13‐832
Smigelski v. Peters
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE
A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of March, two thousand
fourteen.
PRESENT:
Amalya L. Kearse,
Richard C. Wesley,
Christopher F. Droney,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________
Jacek I. Smigelski,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 13‐832
Ellen Ash Peters, Individually and in Official
Capacity, AKA Ellen A. Blumberg, Thomas A.
Bishop, Individually and in Official Capacity,
Lubbie Harper, Jr., Individually and in Official
Capacity, Suzanne B. Sutton, Individually and in
Official Capacity, State of Connecticut, George
Jepsen, in Official Capacity acting for the State of
CT,
Defendants‐Appellees.
_________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Jacek I. Smigelski, pro se, Southington, CT
FOR APPELLEES: Philip Miller, Assistant Attorney General, for
George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of
Connecticut, Hartford, CT
_________________________________________
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut (Chatigny, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
On appeal, Jacek I. Smigelski, a suspended attorney proceeding pro se,
appeals the judgment of the district court dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, judicial immunity, and
prosecutorial immunity. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.
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This Court reviews de novo a district court decision dismissing a
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). See Jaghory v. New York State
Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997). Dismissal of a case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district
court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova
v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). A § 1983 claim may
properly be dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the complaint on its
face reveals that the movant is entitled to absolute immunity. See generally
Day v. Morgenthau, 909 F.2d 75, 76–78 (2d Cir. 1990).
Although we are “ordinarily obligated to afford special solicitude to
pro se litigants” based on “[t]he rationale . . . that a pro se litigant generally
lacks both legal training and experience, . . . a lawyer representing himself
ordinarily receives no such solicitude at all.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90,
101–02 (2d Cir. 2010).
Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record,
we find that the district court correctly concluded that Smigelski’s claims
were barred either by the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrines of absolute
immunity. We therefore affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth
by the district court.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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