FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 11 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRYANT PENIGAR, through Faye Porter No. 12-55857
Guardian Ad Litem,
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-06805-JFW-SP
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 6, 2014**
Pasadena, California
Before: PAEZ, N.R. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Bryant Penigar appeals from a district court judgment dismissing with prejudice
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against various San Bernardino County Deputy Sheriffs
identified in his first amended complaint only as “Does,” and granting summary
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
judgment to the County on his Monell claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm.
1. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), Penigar was required to
show good cause why he had not amended his complaint to name the actual deputies
he sought to sue within the time limit established by the district court’s scheduling
order. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Penigar had not
met that burden, because Penigar failed to make any showing of good cause. Johnson
v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the
district court properly dismissed his § 1983 claim against the unnamed deputies.
2. Penigar claimed his civil rights were violated as a result of inadequate
training and supervision policies of the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department on the
use of tasers. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In
support of its motion for summary judgment, the County submitted evidence that its
training and supervision policies were reasonable. Penigar did not offer any evidence
to the contrary, nor did he designate an expert on the subject. Penigar also failed to
ask the district court to extend the discovery deadline until after it had passed.
Because Penigar failed to demonstrate the presence of an issue of genuine material
fact for trial, summary judgment was appropriate.
AFFIRMED
2