(a)(2)(A), which are not among the
factors that the district court is authorized to consider when
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revoking a term of supervised release under § 3583(e). However,
“a district court’s reference to the § 3553(a)(2)(A) sentencing
considerations, without more, [does not] automatically render a
revocation sentence unreasonable.” United States v. Webb, 738
F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013). We conclude that the district
court’s consideration of these factors was substantially in
conjunction with the enumerated § 3553(a) factors and,
therefore, that its sentence is not procedurally unreasonable.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the sentence imposed by the district court is not
substantively unreasonable. The district court considered
factors specific to Bailey and thoroughly explained its reasons
for imposing the chosen sentence, and the court’s sentence did
not exceed the statutory maximum. Therefore, we conclude that
Bailey’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal.
We therefore affirm the judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform Bailey, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Bailey requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
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Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Bailey.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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